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1 INTRODUCTION: TERMINOLOGY 
1.1 The Questions of Self-irony 
Jewish people living in the United States have had to face various challenges of 
identity several times in course of the twentieth century. Historical events like the 
succeeding waves of immigration or the Holocaust as well as social trends like the civil 
rights movement or feminism compelled both individuals and communities to revise many 
of their inherited concepts regarding religious beliefs, ethnic categories or gender roles. 
Many of these changes are represented as the central theme of documentaries or pieces of 
literature and arts, and many of these representations make the impression of being self-
ironic. Let me start with five—rather diverse but not quite random—examples.    
 Woody Allen’s film, Zelig (1983) is a mockumentary on the fictive title character’s 
life, focusing on the years before and during World War II. The Jewish protagonist, 
Leonard Zelig—played by the director himself, which is a feature not indifferent from the 
point of self-irony—gains fame for his ability to adapt his outlook and behavior to the 
people surrounding him: his hair turns red and curly among Irishmen, his skin darkens 
among African American people, and he speaks professional-sounding gibberish among 
the physicians studying his peculiar condition. The film is an obvious parody of 
assimilation, however, Woody Allen does not simply make ridiculous a minority 
character’s attempt at adjusting to majority society but he rather destabilizes many 
conventional ideas. Mockumentary—the portmanteau of mock documentary—as a genre 
itself questions the sharp distinction between reality and fiction: the film represents Zelig’s 
fictitious biography in the style of documentary films directing the audience’s attention to 
the fact that what one perceives as “true story” is always already constructed. The film also 
challenges several concepts regarding identity. When asked by his psychiatrist about the 
reasons for his genuine ability, Zelig answers he behaves like his environment because 
“it’s safe ... to be like others... I want to be liked”. With an ironic turn of the plot, he 
becomes exceptional due to his intense “to be like others”. Society’s response to his 
condition is also ambiguous: the media celebrates him as the “Chameleon Man” with 
people imitating his imitative skills, whereas physicians treat his condition as an illness. 
One of them, a young female psychiatrist eventually succeeds with stabilizing Zelig’s 
personality, as illustrated by the scene in which the former patient is able to contradict 
visiting professors monitoring their colleague’s achievements. Yet the parodistic features 
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of the scene highlight that the psychoanalytic concept of a true, stable inner self waiting to 
be discovered and fully developed, is just another myth, since the allegedly healthy Zelig 
apparently keeps doing the same as before, only this time he completely adapts himself to 
the expectations of his attractive psychiatrist he is in love with, instead of the other 
professors present. Thus Zelig subtly raises many relevant questions regarding identity 
without either rejecting it or entirely submitting to it. 
 In contrast to Woody Allen’s hilarious comedy, Allen Ginsberg’s “Kaddish For 
Naomi Ginsberg 1894-1956” is far from being humorous as it fits in the tradition of the 
kaddish, the Jewish mourning prayer. Yet the original kaddish is a sanctification of God’s 
name, a fixed text to be reproduced word by word when recited for the deceased relative 
whereas Ginsberg’s poem is a highly personal confession, severely challenging 
conventional ideas concerning God by its Buddhist references as well as its ultimate line: 
“Lord Lord Lord caw caw caw” (36), which draws a parallel between God and the voice of 
repugnant and ominous carrion-eating birds. The poem is also a lyrical quest for identity 
through family history, however, the tableau of the institutionalized mother, the divorced 
father and other fighting, poor and sick relatives does not seem to offer an encouraging 
tradition to rely on. Still, Ginsberg’s “Kaddish” is far from being a refusal of a difficult 
heritage although the lyrical self does not fully acquiesce to it, either. The central, 
recurring line quoted from the mother’s farewell message: “The key is in the window, the 
key is in the sunlight at the window” (31) becomes a powerful metaphor calling for 
opening up one’s mind to new approaches. In other words, the lyrical self surveys key 
components of his identity revealing hidden contradictions and doubts in order to articulate 
questions to which the inherited and evoked paradigms cannot provide fully satisfying 
answers.  
 Dilemmas of identity and of religion are also in the focus of the short story “Angel 
Levine” written by Bernard Malamud in 1955. His narrative is a paraphrase of Job’s 
parable in a contemporary setting. Its protagonist, Manischevitz, an aging Jewish tailor 
suddenly afflicted by a series of tragic losses, is visited by a young African American man, 
who claims to be “a bona fide angel of God” (Malamud, Complete Stories 159) sent to 
save the life of Manischevitz’s fatally ill wife on the condition that he declares he believes 
in his visitor being an angel. “The tailor could not rid himself of the feeling that he was the 
butt of a jokester. Is this what a Jewish angel looks like? he asked himself” (Malamud, 
Complete Stories 165-166). The humor of Malamud’s narrative—analyzed in detail in 
subchapter 4.3—derives primarily from the juxtaposition of the disparate contexts: the 
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realistically depicted scenery and the racial issues acute in the New York City of the 1950s 
versus the biblical paradigm recalled both by the literary allusions to Job’s story and by the 
religious tailor’s conventional beliefs. In spite of the miraculously happy ending—against 
his better judgment, the tailor finally declares the visitor to be an angel and his wife 
immediately starts recovering—Malamud’s narrative is preoccupied with the prolonged 
moment of dilemma. “Manischevitz was recalling scenes of his youth as a wheel in his 
mind whirred: believe, do not, yes, no yes, no. The pointer pointed to yes, to between yes 
and no, to no, no it was yes. He sighed. It moved but one still had to make a choice” 
(Malamud, Complete Stories 165-166). The story argues for the opportunity of redemption 
through reconciliation but at the same time it does so with such incredible turns of the plot 
and such a self-mocking rhetoric that its conclusion deliberately avoids easy 
generalization. Thus Malamud manages to point out the necessity for revising or even 
transgressing outdated and questionable paradigms without completely discarding them or 
pretending to be in possession of a new paradigm able to provide the reader with an overall 
solution. Instead of offering yet another myth soon to become outdated, he emphasizes that 
the pointer tends to be “between yes and no” and the choice is not the mere result of ready-
made categories but it always depends on an individual’s responsibility in a genuine 
situation. 
 Joseph Heller’s novel, God Knows (1984) is a biblical paraphrase, too. It is a 
meditative memoir by King David, who is revising events and participants of his life while 
also talking to and commenting on the people surrounding him on his deathbed: his 
favorite wife, Bathsheba, Abishag, the beautiful Shunammite maid attending to his needs, 
his sons: Adonijah and Solomon, rivals for succeeding their father on the throne, and 
Nathan, the prophet. The characters are familiar not only from different books of the Old 
Testament but also from their reinterpretations by Shakespeare, Milton and others. Heller’s 
account is accurate and carefully true to his biblical sources, however, the modern, satirical 
voice in which King David contemplates on the issues of life and death, history, Jewish 
identity, other people and himself, might easily recall Heller’s other narratives. Thus Heller 
creates from a historical figure a metaphoric self for the aging male Jewish American 
Everyman of the twentieth century. The presence of this point of view is confirmed, for 
example, by the narrator-protagonist’s deliberately anachronistic remarks. “That’s another 
thing that pisses me off about that Michelangelo statue of me in Florence. He’s got me 
standing there uncircumcised! Who the fuck did he think I was?” (Heller, God Knows 43). 
Making David himself point out the distorting nature of artistic representation in an 
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indecent tone, the author self-ironically reminds the reader that his version is just one more 
among the other biased, inauthentic interpretations of the king. At the same time, Heller 
also emphasizes this way that the self can only articulate himself through already existing 
narratives revealing a not linear but rather circular structure of history. 
A similar idea on the unreliability of inherited stories is articulated in Pear Gluck’s 
autobiographic documentary, Divan (2003). The film tells about the Jewish American 
director’s visit in 1996 to Hungary, the homeland of her first-generation immigrant father, 
travelling on a Fulbright grant received to collect Hasidic tales from relatives still living 
there. Her quest for identity is symbolized by a quest for a family heirloom, a couch that 
prestigious rebbes used to sleep on. By obtaining the couch, Pearl Gluck hopes to reunite 
with her father, who is deeply dissatisfied with her thirty-year-old yet unmarried daughter 
because she abandoned the orthodox Hasid lifestyle. Their conflict is succinctly and 
humorously summarized by the narrator: “I tell my father that I’m also praying for a 
chasan. A husband. Even if we are not praying for the same man”. The subtle distinction 
between the Yiddish and the English words indicates the cultural distance, too. Another 
moment clearly expressing Pearl Gluck’s limbo position takes place at an international 
Orthodox Hasidic meeting, where she is trying to record people with a camera but is soon 
banished from the men’s section. There is an almost still picture of a thick and dense hemp 
net, simultaneously serving as a metaphor of the closely intertwined social network, which 
the people on the other side of the net are just celebrating, and making the visual 
impression of bars separating women from men. The sight is accompanied by the 
following narrator’s text: “Here I was in Debrecen and once again I’m banished. I end up 
thrown out. Because I wanted both—inside and outside. And you can’t have both. So I 
figure I’ll just go on my own pilgrimage—my own personal mix of family and rebbes”. 
This “own personal mix” is embodied by the couch Gluck finally buys at a flea market in 
Budapest since she is unable to obtain the original piece of furniture because its owner 
does not judge her orthodox and worthy enough to buy it. The fake couch—the fakeness of 
which is playfully revealed at the end of the film— fulfills its mission as the father finally 
sits on it, paying the first visit in his life to his daughter’s new home and unorthodox 
lifestyle. On the other hand, the couch functions as an ambiguous reminder of family 
heritage and of the ultimate inaccessibility and discontinuity of that heritage. 
 The shared feature of the examples above is that the articulation of identity is at the 
stake of each story, however, each of them constantly destabilizes the subject articulated 
by the narrative. The means of this destabilization is diverse from local textual or visual 
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ambiguities through reinterpretations of various literary and cultural conventions to the 
humorous juxtaposition of different traditions, yet they each result in a self-ironic 
representation. In other words, I understand self-irony as a rhetoric response to a dilemma 
of identity. 
 Self-irony is not the only possible answer to the challenges of identity. In Jewish 
American poetry, for instance, a pathetic voice seems to be more frequent, as it can be 
observed in Muriel Rukeyser’s “Letter to the Front” or “Israel” by Karl Shapiro, to name 
just two of the innumerable available examples. Besides, self-irony is far from being a 
unique feature of Jewish American literature. Daniel Grassian’s Hybrid Fictions: American 
Literature and Generation X, for instance, describes many of the rhetoric and narrative 
strategies I call self-ironic, as characteristic of a powerful trend in American prose 
emerging at the beginning of the 1980s. However, the playfully mixed genres and 
controversial traditions simultaneously evoked in a multicultural context, which Grassian 
focuses on, seem to prevail in the last three decades while these practices were dominant in 
Jewish American fiction already in the 1950s, as argued by Paul McDonald in the first 
chapter of his Laughing at the Darkness: Postmodernism and Optimism in American 
Culture. Consequently, I have decided to start my investigation of self-irony in the field of 
Jewish American fiction with the hope that the observations gained from Jewish American 
texts might prove to be useful for the interpretation of other self-ironic pieces of literature, 
too. 
1.2 Irony, Self-irony and Humor 
The only point that theorists of irony seem to agree on is that they cannot agree. 
Søren Kierkegaard concludes the survey of his predecessors’ approaches to irony by 
emphasizing that “the concept of irony has often acquired a different meaning” (245) 
although he hopes that “the various meanings the word has acquired in the course of time 
can still all be included” (245) in the definition of irony he wishes to offer in his crucial 
book On the Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates. A century and a half 
later, Paul de Man sounds far less optimistic about the same venture in his deliberately 
similarly titled essay “The Concept of Irony”. “[I]t seems to be uncannily difficult to give a 
definition of irony [...] It seems to be impossible to get hold of a definition, and this is itself 
inscribed to some extent in the tradition of the writing on the texts” (164). Henri Bergson 
voices strikingly similar doubts regarding the broader context of the comic—in the 
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framework of which and among many other terms he discusses irony as well—at the 
beginning of his treatise on Laughter.  
What does laughter mean? What is the basal element in the laughable? What 
common ground can we find between the grimace of a merry-andrew, a play 
upon words, an equivocal situation in a burlesque and a scene of high comedy? 
[...] The greatest of thinkers, from Aristotle downwards, have tackled this little 
problem, which has a knack of baffling every effort, of slipping away and 
escaping only to bob up again, a pert challenge flung at philosophic 
speculation. Our excuse for attacking the problem in our turn must lie in the 
fact that we shall not aim at imprisoning the comic spirit within a definition. 
(Bergson 5) 
This apparent resistance of irony—and of several related terms like comic or 
humor—to definitions may derive from numerous reasons. First of all, it is a common 
problem with the terminology in many disciplines of humanities that much of their 
vocabulary consists of words which are simultaneously used in everyday discourse, too. 
Thus the scientific precision of certain terms is often challenged by their subjective, 
intuitive, casual interpretations wide-spread among non-scholarly speakers; and what could 
be more subjective than the inclination to laugh? In particular, since it is not only 
personally but also culturally bound what one finds amusing. Bergson, for instance, 
provides his readers with profuse examples which most of the 21st century audience 
probably still feels funny but when he says “why does one laugh at a negro? [...] I rather 
fancy the correct answer was suggested to me one day by an ordinary cabby, who applied 
the expression “unwashed” to the negro fare he was driving” (Bergson 22), we 
immediately sense the distance of a century dividing us from the author. Sigmund Freud 
describes this ephemeral aspect of droll phenomena apropos of what he calls topical jokes
in his substantial book on Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. “These latter jokes 
contained allusions to people and events which at the time were “topical”, which had 
aroused general interest and still kept it alive. When this interest had ceased and the 
business in question had been settled, these jokes too lost a part of their pleasurable effect 
and indeed a very considerable part” (Freud 150).  
Besides the always changing criteria for what triggers a laugh depending on time, 
place and several other individual factors, there are difficulties specific to irony as well. 
According to the concise summary of Claire Colebrook, “irony has a frequent and common 
definition: saying what is contrary to what is meant [...] But this definition is so simple that 
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it covers everything from simple figures of speech to entire historical epochs” (1).  The 
problem is not so much that irony is discussed in such neighboring still diverse fields as 
rhetoric, linguistics, literary history, literary criticism, aesthetics, ethics or psychology, 
rather that the various disciplines and schools frequently offer incompatible results. These 
incongruities originate in the antique Greek sources, in which eiron referred to the stock 
character of the comic stage constantly gaining a victory over his opponent, the boastful 
alazon by pretending to be less intelligent and powerful than he actually was; while 
eironeia denoted his specific self-disparaging way of speaking. Although “Kierkegaard 
clarifies the relationship between irony as a figure of speech [...] and irony as a mode of 
existence” (Lang 1), scholars working primarily along either line or the other tend to draw 
rather controversial conclusions, as can be seen, for example, in the long debate over the 
concept of irony between representatives of New Criticism versus the Yale School of 
Deconstruction. Moreover, Kierkegaard himself ends up elaborating “two radically 
different concepts, and one of the difficulties of reading this text arises from the fact the 
unqualified term irony is used interchangeably for both” (34), argues Candace Lang, 
distinguishing between Kierkegaard’s two concepts as a teleological irony versus a non-
teleological one, which “eludes dialectization” (Lang 35), and which she calls humor, 
emphasizing that it should not be confused with Kierkegaard’s own concept of “religious 
‘humour’” (Lang 35).  
Synonyms and related terms complicate the picture in other ways, too. In “The 
Rhetoric of Temporality”, for instance, Paul de Man fiercely argues against Peter Szondi’s 
views on irony; however, much of de Man’s argumentation is based on Charles 
Baudelaire’s essay, “De l’essence du rire” (“On the Essence of Laughter”), a text which 
deals with the nature of the comic but does not once mention the word ironie (irony in 
French). But one can hardly blame de Man for having drawn a relevant though differently 
labeled line of thoughts into the discussion for it is true that much can be learnt about irony 
under other titles as well. Arthur Koestler’s theory of humor with its core concept of 
bisociation—the collision, fusion or confrontation of “previously unconnected matrices of 
experience” (Koestler 45)—looks revelatory when thinking about the structure and the 
power of irony, too. Apparently, irony is not easily categorized either horizontally or 
vertically. Bergson in his above cited Laughter treats irony as merely one of the numerous 
subcases of the comic; while for Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel irony is the all-encompassing, 
central term. Similarly, self-irony is just a minor, technical subcase of irony mentioned 
only twice in D. C. Muecke’s detailed monograph on Irony and the Ironic, or listed once as 
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one item among several other subtypes in the crucial essay “Irony as a Principle of 
Structure” by Cleanth Brooks, who reminds the reader that “irony, even in its obvious and 
conventionally recognized forms, comprises a wide variety of modes: tragic irony, self-
irony, playful, arch, mocking or gentle irony, etc.” (1044). Both examples indicate well the 
overall tendency of English-speaking literature on the subject of irony, according to which 
irony and self-irony are labeled by the same term, irony. In contrast, self-irony seems to be 
a category in its own right and antithetical to irony in many Eastern European cultures, as 
we can see it in the Romanian E. M. Cioran’s essay Irony and Self-irony; or in the 
Hungarian Richárd Papp’s book on Jewish humor Miért kell Kohn bácsinak négy 
h t szekrény? (Why Does Mr. Kohn Need Four Refrigerators?), which right after the 
introduction starts with the chapter: “A hagyomány mintái és az önirónia” (“Patterns of 
Tradition and Self-irony”). As Norman Knox notices in his analysis of The Word Irony and 
Its Context 1500-1755, “the rhetoricians played something of a shell game with these 
terms— irony, sarcasm, antiphrasis, asteismus, micterismus, and charientismus—for an 
illustration used in one guidebook under irony was likely to turn up in another under 
sarcasm and in another under antiphrasis” (36).  
This terminological obscurity is especially salient in the context of criticism on 
Jewish American literature, which teems of lengthy lists of the synonyms irony and humor 
without clarifying the relationship of these terms. For example, Victoria Aarons in her 
essay on “American Jewish Fiction” in the Cambridge Companion to American Fiction 
after 1945, an overview published in a series of canonizing power, does not use the word 
“self-irony” but mentions almost all the concepts close to it.  
The ironic self-parody, self-indictment, and attempts to reinvent themselves 
that characterize Roth’s protagonists begin with Eli [...] For Saul Bellow, ironic 
detachment is the means by which twentieth-century, post-industrial man 
dubiously negotiates American, especially American Jewish, life. Bellow’s 
characters are typically intellectual, self-consciously self-reflexive, humorously 
self-parodic, and inclined to sarcasm, bitter irony, and complicated scorn. (132-
133)  
Enumerations like this clearly indicate the need for this whole range of more or less 
synonymous categories as well as the embarrassing absence of clear distinctions between 
them.  
Several attempts have been made to offer a systematic overview of the field of irony. 
Kierkegaard’s dissertation; A Rhetoric of Irony by Wayne Booth; Muecke’s two books, 
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The Compass of Irony and Irony and the Ironic; most recently Irony by Colebrook; or in 
Hungarian Túl az irónián (Beyond Irony) by Antal Éva are just some of the book-length 
summaries trying to cover the whole or at least most of the rich and diverse literature on 
irony. The tendency, however, seems to be pointing from efforts to set up an all-embracing 
and ultimate system of terminology (Kierkegaard, New Criticism) towards the 
chronological surveys which accept or even welcome the co-existence of more or less 
irreconcilable, alternative approaches to irony, although authors of the latter trend usually 
also reveal their personal standpoints and preferences within the wide range of selection 
they describe. Especially, since these comparative studies of the various theories on irony 
allow the reader to notice that the controversial views are all built up of the same collection 
of abstract features originally subtracted from the complex characters and speeches of the 
eiron and particularly the prime ironist, Socrates. In each theory, however, different 
elements are highlighted while others are ineluctably suppressed or completely neglected, 
resulting sometimes in ostensibly mutually exclusive but equally justifiable definitions. 
With all these recent and comprehensive surveys available, I do not feel it necessary to add 
one more revision to the already lengthy list; neither do I feel entitled to make a 
presumably futile endeavor at settling all the debates indicated above. Especially, in the 
light of Paul de Man’s remark, who suggests that the ambiguities of irony and of the 
related terms detailed above derive from the very nature of irony itself.  “Irony is no longer 
a trope, but the undoing of the deconstructive allegory of all tropological cognitions, the 
systematic undoing, in other words, of understanding” (De Man, Allegories 301). 
Therefore I restrict myself to clarifying in what sense I use the terms irony, self-irony and 
humor in this paper. 
Many of the authors quoted above tend to distinguish two essentially different types 
of irony. Wayne Booth, for example, writes about  
[T]he fundamental distinction between stable ironies and ironies in which the 
truth asserted or implied is that no stable reconstruction can be made out of the 
ruins revealed through irony [... In case of unstable irony, the] author—insofar 
as we can discover him, and he is often very remote indeed—refuses to declare 
himself, however subtly, for any stable proposition, even the opposite of 
whatever proposition his irony vigorously denies. The only sure affirmation is 
that negation that begins all ironic play [...] (240) 
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Candace Lang seems to be explaining her aforementioned terminological suggestion for 
irony (roughly like Booth’s stable irony) versus humor (roughly like Booth’s unstable 
irony) along very similar lines. 
The ironic text is primarily “expressive,” by which I mean that it is intended to 
transmit a message, communicate an idea, or express a thought or sentiment. 
[...] If the ironist chooses to transmit this message in a less direct way than the 
“straightforward” expository writer [...] his work is nonetheless potentially 
interpretable, and generally contains indications as to how it is to be read. [...] 
The humorist writes with the conviction that language is always an essential 
determinant of thought [...] and that its semantic ambiguities and connotative 
resonances are to be explored and actualized rather than limited or suppressed. 
(Lang 5-6) 
Lang separates the two concepts chronologically, associating humor with postmodernism 
and irony with—a very broadly understood—modernism (14). However, I agree more with 
Ernst Behler, who dates the turning point separating the two radically disparate 
interpretations of irony to Friedrich Schlegel’s Fragments (73). 
There is general agreement that this decisive extension of irony to a basic 
critical term took place toward the end of the eighteenth century and coincided 
with the formation of the romantic theory of literature. Until then, irony had 
been understood mostly as a figure of speech, firmly established and registered 
in rhetoric. [... Afterwards, however,] irony is virtually identical with that self-
reflective style of poetry that became accentuated during the romantic age, and 
it is a decisive mark of literary modernity [...] (73) 
In this paper I use the word irony in its rhetorical sense (like Booth’s stable irony, 
Lang’s irony or Behler’s pre-romantic irony), that is as a figure of speech of varying 
extension, the obvious meaning of which is in conflict with the overall context including 
not only the whole of the text but the background knowledge of the implied audience 
regarding the author and the situation as well, thus pointing to the necessity of a second, 
recognizable, ironical interpretation. “Participant constellation” (80), as Katharina Barbe 
calls it, is essential here. She differentiates “three types of participants: the speaker or 
ironist, the victim or hearer, and the (evaluating) audience. Not all participants have to be 
present to render a situation ironic. However, the presence of the speaker or ironist is 
obligatory, whereas either one or the other participant (victim or audience) can be absent, 
but not both” (80). Her linguistic analysis calls attention to another significant factor in 
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addition to the translatability of irony: the ironic speaker’s purpose is always some type of 
criticism (30). In other words, irony always culminates in a laugh at someone or 
something, at the expense of the butt of irony, be it a person or an inanimate phenomenon. 
In contrast to irony as understood above, I use self-irony to denote those cases of 
irony in which the butt of the irony is the speaking or writing subject itself, thus rendering 
both meaning and subject doubtful and fragmented (like Booth’s unstable irony, Lang’s 
humor or Behler’s irony after Schlegel). This gesture of negating the ostensible meaning 
without the indication of a clear, translatable “opposite” connotation opens up the text for 
multiple possible interpretations by undermining the obvious reading with the aid of the 
context (again understood in the broadest sense of the word). While rhetorical irony allows 
the speaker to gain a superior position over the victim of the irony in a consensual, finite 
second meaning shared with the audience, self-irony infinitely brings the instability and the 
split or uncertain nature of the subject in the foreground.  
I prefer to introduce the word self-irony instead of either of the above mentioned 
terms (Booth’s unstable irony or Lang’s humor) because I acknowledge the need for 
distinction between the two types of ironies, however, I cannot fully agree with either of 
the suggested variations. The limits of Booth’s exclusively structuralist approach, 
especially regarding the cases of unstable irony, have been revealed by several post-
structuralist authors like Paul de Man or Lang herself. On the other hand, I find Lang’s 
interpretation of humor somewhat misleading. Not only because the simply orthographic 
difference between her humor and Kierkegaard’s religious “humour” do not seem practical 
but also because the plurality of meaning in humor in her interpretation is always produced 
by the uncertainty of the speaking subject. However, in several situations—in jokes based 
on puns or in certain samples of visual humor like in the genre of comics—the author 
might be of no importance and the effect can still be humorous. Therefore, I reserve irony
and self-irony for those texts in which the position of the speaker or writer is crucial, 
distinguishing between the two terms on the basis of the unity versus the plurality of the 
meaning and the stability and superiority versus the uncertainty of the subject’s position. 
This looks particularly feasible when we take into consideration that self-irony as a 
concept antithetical to irony is already widely used in Hungarian literary criticism and 
apparently in other Central-European languages as well, which is relevant to my theme 
since Jewish American literature has a double cultural background: Central European 
traditions re-interpreted in an Anglo-Saxon framework.  
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In addition to irony and self-irony, it looks necessary to have an all-encompassing 
term as well like the comic in Baudelaire’s or Bergson’s texts or irony in the post-
Schlegelian usage, covering all the more or less synonymous words related to any 
phenomena triggering a laugh. Humor could be an appropriate choice since it is widely 
used for examples of a verbal, visual or dramatic nature, even when the speaker cannot be 
identified or is of no importance. Still, there is an apprehensible contrast between humor
and the comic similar to that between irony and self-irony. The word comic has always 
implied a sense of superiority from Aristotle, who suggested in his Poetics that “[C]omedy 
is [...] an imitation of characters of a lower type [...] the Ludicrous being merely a 
subdivision of the ugly” (9), to Bergson or Baudelaire, both of whom start their 
aforementioned essays with describing the quintessentially comical scene of a man falling 
in the street and others laughing at him. Irony expresses the speaker’s superior position 
(often shared by the audience) over the butt of the irony while the comic is built on the 
(implied) audience’ superiority over the participants of the comical scene. Humor, in 
contrast, is either neutral regarding the vertical ranking of communicative roles—as in case 
of Koestler’s above mentioned theory on the bisociation of incompatible but equally 
justifiable matrices—or, moreover, manifests an egaliterian nature, as emphasized in 
Kierkegaard’s concept of religious humor or by André Comte-Sponville, who ranks humor 
among the virtues because of its essential element of empathy (211-221). Consequently, I 
use humor as the most general term in this paper. Irony versus self-irony will be 
investigated if the speaker’s or writer’s position is of importance. In addition, the comic
aspect will be analyzed if the subordinate versus superior roles among the participants of 
the communication seem to be essential for the interpretation. 
1.3 Twentieth Century Jewish American Fiction 
“Who is a Jew?” asks in the title of a chapter Simon N. Herman in his book on 
Jewish Identity and his response includes the detailed analyses of two, somewhat 
controversial judicial decisions brought in Israel. In the first case, a petitioner called 
Brother Daniel, who had been born Jewish but converted to Christianity during the World 
War II and became a monk, applied for Israeli citizenship in 1962 in terms of the Law of 
Return. The Israeli Supreme Court rejected his claim for naturalization arguing that “a Jew 
who has become a Christian is not deemed a Jew” (78).  However, “[i]n the main judgment 
Justice Silbert pointed out that according to religious law, the fact of Brother Daniel’s 
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conversion did not obliterate his Jewishness. He could still be regarded as a Jew for certain 
purposes” (78) in line with the halacha (the Jewish religious law), which says that “a 
person is a Jew if he was born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism with the 
prescribed procedures” (78). The ambiguity of the court’s argumentation lies in the fact 
that the decision is based on a religious criterion for identity while it contradicts the 
relevant rules of the very same religious code. Herman summarizes the description of the 
heated public dispute aroused by the cases he has investigated, calling attention to the 
impossibility of an ultimate definition. 
Basic differences of conception appear about the structure of Jewish ethnic 
identity; some participants in the debate sought to separate out the “religious” 
and the “national” components, while other maintained that they could not be 
disentangled. While it was widely agreed that there needed to be [...] a 
commonly accepted criterion (applicable alike in Israel and in the Diaspora) as 
to who is a Jew, questions arose about the extent to which it was feasible to 
speak of “a Jewish identity” existing everywhere as a uniform entity; [...] the 
variations [...] make it more appropriate to think in terms of a pluralistic Jewish 
society allowing for a diversity of “Jewish identities”. (81) 
The key element both in Herman’s and Judge Silberg’s approaches seems to be the 
phrase “for certain purposes”. Accordingly, I do not endeavor to offer a conclusive 
definition for Jewish American literature since the various possible meanings of each 
component are infinite and no boundaries can be drawn in these fields which could not be 
rightfully challenged. Nevertheless, boundaries must be drawn for the purpose of clarifying 
the scope of any treatise, therefore I describe below what I intend to examine under the 
title “Twentieth Century Jewish American Fiction” without claiming that my 
understanding of these terms could not be justly and significantly modified in a different 
situation. 
I prefer the phrase “Jewish American” to the alternative “American Jewish” in line 
with the “General Introduction” of the canonical Norton Anthology of Jewish American 
Literature, in which the editors elucidate that this order of the adjectives suggests that 
“Jewish American literature” is to be studied primarily in the greater context of “American 
literature”, along with other subcategories like “African American” or “Native American” 
literatures (1). The vital connections of Jewish American literature to the works and trends 
of the other available broader category, Jewish literature are not to be neglected either but I 
will refer to them in a peripheral way. In the same spirit and also for practical reasons, I 
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will study in detail only those authors who produced most of their oeuvre in English, in 
spite of the fact that the so-called “Great Tide” of first-generation Jewish authors like 
Abraham Cahan or Avrom Reyzen continued writing and publishing in Yiddish—some of 
them beside English, some others instead of it—even after their arrival to the USA. 
However, it can be argued that Jewish American literature was acknowledged by and 
integrated into the mainstream of American literature only from the moment on when the 
authors switched from Yiddish to English. Isaac Bashevis Singer’s career demonstrates this 
transition very palpably, that is why I have decided to analyze his work in detail although 
he kept writing all his life in Yiddish. Yet many of his books were first published in 
English translations strictly revised by the author himself so he is not so much of an 
exception to the rule regarding language as he might seem at first glance. As for  
Jewishness, setting religious or genealogical criteria is extremely elusive as we have seen 
in Brother Daniel’s example or even risky and grim as being possibly reminiscent of 
discriminative laws preceding and during World War II. Therefore I concentrate on the text 
rather than on the author, that is, I investigate works in which Jewish heritage and culture 
are embraced and addressed as major issues on the thematic level. This approach is in line 
with what Tresa L. Grauer proposes in her essay “‘The Changing Same’: Narratives of 
Contemporary Jewish American Identity”.  
“Jewish” functions [...] in contemporary Jewish American literature [...] as a 
powerful fiction or trope of identity. [...] Rather than depicting an “authentic 
truth” about Jewish existence, whatever is Jewish about the literature that I 
have been examining—as well as the fictional authors that it represents—lies 
in its claim to locate Jewishness within a self-conscious re-visioning of a 
Jewish narrative tradition. (42)  
Most of the writers have been motivated to deal with these themes because they come from 
a Jewish family background on which many of them reflect in their autobiographical 
statements. However, I will refer to these extra-literary texts only as secondary sources as 
my focus is the Jewish viewpoint manifest within their pieces of fiction. 
This leads to the second criterion: in what sense I use the word fiction. Literature, 
especially from a postmodern point of view, is a treacherously broad term possibly 
including any text from high-brow publications to products of popular culture or even 
documentaries. For this reason, I prefer fiction, emphasizing that my primary subject is the 
analysis of works created by the imaginative mind, and I will rely on pieces of 
documentary genres like essays, interviews or straightforward testimonies, which 
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otherwise constitute a substantial part of the relevant Holocaust literature, only as 
subsidiaries. To narrow down the still immense field, I have decided to exclude both poetry 
and drama as well, although for different reasons. The impressive corpus of Jewish 
American poetry seems to be far less rich in irony, self-irony and humor than Jewish 
American prose. Drama, on the other hand, is abundant in such phenomena but the study of 
plays would necessarily lead to the realms of stage productions and films—especially in 
the American culture—where the dominance of visual elements and other constituents of 
the performance would easily divert the attention from my main interest, which lies in the 
written literary text. For similar reasons, I do not explore the great field of jokes either 
since they primarily belong to the oral tradition, albeit several book-length scholarly 
studies have recorded and discussed this treasury of Jewish humor, too. Nonetheless, these 
restraints cannot mean the complete elimination of the genres listed above. It is out of the 
scope of this study to endeavor a full overview of the omitted fields, and I do will not give 
detailed analyzes of texts belonging to them either. Still, irony, self-irony and humor are so 
much built on the encounter and dynamics of disparate paradigms that several samples of 
prose in this paper could not be fully interpreted without references to the relevant contexts 
in poetry or film as well as to the parallel phenomena in non-American Jewish or non-
Jewish American cultures. But it must be noted that all these allusions will be used only to 
support the main line of argumentation without any claim for totality in the neighboring 
fields. 
   Finally, I need to clarify my use of the period twentieth century in this paper. As I 
have mentioned, a significant part of Jewish American literature in the first decades of the 
twentieth century was still written in Yiddish in spite of some major achievements like 
Henry Roth’s first novel, Call It Sleep; while some Jewish authors like Gertrude Stein 
produced some of the greatest books of the period without paying much attention to Jewish 
issues. Consequently, for obvious but complex historical reasons to be explored more in 
detail in the next chapter, Jewish American fiction in English started to flourish in the 
years immediately before and during World War II and it still continues to offer numerous 
outstanding books. Therefore I will survey the trends of the first half of the century 
relatively briefly in comparison with the chapters devoted to the post-war decades.  At the 
other possible end of the line, the mere number 2000 in the calendar does not look like a 
satisfactory enough reason to stop my investigation of exciting trends which started in the 
final years of the twentieth century and are still going on. So I will to cover some texts 
from the first years of the twenty first century as well.  
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To sum up, my intention in this paper is to discuss literary works in English prose 
by authors who have spent at least a decisive period of their career in the US in the 
twentieth century producing fiction, on the thematic level of which they acknowledge and 
address their Jewish heritage. The questions I would like to answer in the next chapters are 
the following. What are the issues that tend to be represented in an ironic, self-ironic or 
humorous way by Jewish American authors? Obviously, the already vast and ever-
expanding corpus of Jewish American literature makes it impossible—at least in the extent 
of a dissertation but probably in any single book—to offer a comprehensive list of all such 
themes. Therefore I will focus on some of the motifs that repeatedly appear in the work of 
several prominent authors, admitting in advance that my selection is necessarily somewhat 
subjective and far from being ultimate hence could be supplemented by further examples. 
However, the three major thematic areas to be covered in this paper already provide us 
with abundant samples for close reading analysis allowing the study of the second and 
even more important question: precisely how irony, self-irony and humor operate in these 
texts. As a result of the above investigations in detail, I will finally attempt to answer my 
last and most significant question. Namely, what are the additional hues, aspects and 
meanings that irony, self-irony and humor add to the examined pieces of fiction in 
particular and Jewish American fiction in general? Especially since detecting how 
emphases are shifted within a certain field of literature by the three literary terms to be 
explored we might learn about the nature of these concepts themselves. 
  
23 
2 THE IMMIGRANT: TRANSFORMATIONS OF IDENTITY 
2.1 Introduction: Generations 
Generation is a keyword in Jewish American literature, just like in any immigrant 
culture. However, it is not without ambiguities. Actually, it refers to two somewhat 
oppositional movements which chronologically succeed one another but partially overlap 
as well. In the first sense of the word, one can start counting generations with the 
immigrant just arriving from Europe in the USA, mostly at the end of the nineteenth or in 
the first decades of twentieth century. In the archetype of this family history, the Orthodox 
Jews of the first generation insist on tradition: they speak Yiddish, observe religion, and 
spend most of their time in the relatively closed community of the ghetto, the city version 
of the shtetl (European small town with a large Jewish population); the second generation 
makes intense efforts to integrate better into majority society: prefers to speak English, 
goes to a secular college instead of a yeshiva (Hebrew religious school), loosens up the 
rules of religion and moves out of the ghetto for the sake of a better job; while the third and 
the succeeding generations go even further in the same direction gradually forgetting first 
Yiddish then Hebrew, attending shul (synagogue) and celebrating religious holidays less 
and less frequently, giving up kosher (religiously appropriate) cooking and finally 
considering interfaith marriages. In this trend the overall tendencies of secularization in 
twentieth century society coincide with the ethnic minority’s aspiration for integration in 
the majority heading towards the dissolution of Jewish identity in a general American 
identity. This process of transformation and the involved conflicts between generations are 
thoroughly represented in several narratives from first-generation Abraham Cahan’s 
immigrant novel, The Rise of David Levinsky published in 1917 or Anzia Yezierska’s short 
stories through the work of second-generation authors like Saul Bellow or Tillie Olsen to 
the following passage of Operation Shylock by third-generation Philip Roth. 
Hebrew school wasn’t school at all but a part of the deal that our parents had 
cut with their parents, the sop to pacify the old generation—who wanted the 
grandchildren to be Jews the way that they were Jews, bound as they were to 
the old millennial ways—and, at the same time, the leash to restrain the 
breakaway young, who had it in their heads to be Jews in a way no one had 
ever dared to be a Jew in our three-thousand-year history: speaking and 
thinking American English, only American English, with all the apostasy that 
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was bound to beget. Our put-upon parents were simply middlemen in the 
classic American squeeze, negotiating between the shtetl-born and the Newark-
born and taking blows from either side (Roth, Operation 312) 
One of the most concise illustrations of the assimilation process described above is a 
collage of family photos made by Elliot Malkin, labeling each representative of his 
generation with a movement within Judaism under the title “How To Lose Your Religion 
in 5 Easy Steps”. 
The complex humor of the collage results from several factors. First of all, the title 
recalls the language of Do It Yourself brochures, which usually instruct the reader how to 
repair or construct something, while the procedure described by Malkin points to the 
opposite direction. In addition, DIY traditionally focuses on manual work: mechanical 
operations performed with and on objects; in contrast, Malkin reflects on the most spiritual 
aspect of human beings: religion. Nevertheless, the parallel drawn between the two, 
apparently and amusingly incompatible levels of life seems appropriate if one thinks about 
how DIY and family history are both bound to the home, being personal versions of greater 
and more general systems; or even illuminating since it emphasizes the active nature of 
identity transformations, calling attention to the fact that these changes are not just 
happening to the individual but one is highly responsible for them. Malkin’s choice looks 
especially apt if we consider that DIY is the everyday aspect of the self-made man’s 
essentially American myth and Malkin uses the genre—although turned inside out—to 
describe the process of his family’s Americanization. 
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The collage, at the same time, is self-ironic. In the title Malkin describes himself 
and his family’s accomplishment as a loss, still, his standpoint is more ambiguous than the 
expression of mere grief over a gradually and irrevocably lost religion. Conceptually, his 
family tableau is built upon the model of a family tree displaying names and portraits. The 
family members, however, are not positioned vertically, placing the first known ancestor 
either at the top, suggesting his superiority, or at the bottom, as the root or the trunk of an 
actual tree, implying that the representatives of the latest generation would be the fruits, the 
fulfillment of the family’s accumulated efforts. Contrastingly, Malkin’s representation is 
horizontal: the generations are set along an imaginary timeline, next to each other, neither 
of them dominating the picture. Moreover, they are arranged into a sine wave insinuating 
that the progress should not be apprehended as a simple, straight line leading from the 
fixed starting point of the first forefather to a certain direction but as a constant oscillation 
within a certain range of possibilities. This layout visualizes that the different trends of 
Judaism indicated in the inscriptions are not so much succeeding phases of degradation—
as the title explains—but rather equal and simultaneously co-existing versions of a faith, as 
it actually is among contemporary Jews. Consequently, Malkin’s own “unaffiliated” point 
of view, which would manifest the position of final loss according to the title, appears at 
the same time as one more justifiable version of the same heritage, with the two possible 
interpretations of the author’s statement—the loss versus the maintenance of tradition—
mutually questioning each other. The choice of the word “unaffiliated” intensifies this 
ambiguity, since it is a declaration that the person is not the member of an organization, 
which in this context means that Elliot Malkin considers himself not to belong to any 
church; at the same time he portrays himself in a family tableau, affiliate to a family 
portrayed as a series of representatives of a religion. Below the collage, he provides a short 
biography for each individual’s portray, concluding his own with the following outcome: 
“You've lost your religion but still identify strongly as a Jew”. This distinction between a 
religious versus an ethnic and cultural identity might explain to some extend but by no 
means erases the complex and problematic nature of Jewish identity revealed above.  
Apparently, Malkin’s position in this collage is that of the liberal ironist, as 
Richard Rorty coined it in his philosophical treatise on Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. 
He uses the word ironist “to name the sort of person who faces up to the contingency of his 
or her most central beliefs and desires” (xv). In the same spirit, Malkin takes his agnostic 
or atheistic stand as just one option among several others, which he acknowledges as 
alternatives and ranks at the same level as his own approach although he does not entirely 
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agree with any of them. Just like Rorty, who dedicated his book to his ancestors: “In 
memory of six liberals: my parents and grandparents” and emphasized the historically 
determined and therefore contingent nature of one’s set of beliefs, or as Rorty calls it: final 
vocabulary, Martin also takes (family) history as the starting point of his quest for his own 
personal vocabulary, which, nevertheless, he does not claim to be any better or more true 
than the ones he inherited but does not share any longer. 
 The concept of vocabulary as a decisive factor dominates the passage by Roth 
quoted above, too. There the narrator, who bears the same name as the author, portrays the 
generation of his parents as rather comical figures stuck in between two powerful 
identities, ineffectively trying to make a compromise between the strong Jewish heritage of 
the “shtetl-born” grandparents and the equally strong, American ambitions of the “Newark-
born” grandchildren. However, the firm position of the narrator rejecting his Jewish 
heritage for the sake of a new, assimilated identity is simultaneously questioned by the 
context since this meditation on the relationship between generations is motivated by the 
scenery: the narrator-protagonist is sitting alone in an empty room with a blackboard 
bearing a short Hebrew text, unintelligible for him, which reminds him of the Hebrew 
school he used to attend. This instructive classroom situation is a condensed, metaphorical 
model of the whole novel, in which Roth is compelled to reassess his views regarding his 
Jewish identity as he gets involved in an adventurous and dangerous plot taking place in 
Israel. The conclusion he draws later in the passage contradicts the fully assimilated 
position he claimed to possess earlier in the novel. „The cryptography whose signification I 
could no longer decode had marked me indelibly four decades ago: out of the inscrutable 
words written on this blackboard had evolved every English word I had ever written.” 
(Roth 312) In the light of this recognition, it is no longer the generation of the parents 
which looks comical aspiring in vain for an impossible compromise but the generation of 
the narrator, which beguiled themselves thinking that they can absolutely get rid of their 
past. On the other hand, the central theme of the Operation Shylock is the wide range of 
doubts regarding fake and real identities. Accordingly, both the classroom and the life 
threat under the pressure of which Roth has been meditating on the issues above turn out to 
be a bogus thus questioning the validity of the lessons he learnt and the statements he made 
in these circumstances. As a result, no final, stable propositions seem possible in the self-
ironic structure of the novel which offers only somewhat controversial standpoints, among 
which the speaker’s mind oscillates due to each turn of the plot, somewhat similarly to the 
movement described by Malkin’s sine wave. 
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 Just like Roth, who is forced in his narrative by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
driving the plot to reevaluate his identity, American Jewry also had to reconsider their 
relationship to Jewish tradition due to a historical trauma, the Holocaust. Beforehand, 
several authors with a Jewish family background did not judge this aspect of their identity 
essential enough to focus on it in their work; afterwards, many of them turned their 
attention to it. A good example for this shift is Karl Shapiro’s collection, Poems of a Jew, 
published in 1958, in the Introduction of which he reflects on “The hideous blood purge of 
the Jews by Germany in the twentieth century” (xii) and adds that “[t]he poems here were 
written over a long period of time and are extracted mostly from volumes which have 
nothing to do with the present theme. But the undercurrent of most of my poems is the 
theme of the Jew, and for this reason I collect these examples now as a separate 
presentation.” (xii). So what was only an “undercurrent” all through his career is now 
brought into the foreground. Of course, the temporal gap between the years of World War 
II and 1958 is not insignificant. To understand the connection between the two, apparently 
distant events—the trauma of the massacres in the 1940s and the book of poetry published 
at the end of the 1950s—one needs to take into consideration that “[o]ne of the 
characteristic features of PTSD1 is its belatedness” (7), as Stanislav Kolá  points it out in 
his “Introduction” to the Reflections of Trauma in Selected Works of Postwar American 
and British Literature.  
The second meaning of the word “generation” in Jewish American literature 
belongs to the terminology of Holocaust and trauma studies. Trauma studies are rooted in 
the psychological and medical diagnoses of PTSD by Freud and his contemporaries, who 
examined veteran soldiers returning from the fights of World War I, however, the 
independent researches were united to form the great, interdisciplinary field of trauma 
studies after World War II, in close relation to the similarly complex investigations of 
Holocaust studies. The “intergenerational and transgenerational transmission of trauma”, 
or in other words, the “idea that trauma can be passed on to descendants was initially 
explored in the field of the Holocaust studies” (Kola  11). In this sense, first generation 
survivors are the individuals who were the victims of Holocaust themselves; second 
generation survivors are their children; while third generation survivors are the 
grandchildren. Holocaust and trauma studies have revealed that the victims—both as 
individuals and communities—often respond to the atrocities with evasion and repression 
                                                 
1 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
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since the traumatic experiences fall so far out of the scope of the available conceptual 
systems that they are unable to interpret and process the trauma inflicted upon them for a 
long time. This phenomenon explains why the first literary testimonies on Auschwitz, like 
Primo Levi’s If This Is a Man (1958) or Eli Wiesel’ Night (1960), were written and 
especially published in English translation so many years after the events. In other words, 
the Holocaust was fully recognized as a major issue of Jewish American literature with a 
significant delay, but as it entered the mind it started to dominate it as well.  
In that respect, the two interpretations of the word “generation” work in opposite 
directions. In case of the assimilation process, later generations get gradually further from 
the tradition brought by the immigrant ancestors—as illustrated by Elliot Malkin’s family 
tree—while in the posttraumatic narrative the first generation survivors’ futile attempts to 
forget and move one as well as the second generation’s difficulties tend to raise interest in 
the narrative of the family history typically culminating and offering resolution by the time 
of the third generation. In the particular case of the Holocaust and its American reception, 
the situation was further complicated by the peculiar position of the already more or less 
assimilated American Jews contemporaneous to the European victims. They had to realize 
that their European Jewish hinterland was practically erased since hardly anyone was left 
there to maintain the tradition from which they arrived. The previously rather individual 
decisions regarding assimilation became burdened by an increased sense of responsibility 
for the Jewish community as a whole. The interplay of these dilemmas and of the wide 
range of various personal responses resulted in the “Literary Renaissance among American 
Jews” (157) starting in the late 1950s, as pointed out by Cynthia Ozick in her crucial essay 
Toward a New Yiddish. 
Moreover, the shift from ambitions of assimilation towards an increased 
consciousness of heritage among the American Jews coincided with a major conceptual 
shift in American society in the 1960s. Beforehand, the United States were considered to 
be a “melting pot” in which people of diverse ethnical background amalgamated. The 
process of assimilation was primarily understood as the individual’s adaptation to the 
majority. From the 1960s, however, more and more attention was paid to different 
minorities and their unique values. The metaphor of the “melting pot” was gradually 
substituted by the concepts of the “salad bowl” or “mosaic culture”, in which the ultimate 
goal of a homogeneous society is replaced by the co-existence of more or less different 
groups based on mutual tolerance and respect (Yang 86). The need for such a multicultural 
view emerged not quite independently from the lessons of the World War II but it was 
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motivated by other factors as well—the Civil Rights Movement, for instance—and it 
influenced people far beyond the Jewish community. 
 In the context outlined above, phenomena belonging to the first versus the second 
interpretation of generations cannot be fully and clearly separated. Accordingly, Chapter 2 
of this paper focuses on the steps of the assimilation process of immigrants and their 
descendants while Chapter 3 is primarily devoted to fiction motivated by and concentrating 
on the Holocaust from the point of view of the first, second and third generation survivors’ 
generations. Nonetheless, it has to be kept in mind all along the investigation that in case of 
individual authors the two categories above often coincide so the two themes are mutually 
and unavoidably influenced by each other. 
2.2 From the Shtetl to the City 
  
The archetypal scene of European Jewish life before the World War II was the 
shtetl while most of the immigrants arriving at Ellis Island entered the United States 
through the similarly emblematic American landscape: New York City. Moving from a 
small town to a metropolis influenced numerous aspects of life both for the individual and 
for the various units of community from the nuclear family to the newly emerging urban 
neighborhoods. The change of daily practices often questioned and altered not only long-
established customs but also the essential value systems they were based on and these 
transformations frequently manifested as conflicts between the “old” and the “new”.  
Abraham Cahan’s short story, “A Ghetto Wedding” (1898) tells about the marriage 
of two first-generation immigrants in New York City. Wedding is a rewarding theme in 
general and it is especially so in case of a Jewish narrative published in an American 
context. In addition to the romantic appeal of love stories culminating in marriage, the 
wedding ceremony grants an exquisite subject, too, because it takes place at the 
intersection of the personal and the social, allowing the author to depict the intimacy of the 
couple and the great tableau of the family and the guests simultaneously.  Moreover, a 
WASP audience can find a special interest in the exotic details of the Jewish wedding 
ritual; no wonder that the American image about Jewish life at around the turn of the 
century has long been dominated by the musical Fiddler on the Roof, which also centers 
around the theme of marriages. However, Hollywood expectations regarding a romantic 
story with a proper happy ending are not completely fulfilled either by Sholem Aleichem’s 
stories about Tevye, the dairyman and his daughters—which served as the basis for the 
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musical—or by Cahan’s story. Both writers—and many of their contemporaneous 
colleagues in Yiddish literature—offer instead a gentle humor verging on sadness, which 
results in an air of realistic authenticity in spite of the narrative voice slightly reminiscent 
of folk tales. 
 The complication in Cahan’s story derives from the poverty of the young couple in 
love. Nathan would acquiesce to a modest wedding but his sweetheart, Goldy insists on a 
respectable wedding. “It is to be noted that a ‘respectable wedding’ was not merely a 
casual expression with Goldy. Like its antithesis, a ‘slipshod wedding’, it played in her 
vocabulary the part of something like a well-established scientific term, with a meaning as 
clearly defined as that of ‘centrifugal force’ or ‘geometrical progression’” (Norton 
Anthology 125). The third person singular narrator ironically exaggerates when compares 
something so subjective and down-to-earth as a wedding to hard sciences. On the other 
hand, the implications of the simile are extremely precise. A scientific concept functions 
only if it is clearly defined and consensually used by all the experts in the field; 
consequently, its modification or confutation necessarily influences or may even destroy 
the whole system. Likewise, Goldy’s personal vocabulary—used here in a sense similar to 
Rorty’s term, signifying one’s essential set of beliefs—with its central term of a 
“respectable wedding” represents the whole value system of the shtetl she comes from. The 
conflict develops as Goldy not only acts according to tradition but also expects other 
members of the community to do so.  
 But the Jewish ghetto of the Lower East Side in Manhattan is far from the shtetl. 
The people are partly the same—the story is populated by relatives and friends living in 
closely related neighborhoods—but the old rules do not quite apply. This is indicated by 
the story by the couple’s changing approach to the wedding. In the first phase, they have 
enough money only for a “slipshood wedding”, which Goldy rejects, so they wait and work 
for each other. However, economy is down and jobs are rare so instead of accumulating 
more money they have to live on their dwindling savings. Thus, after two years, Goldie 
agrees to have the modest ceremony and apartment which they can afford. In this second 
phase, ambitions are turned upside down: the sum of one hundred and twenty dollars, 
which did not seem satisfactory in the beginning, becomes now the very goal of their joint 
efforts. The enthusiasm with which Goldy argues and strives for the newly set but 
previously disdained target ironically questions the validity of her beliefs, especially since 
the constituents of Goldy’s definition for a respectable wedding are all the material 
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markers of social status: proper clothing, a large ballroom full of guests and certain refined 
pieces of furniture in the newlywed’s home.  
Still, the narrator does not portray the betrothed or even the fiancée as comical 
figures. The reader is not only addressed directly in the opening sentence of the story but 
placed in the middle of the scenery. “Had you chanced to be in Grand Street on that starry 
February night, it would scarcely have occurred to you that the Ghetto was groaning under 
the culmination of a long season of enforced idleness and distress” (123). Thus the events 
are not represented from a superior observer’s point of view but from the street level, 
where the reader is also positioned as one of the passers-by, just like the others, including 
the protagonists depicted in the following passages. This technique makes the situation 
more personal invoking empathy, which is the basis of humor according to Comte-
Sponville. The third phase of the plot starts with Goldy’s idea that spending all of the 
couple’s money on a fancy ceremony instead of sharing it between the modest wedding 
and the basic furniture necessary for their first common household would compel the 
guests to bring gifts matching the level of the celebration so the couple could finally get 
everything she dreams of. Nathan expresses his doubts first but soon complies with the 
plan simply to make his beloved happy. And the narrator’s voice is full of sympathy, too. 
The spiritual aspect of such ephemeral objects like a satin gown or a Brussels carpet is 
emphasized for instance by the scene when Goldy mails a piece of carpet she got as a 
sample for free in the shop to her mother. To Nathan’s inquiry, “how do you know that is 
just the kind of carpet you will get for your wedding present?” Goldy merrily answers: “As 
if it mattered what sort of carpet! I can just see mamma going the rounds of the neighbors, 
and showing off the costly table-cloth’ her daughter will trample upon. Won’t she be 
happy!” (127). In other words, Goldy is not depicted as a simple, material and egoistic girl 
but as someone who goes beyond her limits to meet the social norms she believes to be 
essential. 
The failure of the wedding is inevitable and faithfully described in detail, 
nonetheless, the closure of the tale is not depressing at all. Very few of the invited guests 
arrive and even fewer of them send or bring some cheap presents since the whole 
community is afflicted by unemployment. Moreover, Nathan and Goldy have no money 
left to call for a carriage and as they are walking home in the middle of the night they are 
insulted and humiliated by a gang of loafers. Still, most of the human responses to the 
gloomy situation are heart-warming: “[T]he bard [...] stirred by an ardent desire to relieve 
the insupportable wretchedness of the evening, outdid himself in offhand acrostics and 
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witticisms. Needless to say that his efforts were thankfully rewarded with unstinted 
laughter” (132); Goldy whispers in Nathan’s ears with sincere affection: “My husband! My 
husband!” (132), and he answers with calling her “my pearl, my birdie” (133). The final 
scene displays the couple in the dark street heading towards their rented home, “being only 
themselves in the universe, to live and to delight in each other” (134). So the whitewashed 
walls and empty rooms of the apartment they are trying to reach symbolize not only the 
loss or absence of old values but also the promise of a fresh start free of blocking 
conventions.  
The humor prevailing in Cahan’s story is characteristic of many Jewish American 
narratives portraying the difficulties of first generation immigrants. The sympathetic but 
realistic representation of ambiguities and the more or less open endings of plots allow 
authors like Cahan or Bernard Malamud to avoid a didactic voice still to suggest that one 
should embrace life as it is, accepting its faults, doubts and misfits, opening up one’s mind 
to deal with these challenges and to adapt to reality instead of trying to force any 
preconceived conceptual system on it in vain. I. B. Singer’s humor, on the other hand, 
derives not simply from accepting and revealing the plurality inherent to his subjects but 
also from generating uncertain and multiple meanings by the employment of unreliable 
narrators and by the ironic use of the Yiddish literary tradition. This modernist gesture of 
writing between quotation marks may be one of the reasons that made his oeuvre so 
outstandingly popular among the English-speaking audience, especially if we consider that 
he became acknowledged around the middle of the 20th century when New Criticism, 
which favored Modernism, was the dominant school of literary theory in the US. 
Isaac Bashevis Singer is possibly the most prominent representative of Yiddish 
literature, or at least his receiving the literary Nobel Prize in 1978 suggests so. In his 
acceptance speech he also emphasized this aspect of his work: “The high honor bestowed 
upon me by the Swedish Academy is also a recognition of the Yiddish language”. 
However, his identity as an author is far from being unambiguous, as reflected by the 
various pennames he used. Leslie Fiedler, in his essay on “Isaac Bashevis Singer; or The 
American-ness of the American-Jewish Writer” expounds convincingly how each 
pseudonym corresponds not only to a certain period in Singer’s career but also to a specific 
authorial position. Born in Poland in 1902 as Izaak Zynger, the young writer immigrated to 
the US in 1935 fleeing from Nazi threat and following his brother, Israel Joshua, already 
an established belletrist at the time. Upon his arrival to New York, Isaac first worked for 
the Yiddish magazine The Daily Forward under the name “Isaac Warshafsky”. Later on, 
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he developed the American persona “Isaac Bashevis Singer”, the middle name of which 
means “Bathsheba’s”, referring to his mother, and he published most of his work first in 
English translation under this name. Whatever he decided to publish in its Yiddish original 
as full-length volumes, went to press bearing a third version of his name, “Isaac Bashevis” 
on the cover. As Fiedler puts it, “Son of his native city as a journalist, son of his mother as 
a Yiddish novelist, he is his father’s son as an American author; or perhaps rather the 
acknowledged brother of Israel Joshua Singer” (75). It could be debated how much the 
name by which Singer became famous reflects his father’s, his mother’s or his early 
deceased brother’s heritage, or why the Warshawian tradition is emphasized in the work of 
the Yiddish essayist while it is omitted from the American belletrist’s self-image; but these 
questions would be slightly off the point of this paper. What seems more important here is 
the conscious act of the author creating himself instead of taking his identity for granted.  
Singer’s experimenting with versions of his own name as an author reminds me of 
Kierkegaard’s gesture of publishing some of his work under different pseudonyms, which 
many critics evaluate as ironical (Evans 68). Yet there is an essential difference between 
the two authors’ ironic self-multiplication. Whilst Kierkegaard’s insertion of imaginary 
writers like Johannes Climacus or editors like Victor Eremita calls the reader’s attention to 
the distance between the originally intended meaning and the final text thus revealing the 
mediated nature and consequently the unreliability of any utterance and its interpretations, 
Singer’s self-ironic separation of his authorial identities accentuates more personal 
concerns: his commitment to his family and his hometown, and the discrepancies of the 
tradition he grew up in versus the one he chose and made success in as an adult. The 
philosophical questions raised by the ambiguities of Kierkeagaard’s pseudonyms express 
doubts regarding theories on truth and the subject claiming to make valid statements about 
it. In contrast, Singer’s approach is more emotional and literary: keeping apart different 
fields of his activity he highlights that neither identity nor the culture inherited and 
produced can be treated as part of a homogeneous unity, although parts of his name 
recurring in each variant of his pennames also imply that the fragments are not completely 
independent either. 
I. B. Singer often plays this destabilizing game not only with his own identity as an 
author but also with the narrative voice. The title story of his first collection, Gimpel the 
Fool starts with Kierkegaardian self-irony negating the truth of the subject’s statements in 
the moment they are articulated.  “I am Gimpel the fool. I don’t think myself a fool. On the 
contrary. But that’s what folks call me” (Singer Collected 3). In many other stories like 
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“The Unseen”, “The Destruction of Kreshev”, “Zeidlus, the Pope” or “The Last Demon”, 
the narrator is the “Evil Spirit”, who is notorious not only for its wicked deeds but even 
more for his ambition to manipulate people: characters and readers likewise. Consequently, 
the atmosphere of the shtetl represented otherwise with a sensitive nostalgia makes an 
enchanting and a threatening impression simultaneously, like many fairy tales, and the 
morals proposed by the stories are ambivalent. For example, “Joy” tells about the Job-like 
sufferings of a devoted rabbi who loses his children one after the other to consumption and 
as a result rejects his faith but remains a benevolent person and seems to have a revelation 
on his deathbed. “Well, now everything is clear.” [...] the rabbi murmured. “One should 
always be joyous.” Those were his final words.”  (Singer, Collected 37) On the one hand, 
the rabbi’s final words clearly contradict the atheist views he logically developed along the 
plot, on the other hand, his behavior—his grief, his doubts as well as his good deeds—are 
so convincing that the reader is motivated to believe in his sincerity and wisdom in case of 
his last statement just like previously, and endeavors to find coherence behind the apparent 
absurdity; which is quite in line with the conventional interpretation of the story of Job 
serving as a model for Singer’s plot as well; and which is the very tradition fully and 
persuasively refused beforehand. Thus the self-ironic multiplication of possible meanings 
elicits both sympathy and a very active participation on behalf of the reader. 
This maintained ambiguity of a strong nostalgia mixed with signs of the awareness 
that the object of desire is only imaginary can be among the reasons explaining why “The 
Little Shoemakers” by Singer is one of the most popular stories on first-generation Jewish 
immigrants. The tone of the folk tales is nowhere more impressively dominant in Singer’s 
oeuvre than in this saga of the shoemakers’ dynasty from the Polish shtetl, Frampol. After 
introducing the family tree with several generations pursuing the same profession and 
bearing the same first names as the five sons of the founder of the trade, the narrator tells 
the story of Abba, whose seven sons, one after the other, immigrate to America. Finally, 
under the immediate threat of Nazi invasion, their father also follows them and the whole 
family is happily reunited over the ocean. After all the tribulations, the story closes with a 
completely and unusually happy end: the old grandfather overcomes his initial feelings of 
being a foreigner and he is integrated both into the large family of his descendants and 
their prospering trade of a shoe factory. The only dissonant element is the way the eldest 
son and the founder of the American factory, Gimpel, publicly announces the arrival of his 
father. “In the ads Gimpel published in the papers, he had proudly disclosed that his family 
belonged to the shoemaking aristocracy” (Singer, Collected 54). Not only this strongly 
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American gesture of exploiting an intimate family matter for the sake of invigorating the 
trade sticks out of the basically emotional approach of the context but also the language of 
the passage, which concisely paraphrases the family history in the businesslike style of 
newspaper advertisements. Still, this incongruity does not render all the rest of the story 
incredible. The contrast only stresses the fairy tale quality already indicated by the little 
song recalled in many crucial moments of the plot listing the names of the little 
shoemakers as well as by the overall structure of the saga. These elements keep the readers 
permanently alert to the fictitious nature of the narrative.  
Beside the author and the narrator, the characters’ level can be dominated by irony 
and self-irony as well. Similarly to the previous example, Bernard Malamud’s short story, 
“The First Seven Years” also takes place in the milieu of the shoemaker trade in New York 
City, in a small workshop owned by a first-generation Jewish immigrant from Poland. 
Feld, the shoemaker is most concerned about the impending marriage of her nineteen-year-
old daughter, Miriam. The father would prefer Max, a college boy and future accountant 
from the neighborhood but the girl seems uninterested, although she obediently goes for 
the few dates Max proposes at the request of Feld. The situation is further complicated by 
Feld’s assistant, Sobel, a young World War II refugee, also from Poland, who has been 
working deftly and honestly for seven years but involuntarily eavesdrops on the first 
conversation between Feld and Max and rushes out from the workshop without any 
explanation. The story is told by a third person singular narrator from Feld’s point of view, 
which might make the reader inclined to identify with him. However, the narration works 
covertly but constantly against that. The opening sentence represents the protagonist 
daydreaming about Miriam’s wedding in the workshop. “Feld, the shoemaker, was 
annoyed that his helper, Sobel, was so insensitive to his reverie that he shouldn’t for a 
minute cease his fanatic pounding at the other bench” (69). Ironically, it is Feld who turns 
out to be insensitive to the long-growing affection between Sobel and Miriam.  
 Another example for the irony of the narration could be the scene of the above 
mentioned initial conversation between Feld and Max. The whole situation is turned upside 
down in several respects. First of all, the romance is proposed neither by Max nor 
Miriam—who have not even met yet at this point—but the father, who tries to play the role 
of the matchmaker. The dialogue here is on the verge of the ridiculous both from an 
American point of view concerning romantic love and in the context of Jewish tradition as 
well since Feld is far from being an objective professional in the matchmaking trade; his 
reveries about Max make him look and act more like an immature girl detached from 
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reality: like someone he considers his daughter to be. On top of all, the whole dialogue 
about the date is mingled with a business transaction as Max originally entered the shop to 
get his worn shoes fixed, and the mixture of the material and financial with the spiritual 
and romantic is one of the most conventional techniques producing a humorous effect. 
However, the reader is impressed in “The First Seven Years” not so much by an ironical 
narrator pointing out the protagonist’s delusions but rather by Feld’s self-irony since he is 
aware of and repeatedly reflects on the awkwardness of his position all along the scene. 
For instance, when he offers a discount on mending the shoes to encourage Max, he 
immediately makes a mental note about the mistake of integrating the two disparate 
processes in the gesture of setting the price. “At once he felt bad, for he usually charged $ 
2.25 for this kind of job. Either he should have asked the regular price or done the work for 
nothing” (71). 
 Self-irony culminates at the end of the story, in the closing conversation between 
Sobel and Feld, who is finally forced by his ailments and business difficulties to plead his 
assistant back. Sobel cannot avoid it any longer to disclose that he has been serving Feld 
for such a low wage for such a long time in the hope of marrying Miriam, who seems to 
return his sentiments though they have never overtly spoken about love without the 
father’s permission. The shocked Feld bursts out: “Sobel, you are crazy,” he said bitterly. 
“She will never marry a man so old and ugly like you” (77) but a moment later he corrects 
himself: “Ugly I didn’t mean,” he said half aloud. Then he realized that what he had called 
ugly was not Sobel but Miriam”s life if she married him. He felt for his daughter a strange 
and gripping sorrow, as if she were already Sobel’s bride, the wife, after all, of a 
shoemaker, and had in her life no more than her mother had had” (78). Feld’s 
observation—articulated by the narrator—ironically turns against his own standpoint: he 
has to recognize that what he rejects in Max is his own identity. On the other hand, he does
admit this recognition—although only to himself and not to Sobel—so in this sense the 
climax allows for a reconciliation of the conflict due to the protagonist’s self-irony. A very 
similar resolution appears in another story by Malamud, “A Summer’s Reading”, the 
careless adolescent protagonist of which goes straight and starts to educate himself after 
the self-ironic guidance of an old friend of his, who admonishes him “George, don’t do 
what I did” (172).  
 It must also be noted that Malamud’s story is an ambiguous paraphrase of a Biblical 
incident, “The First Seven Years”—as the title indicates—of Jacob serving Laban for the 
love of Rachel (Gen. 29. 15-30.), adapted to a contemporary urban setting. In the Old 
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Testament Laban cheats on Jacob, replacing his younger daughter, Rachel with his elder 
daughter, Leah on the wedding night so that he can exploit Jacob’s expertise for another 
seven years. Contrastingly, in Malamud’s version Feld is only inadvertent and not wilfully 
deceptive and the end of the plot is left open with the father asking for two more years of 
patience from Max before consenting to the marriage proposal. The Biblical narrative 
focuses on Jacob’s position and approves of his deeds in a speech allegedly conveyed by 
the angel of God while the modern version concentrates on Feld (the counterpart of Laban, 
the father) and it offers no omnipotent voice declaring which of the characters would be 
completely right or wrong. While both narratives suggest that the claim of a new 
generation wins over the aspirations of the elders, Malamud is not only more sympathetic 
with the old generation represented by Feld but his distinction between the generations is 
less sharp, too. For instance, Feld’s main, self-ironic objection against Max is that he is 
“old”, by which he refers to the suitor’s age as well as to his first-generation immigrant 
status. Besides, Feld’s ambitions to foster his family’s assimilation by marrying his 
daughter to a better assimilated accountant are hindered by his daughter’s preference for 
the “soul” familiar from the shtetl, which she esteems so high in Sobel and misses form 
Max (75). In other words, her choice is justified by the new American concept of young 
people choosing their spouse instead of the old routine of marriages decided upon 
primarily by parents but the object of her desire is a representative of the “old” world. 
Moreover, the author’s gesture of conveying a modern dilemma by retelling a traditional 
story also casts a vote for the “old”. 
 A similarly humorous contrast of the “old” versus the “new” is in the center of Saul 
Bellow’s short story, “The Old System”, too. However, the tension here is not between an 
underlying “original” narrative and its modern paraphrase but between two systems of 
references manifest in the frame and the main plot of the story. The frame represents Dr. 
Braun, a biochemist spending a winter Saturday afternoon alone at home recalling a family 
conflict in his childhood between two of his cousins. Thus the actual plot is separated from 
the frame regarding chronology and protagonists as well. In addition, the shift in the 
narrative voice seems even more significant: although the whole story is told by the same 
impersonal third person singular voice restricted to the knowledge of Dr. Braun, the frame 
is a monologue in which objective descriptive parts alternate with philosophical comments 
while the main plot consists of vivid scenes full of sentiments and dramatic dialogues. This 
contrast between “The Old System” and Dr. Braun’s present lifestyle is also made explicit 
as the very subject of his meditations in the frame.  
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 Dr. Braun’s point of view is ironically detached. He is a biochemist, who “had 
himself delivered cats and dogs. Man, he knew, entered life like these other creatures, in a 
transparent bag or caul” (51) and who examines members of his family—including 
himself—with the same analytic attitude always slightly superior to its object that he 
applied to “other creatures” in his professional life. This approach is striking, for instance, 
in the self-ironically precise evaluation of his emotional life. “It was said of him, 
occasionally, that he did not love anyone. This was not true. He did not love anyone 
steadily. But unsteadily he loved, he guessed, at an average rate” (48). Accordingly, the 
scientist’s objectivity and accuracy dominate the style of the whole frame: the reader is 
informed in succinct, meticulous sentences about Dr. Braun’s daily routine from noon 
when he wakes up till early sunset. The time is short and late: it is the second half of a brief 
day at the very end of the year, making the impression that it symbolizes Dr. Braun’s 
position in his life, too. Beside the cold scenery, the protagonist’s solitude and the lack of 
action, especially the need for a summative contemplation on one’s own life and family 
history also evoke the image of approaching death.   
 In contrast, the main plot teems with life, although—ironically—all of its characters 
are dead by the time of the recollection. The two personalities in the focus are Isaac and his 
sister Tina, both of them Dr. Braun’s elder cousins. Although each of them belongs to the 
same second generation of an immigrant Jewish family, Isaac acts with “the authority of a 
senior, almost an uncle” (52) and both he and Tina seem to represent an earlier generation 
than Dr. Braun, who is the only character permanently referred to by his family name all 
along the story. In fact, relatives’ first names are necessary in the narrative for practical 
reasons so that one can distinguish between the characters; and the frequent use of the title 
“Dr.” might also have the function of reminding the reader of the acknowledged scientist’s 
image. However, the consistent use of “Braun” even in situations representing him as a 
child surrounded by others with the same family name highlights the ambiguity of his 
position. On the one hand, he despises the fight between Tina and Isaac labeling its events 
as “European Judaic, operatic fist-clenchings” (69) or “a situation of parody” (72). On the 
other hand, thinking of himself exclusively in terms of his family name suggests that he is 
above all the representative of his family. It is especially telling that Dr. Braun’s first 
name, Sam is mentioned only once, which is at the same time the only occasion when he 
actively participates in the conflict of the siblings that he otherwise tries to observe from a 
distance, unbiased. In other words, he makes constant efforts to keep himself out of the 
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object of his investigation striving for rational statements of general validity but at the 
same time he is deeply involved so most of his ironic rejection turns into self-irony. 
 The whole story is organized along dichotomies which humorously break down in 
the end. Braun’s aforementioned rationality and his preference for general theories are in 
sharp contrast with the other family members, who are represented as impressive 
individuals primarily directed by their feelings. In the conflict of Isaac and Tina, the former 
is a stereotypically male figure: a multimillionaire and womanizer, who likes to say about 
himself that “I fought on many fronts, Cousin Isaac said, meaning women’s bellies” (63). 
Tina, on the other hand, is depicted as the archetype or even the caricature of the Jewish 
mother: the center of the family with an oppressive influence on others like her younger 
brother, Mutt, or even Isaac. The conflict between the two genders merges with a conflict 
between two steps of assimilation: Isaac starts his big business bribing a WASP partner, 
which the others feel too risky to join in spite of his invitation. As a result, Tina later 
blames Isaac for not sharing his fortune with the large family while Isaac is angry at Tina 
because she abandoned him at the first, crucial moment. Dr. Braun, a scholar with a degree 
and apparently void of all the confusion of the two siblings seems to be more successfully 
integrated into American society than either of them. His temperate style is also in line 
with what he says about non-Jewish Americans: “[t]he native, different wisdom of 
Gentiles, who had much to say but refrained” (74) as opposed to “these Jews—these Jews! 
Their feelings, their hearts! Dr. Braun often wanted nothing more than to stop all this” 
(83). The ambiguity of the two approaches culminates in the description of the final 
“deathbed scene” (70) or “deathbed joke” (77) the most cathartic and parodistic moment of 
the story when the dying Tina theatrically makes peace with Isaac offering emotional 
reconciliation but simultaneously erasing all meaning from the previous events. 
Nonetheless, Dr. Braun’s logical and stabile life looks static, lifeless and desolate 
compared to the great and vivid world of the cousins recalled by him with great nostalgia.  
 In each of the stories above, the transition from the European Jewish shtetl to the 
multinational American city is represented in the context of the family, which serves as a 
condensed model of the greater social movements. First and second generation immigrants 
often act as middlemen between a traditional Jewish and an American value system. The 
diverse versions of third generation immigrants’ fates and attitudes will be discussed more 
in detail later since they significantly coincide in time with the decades during and after the 
Holocaust and the succeeding generations of its survivors. The direction of the progression 
necessarily points toward assimilation to the American majority, however, the nostalgia for 
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the “old” is strong and can never be fully resolved or erased within the individual. Most of 
the stories offer reconciliation in the form of self-irony and humor which allow the author 
and the characters to fully express both components of the Jewish American identity and 
the conflicts between the two without making judgments in favor of either.    
2.3 From Religion to Secular Culture 
 Religion has always been one of the key components of Jewish identity, as 
illustrated, for instance, by Alan Unterman’s list on “The dimensions of Jewish identity”.  
An analysis of the various elements constituting Jewishness, in its broadest 
sense, is important for understanding both the Jewish and the gentile perception 
of Jewish identity. Briefly we can isolate four categories which go to make up 
Jewishness: (1) biological origin, (2) religious affiliation, (3) membership of 
community/culture, (4) ethnic or national belonging and language use.” 
(Unterman, Jews 13) 
Moreover, several theorists of the Jewish Emancipation claimed for Judaism to be 
considered primarily a religion. As a result, “in western Europe in the middle of the 
nineteenth century [...] the dogma of assimilation [...] asserted that Jewry is not a nation 
but a religious community” (94) explains Simon Dubnow in The Sociological View of 
Jewish History. Emmanuel Levinas voices similar views in his 1961 essay “Jewish 
Thought Today” regarding “the Jewish thought born from the Emancipation that occurred 
in the eighteenth century. [...] In this position, which is still that of many Western Jews, 
Judaism is a religion alongside with Christianity, a form of worship” (160). On the other 
hand, Arthur Hertzberg suggests that “the position and politics of the Jew in the modern 
era have [...] been identified with the era of revolution and with revolutionary forces” (27) 
of the nineteenth and twentieth century as their struggle for “equality as a right” (27) 
included equal rights for Jewish people as well; however, many of these egalitarian social 
movements meant to discard religion. Therefore the theme of faith in the Jewish American 
literature of the twentieth century is controversial: it is represented both as a definitive 
token of identity and as an obstacle to assimilation, challenged not so much by the 
dominantly Christian views of the American majority but rather by numerous elements of 
secular life. 
 The resulting conflict within the individual’s identity is a frequent theme in Jewish 
American literature often expressed by means of Christian versus Jewish imagery and 
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doctrines. But even in such cases, the decisive motivations and the essential stakes of the 
narrative are often to be found not in the confrontation of two religions but in the worldly 
aspects of the story. For instance, the protagonist in Chaim Potok’s 1972 novel, My Name 
is Asher Lev, is an aspiring young painter, whose ambitions are hindered by his Hasidic 
family background. He has to face what Isaac Deutscher describes in his essay on “Marc 
Chagall and the Jewish Imagination”: “Judaism’s hostility towards the visual arts is 
notorious. By enforcing rigorously the commands, ‘Thou shalt not make any graven 
image’, rabbinical orthodoxy stunted the growth of the visual arts far more cruelly than 
even Calvinism did” (154-155). The central scandal of the novel is Lev’s painting, “The 
Brooklyn Crucifixion”, in which he employs Christian symbols to depict his mother’s 
tribulations, who is torn between her devout husband and his son. The father judges the 
work as a betrayal of Judaism in favor of Christianity, however, Asher Lev understands 
their dissent not so much in terms of religion but in the traditional context of the artist’s 
clash with society. He dedicates his “Brooklyn Crucifixion” also “For the Master of 
Universe whose suffering world I do not comprehend” (Potok 313), implying the ordeals 
of the numerous persecuted Jewish characters of the book and recalling the crucified Jew 
in Marc Chagall’s “White Crucifixion” (1938), which referred to the long centuries of 
Russian pogroms as well as the emerging Nazi threat. 
Similarly, Philip Roth’s short story “The Conversion of the Jews” tells about a 
dispute between a rabbi and a schoolboy on Jewish versus Christian doctrines. However, 
the final point made by the protagonist does not judge in favor of either but exceeding both 
claims that one should “never hit anybody about God” (Roth, Goodbye, Columbus 158). So 
the apparently theological conflict points beyond the boundaries of any theology as the 
various ironies present at every level of the narrative—the plot and the characters as well 
as the rhetoric— systematically question each system of references evoked by the text.  
The plot develops along a series of dogmatically provocative inquiries proposed by 
the protagonist, Ozzie in class. His antagonist, the representative of scholarly and social 
authority that Ozzie revolts against, is his teacher at Hebrew school, Rabbi Binder, whose 
name triggers associations like the profession of a bookbinder, or someone establishing 
links between generations by means of a shared knowledge, or someone bound by 
tradition. In contrast, Ozzie’s full name is Oscar Freedman, designating someone for whom 
freedom is the decisive factor in life. Although the theme of the narrative is precisely how 
Ozzie manages to break free of the constraints of his heritage, the past participle form in 
his name ab ovo represents him as someone already liberated, whose freedom is the result 
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of someone’s active efforts; which in the context of the short story and of Roth’s oeuvre 
might refer to the American component of Ozzie’s identity. It is worth noting that this 
interpretation shows similarities with Allen Guttman’s reading of the protagonist’s name in 
Bernard Malamud’s short story, “The Lady of the Lake”, in which the character “changes 
his name to Henry R. Freeman, in an obvious effort to shed his Jewish identity for that of a 
free man” (Guttman 113). The use of such speaking names—mostly of Yiddish or German 
origin but easily recognizable for the English speaking reader, too—is a frequent literary 
device in Jewish American literature.   
 Ozzie undermines Rabbi Binder’s teachings by the Socratic method of ironic 
questions. 
‘What I wanted to know was different.’ 
What Ozzie wanted to know was always different. The first time he wanted to 
know how Rabbi Binder could call the Jews ‘The Chosen People’ if the 
Declaration of the Independence claimed all men to be created equal. Rabbi 
Binder tried to distinguish for him between political equality and spiritual 
legitimacy, but what Ozzie wanted to know he insisted vehemently, was 
different. (141)   
Socrates’ pretended naivety is disguised here as a child’s innocence, still, Ozzie threatens 
religious doctrines due to his acute sense of pointing out incoherences within the system—
emphatically repeated thrice in the quotation above—quite in the spirit of Derridean 
Deconstruction, also rooted in Socratic irony. The boy not only challenges Jewish dogmas 
on the basis of his American knowledge about the Declaration of Independence—as a 
symptom of his somewhat split Jewish American identity—but always focuses on what is 
“different”, turning arguments taken from Judaism against the rabbi. After a series of 
debates, their conflict culminates regarding the Christian idea of the Immaculate 
Conception, which Rabbi Binder repudiates as biologically impossible but Ozzie asks: if 
God is omnipotent then “why couldn’t He let a woman have a baby without having 
intercourse” (141). 
 Roth’s narrative can also be read as a humorous paraphrase of Christ’s passion 
story. The everyday characters, the childish phrasing of sublime doctrines, the comic 
episodes and the happy ending might even make the impression of a parody but without an 
offensive edge, rather directing the reader’s attention to the human aspect of story, “how 
Jesus was historical and how he lived like you and me” (141). Ozzie is reminiscent not 
only of the twelve-year-old Jesus teaching in the temple but also of the mature man 
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persecuted for his views. The young boy, who repeatedly irritates his seniors with his 
inquiries, is slapped on the face first by his mother then by the Rabbi so he flees up to the 
roof of the school, where his dialogue with the crowd gathering below and anxious for his 
life gradually turns into a scene of preaching. Like Christ on the cross, Ozzie is also placed 
above the others as if he got closer to some heavenly truth through his suffering, which is 
further emphasized by the lengthy and philosophical description of the intimate 
relationship between the sky, the light and human life introducing the final scene of the 
story. It is worth mentioning regarding the psychology of martyrdom what the narrator 
points out: “the truth was that he hadn’t really headed for the roof as much as he’d been 
chased there” (151). Ozzie also has a charismatic influence on the people: he persuades 
everybody to repeat his words “upon his knees in the Gentile posture of prayer” (157). The 
differences between the two figures, however, are just as informative as the parallels. The 
mother is dominant in both narratives but Ozzie is a half-orphan, so the father—a possibly 
authentic source of authority both in a worldly and in a transcendental sense—is totally 
absent from his world. Besides, Christ welcomed suffering, saying “whosoever shall smite 
thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also” (King James’ Bible, Matthew 5:39) 
while Ozzie’s ultimate conclusion is the complete rejection of not only hitting another 
human being but also of accepting the blow. 
 All through the story, Ozzie is accompanied by his schoolmate, Itzie, who acts both 
as his double and his counterpoint. They are of the same age, they have similarly sounding 
nicknames, and the reader first learns about the debate between Ozzie and the rabbi from 
their dialogue. In contrast to Ozzie, Itzie is interested not so much in the controversial 
theoretical information regarding God’s omnipotence but the petty and funny scandal of 
the word “intercourse” being pronounced in class. Later on, he is the first to become 
Ozzie’s disciple encouraging his friend on the roof not to yield to the rabbi. However, he 
does so by saying “Jump!” (153). And when Mrs. Freedman begs Ozzie “Don’t be a 
martyr, my baby” (155), Izzie misunderstands the word hitherto unknown to him and starts 
chanting: “Be a Martin, be a Martin...” (155), which is then echoed by all the children in 
the yard, too. So Izzie’s character functions as a permanent source of irony, challenging 
religion first by emphasizing the carnal aspect of the Immaculate Conception—“Marry 
hadda get laid” (140)—then by acting as the embodiment of the ignorant crowd, who seem 
to support their spiritual leader but are practically the very ones turning him into a martyr 
and completely misinterpreting the situation and the ideas involved.   
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 Not only Ozzie and Itzie see things different: much of the humor in the short story 
derives from the way Roth represents the same idea or scene repeatedly, from various 
characters’ points of view. For example, Ozzie’s presence on the roof is celebrated by his 
schoolmates as a heroic deed and it is gradually enriched by spiritual and theological 
associations but the old custodian of the school, Blotnik interprets the situation in a 
radically different context. “Anybody who has ever had a cat on the roof knows how to get 
him down. You call the fire department. [...] you do the same thing if you are Yakov 
Blotnik and you once had a cat on the roof” (150). These rapid shifts between contrasting 
frames of reference in the narrative activate the reader’s sensitivity to the multiple possible 
interpretations of the same phenomenon.  Therefore it is easy to see by the end that Ozzie’s 
claim for religious tolerance self-ironically points into two opposite directions. On the one 
hand, he addresses his mother, his schoolmates in Hebrew school and the rabbi; and the 
title, “The Conversion of the Jews” also suggests that he warns Jewish people not to hurt 
others. On the other hand, the short story was published in 1959, at a time when Holocaust 
literature had already started to flourish and Jews started to be generally considered as the 
archetype of people persecuted for their religion; moreover, it appeared in the collection 
Goodbye, Columbus, which also included the story “Eli, the Fanatic”, directly addressing 
the theme of Holocaust. Thus Roth avoids the dangers of a didactic voice lying in Ozzie’s 
admonition “You should never hit anybody about God” (158) by opening up the horizon 
for numerous various readings involving different victims and victimizers, possibly beyond 
the scope of the actual story but always emphasizing the responsibility of the individual. 
 In contrast to Roth, whose narrative directs the attention to the social dangers of 
religious intolerance and calls for the acceptance of several coexisting theologies, Cynthia 
Ozick’s short story, “The Pagan Rabbi” focuses on the other side of the coin: she 
dramatizes how one’s life might be destroyed by letting religious plurality in it. The story 
is told by a first person narrator who learns that his childhood friend, “Isaac Kornfeld, a 
man of piety and brains, had hanged himself in the public park” (Ozick, The Pagan Rabbi
4). The friend visits the widow, Sheindel and tries to reconstruct the events relying on three 
sources: his own memories, Sheindel’s oral reminiscences and Kornfeld’s written legacy, a 
notebook and a letter found in the pocket of his coat. This diversity of genres—childhood 
anecdotes, dialogues, summaries of bedtime stories told by Kornfield to his children and 
parts of his multilingual notes including quotations of poetry as well as original 
observations—results in a fragmented structure, which reflects well the theme of the 
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narrative: the tormenting absence of one ultimate and fully comprehensible truth and the 
both seductive and killing multiplicity of incongruent phenomena and their interpretations.   
According to his notes, the title character, Isaac Kornfeld is forced “to choose 
between Jewish and pagan values embodied respectively in his first and last names” 
(Friedman 8). The former child prodigy, the rabbi of great reputation is entranced by 
Nature, who appears to him in the form of a dryad or tree nymph: the spirit of a tree 
embodied as a young and beautiful girl. Under her influence and aspiring for a free soul 
able to admit the delightful and elusive diversity of the world, the rabbi gradually turns 
away from his religious studies and the discipline of monotheism, finally committing 
suicide on the dryad’s tree, presumably as a gesture expressing ultimate freedom. As 
shown by the name of both the girl, Iripomo oéià and her master, Lord Pan as well as 
Kornfeld’s notes written in Greek, Hebrew, Aramic and English, the dilemma of the Many 
versus the One is articulated here through “the Hellenism versus Hebraism theme that 
features so prominently in Ozick’s fiction” (Friedman 2) from her early “unpublished 
volume of poetry ‘Greeks and Jews’” (Friedman 2) to the novella “Usurpation” in which 
the protagonist must choose between “The Creator or the creature. God or god. The Name 
of Names or Apollo” (Ozick, “Usurpation” 176). 
 Stephen Wade proposes that “Ozick’s story has a forebear in E. M. Forster’s story, 
‘The Story of a Panic’ (1954), in which a very plain and provincial Englishman has a 
vision of Pan” (179). It is worth expounding this parallel in respect of the subject of the 
present paper since the similarities of the two narratives are significant while the 
differences demonstrate well the contrast between Forster’s ironic versus Ozick’s self-
ironic approach to the same subject: the liberating yet destructive power of sensual and 
intellectual ecstasy. Both titles encapsulate tension: the concept of a “Pagan Rabbi” is an 
oxymoron in itself while Forster’s etymological pun on “a Panic” refers to the double 
effect of the incident described by the narrator: his company’s sudden alarm and 
Eustache’s, the protagonist’s revelation due to an unexpected visit of Pan during a walk, 
which a group of English tourists take in the hills surrounding Ravello. Both narratives 
describe the surrealistic course of events turning the protagonist into a disciple of Pan, who 
breaks free from the bonds of ordinary society. Besides, both stories are told by a narrator 
of the similar type: a middle-aged male Everyman of mediocre mind, who tries to 
understand in vain what has truly happened. On the other hand, Eustache is an adolescent, 
who becomes a follower of Pan as a result of a momentary epiphany launching the 
“career—if career it can be called“ (Forster 1) of the enlightened mind whereas Kornfeld’s 
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devotion enfolds gradually as the fulfillment of his studies and culminates in his death. In 
other words, the divine presence is the beginning of the plot for Eustache, who receives it 
as a gift; while it means the end for Kornfeld, who has been working hard toward it all 
through his life. In harmony with these elements, the conflicts are not quite the same either. 
Eustache’s spirituality is clearly inhibited by society so his freedom means getting rid of 
the social constraints. Ironically, his victory gains even public acknowledgement later on; 
as the narrator puts it: “I have often seen that peculiar smile since [...] on the photographs 
of him that are beginning to get into the illustrated papers” (Forster 14). In opposition, 
Kornfeld’s struggle is an inner dilemma: his spiritual efforts are not only accepted but 
greatly supported by society and the ironic turn does not take place in the community but 
in the individual, who becomes dissatisfied by the rabbinical path along which he has been 
seeking his freedom and enlightenment therefore turning to Hellenism instead.  
The narrators’ personalities and their relationship with the protagonists differ, too. 
Forster’s narrator is the prototype of Matthew Arnold’s repugnant Philistine as described in 
his Culture and Anarchy:  a conventional and materialistic man, who tells about himself in 
the context of a discussion on the artistic and philosophical aspects of a beautiful landscape 
that “I do not know anything about pictures” (Ozick, The Pagan Rabbi 5) but “I have had 
some experience of estates” (Ozick, The Pagan Rabbi 7). He is irritated both by Eustache 
and the Italians he feels superior to. Consequently, he completely misunderstands the 
events: he explains the appearance of Pan as a simple gush of wind overreacted by his 
group of friends; he physically obstructs Eustache’s strife for freedom by trying to lock 
him up in his hotel room; and fails to recognize the young Italian servant’s, Gennaro’s self-
sacrifice, who first betrays Eustache for ten lire—in a way reminiscent of Jude—but finally 
helps him to escape from the hotel, Gennaro dropping dead as they jump out of a balcony. 
In contrast to Forster’s narrator, Ozick’s chronicler does not share the direct sensation of 
Pan with the protagonist, he only hears and especially reads about Kornfeld’s experiences, 
still, he appreciates these revelations more than his counterpart in Forster’s story. He is an 
educated man himself—his friendship with Kornfeld dates from the rabbinical seminar 
they used to attend—and he not only reproduces—quotes, summarizes or translates if 
necessary—his friend’s notes but also comments on them. As a result, Forster’s narrator 
depicts only the surface of the events while Ozick’s story gives partial insight into the 
psyche of the characters. 
In spite of the numerous thematic, motivic and structural similarities of the two 
narratives, the authors’ approaches are essentially different. Forster’s story is based on one 
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coherent series of dichotomies whereas Ozick sets up a humorously multifaceted situation 
including several points of view. Forster’s story is organized along oppositions like the 
Englishman versus the Italian, the material versus the transcendental, the rational versus 
the artistic and the objective versus the subjective. His narrator not only makes explicit that 
he belongs to the group defined by the first elements of these word pairs but speaks 
disdainfully about people depicted by the second ones. For instance, when the enlightened 
Eustache warmly greets Gennaro, the only person who understands him in the hotel, the 
narrator is outraged. “I always make a point of behaving pleasantly to Italians, however 
little they may deserve it [...] Taking Miss Robinson aside, I asked her permission to speak 
seriously to Eustache on the subject of intercourse with social inferiors” (22-23). 
Understanding Forster’s story requires from the reader the understanding of the author’s 
irony: how the narrator’s stable social and ideological system is shaken by the 
transcendental experiences and how the simplest old Italian peasant women comprehend 
this far better than him. The narrative does not lack other characters, either, but their 
positions do not divert from the basic dichotomy; each of them can be arranged along an 
imaginary line drawn between the protagonist and the narrator, some of them closer to the 
pole of transcendental understanding represented by Eustache—like the young English 
girl, Rose, who says after the panic that “I should have stopped, I do believe” (13)—some 
closer to the narrator’s worldview. The inferiority of the latter is emphasized by the 
Christian references of the story: the Italian scenery, Gennaro’s self-sacrifice, Eustache’s 
blessed smile and his ultimate freedom all seem to suggest that transcendental knowledge 
is accessible, though mysterious. Forster does not express directly what Eustache 
symbolizes—he does not specify, for example, whether the transcendental should be 
imagined in the realm of religion or art or sensuality etc.—but he points out his meaning 
ironically, representing the defeat of its opposite embodied by the ridiculously narrow-
minded narrator.  
In contrast, Ozick’s story offers various futile attempts at communicating with the 
transcendental. Not only Kornfeld is looking for spirituality: his father as well as the 
narrator’s father were devout Jews proud of their sons studying to be rabbis; the narrator, 
disillusioned by their rivalry turns to atheism; while the failure of his marriage to a Puritan 
woman illustrates the dead-end street of Christianity. On the other hand, none of these 
characters turn out to be right or wrong in the end, as it happened in Forster’s narrative. 
Even Kornfeld’s search for the transcendental is depicted as not only the most powerful 
endeavor—the central issue of the narrative—but also as the greatest failure at the same 
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time, leading to his death. Consequently, Ozick’s construction does not provide the reader 
with any superior position to identify with thus understanding the author’s irony and 
message; her self-ironic narrative displays only equally justifiable ideologies, each of them 
questionable in light of the others and apparently all doomed to fail. In the end, there is no 
Eustache who would possess transcendental wisdom and whom the seeker could turn to. 
The Christian idea of salvation through the sacrifice of another person does not work, 
either; unlike Gennaro’s death, Kornfeld’s perishing does not bring anyone closer to any 
revelation. Moreover, his ultimate position of hanging dead from a tree can be read as the 
visual parody of the elevated spiritual status he has been struggling for, so even his death is 
deprived of the atmosphere of redeeming pathos. Still, Ozick’s world does not seem more 
pessimistic than that of Forster. Quite to the contrary: Kornfeld’s joyful notes as well as his 
intimate relationships—his marriage, his friendship with the narrator and his professional 
reputation—all testify the delightful nature of his search even if it teems with doubts and 
can be fulfilled only by death. Ozick is unable to offer an ironically transmitted conviction, 
like Forster did. She finishes her narrative with the narrator’s advice to the widow, “Your 
husband’s soul in that park. Consult it” (p 37), which can be read as the equivalent of a 
self-ironic encouragement to read Ozick’s story. 
Religion is not always challenged on a scholarly basis in Jewish American fiction. 
Bernard Malamud seems to be more interested in the practical, emotional and social 
aspects of the subject. He addressed the theme of the contrast between the devout Jewish 
man and the young female prostitute twice, in “The Magic Barrel” (1953) and in “God’s 
Wrath” (1972). Both short stories have strikingly similar constellations of characters—a 
prostitute with an aging, religious father and her lover(s)—, both fit in the series of 
parables so typical of Malamud’s oeuvre, and the closing scenes also resemble; but 
different elements of the analogous situations are emphasized creating a doubtful yet 
optimistic atmosphere in “The Magic Barrell” on the one hand and invoking the voice of 
the most desperate prophets at the end of “God’s Wrath”. 
“The Magic Barrell” starts with a scene of the matchmaking stereotypical in Jewish 
fiction. Leo Finkle, a young rabbi-to-be living in New York City is so immersed in his 
studies that he has no time for women but his chances for a job are better if married so he 
consults a matchmaker. Pinye Salzman offers him a long series of disenchanting 
maidens—some too old, some disabled, some not truly a maiden any longer—and Leo 
finally finds himself attracted to the photo of a beautiful girl, allegedly mixed among the 
other portrays only by accident; she is Salzman’s own daughter, disowned since she 
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became a prostitute. In spite of the matchmaker’s resistance, the story ends with the 
encounter of the two young people at the usual corner of the girl, witnessed by the father 
hiding behind a wall. Leo approaches the girl with the feeling that “[h]e pictured, in her, 
his own redemption” (Malamud, The Complete Stories 149). The question is left open 
whether the couple will really come together but the possibility of a happy ending is 
undoubtedly present.    
The essential question of the story is why the future rabbi is attracted to the harlot. 
A socially reasonable explanation might be that the Jewish rabbi is just as much an outcast 
in the WASP society of America in the 1950s as a prostitute, though on radically different 
bases. Uniting their forces, the female professional of the body and the male professional 
of the mind might really make up a successful whole. More pessimistic interpretations may 
argue that Leo is simply the victim of a cunning Salzman, who only pretended to be 
unwilling to introduce him to his daughter in order to increase his desire by setting up 
artificial difficulties, being aware from the beginning that the yeshiva student will be easily 
seduced by the hustler’s charms precisely because he is so unexperienced in the realm of 
the flesh. Either way, the narrative questions both religious and social prejudices self-
ironically emphasizing the common heritage of the Jewish immigrants yet insinuating that 
the breakdown of traditional rules might prove to be fruitful.   
In “God’s Wrath”, Malamud focuses not on the perspectives of the young couple—
in fact, there is no young couple to speak of—but on the father-daughter relationship. The 
father this time is “Glasser, a retired sexton” (Malamud, The Complete Stories 507), a 
widower living with Lucille, his youngest daughter from his second marriage. He does not 
often see his elder daughters since they are unhappily married: “Helen’s husband, a 
drinker, a bum, supported her badly” (507-508) while “Fay had a goiter and five children” 
(508). After a while, the youngest girl also moves away from home and becomes a 
prostitute under the name Luci Glass. The final scene is reminiscent of the ending of “The 
Magic Barrell”: the father is peeping round the corner as the daughter meets her next client 
but the optimism of the previous story is completely absent. In the last sentence, Glasser 
“calls down God’s wrath on the prostitute and her blind father” (513).  
The text invites the reader for at least two, controversial interpretations: a religious 
versus a psychological one. The theological understanding evokes the lamentations of 
Jeremiah who compared Israel turning away from the one true God for the sake of various 
idols to a prostitute abandoning her husband, saying “thou has played the harlot with many 
lovers; yet return again to me, saith the Lord” (King James’ Bible, Jeremiah 3:1). In this 
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reading, Malamud’s story would be a sorrowful, modern paraphrase of the biblical parable 
warning Jewish people that they have committed the sin of giving up their faith and 
offending its laws for the sake of ephemeral worldly pleasures again. But equally 
justifiable would be a psychological analysis proposing that the daughter’s behavior is 
more than logical. She has grown up in a family where there are no attractive female role 
models to follow: both wives of Glasser have deceased early, Luci’s married sisters are far 
from being happy and the perspective her father kept proposing to his youngest daughter 
was to become a financially independent spinster; so it is not very surprising that she ends 
up experimenting with an entirely different lifestyle, marking her shift of identity by 
changing her name as well. Her chief argument for her choice is the open-minded variety 
of her new social life; which is in contrast with the failure of communication between 
father and daughter. “‘It’s not as bad as people think,’ Luci said. [...] I meet lots of people” 
(512). Glasser’s final outcry for God’s wrath activates both interpretational frameworks, 
self-ironically playing out one against the other. According to religious laws, the prostitute 
is the sinner, however, Glasser equally blames “the blind father” (513), referring either 
literally to his own “rheumy eyes” (507), or metaphorically to his psychological blindness 
regarding his daughter’s needs, or—turning the logic of psychology against theology—to 
the blindness of the universal father, God, who is insensitive to the psyche of actual human 
beings, fragile and fallible as suggested by Luci Glass’ name and fate, and who would 
require blind obedience to several millennia old phrases hardly applicable to contemporary 
reality.   
The incongruence of theology and the everyday world is a frequent issue in Jewish 
American literature. Another short story by Malamud, “The Silver Crown” approaches it 
from a different angle: this time the conflict is not between religious inhibitions and the 
individual aspiring for fulfillment even at the expense of transgressions but between a 
rational versus a mystical worldview. Faith is associated here with the irrational, located 
almost on the verge of the foolish; an approach familiar from I. B. Singer’s formerly 
discussed “Gimpel, the Fool” or “Idiots First” by Malamud. In these narratives, the devout 
protagonist is either a feeble minded person himself like Gimpel or someone responsible 
for a relative like that, as in the case of Malamud’s stories. Both Singer and Malamud 
emphasize that faith is not simply of essential necessity turning visible as one reaches the 
boundaries of the ordinary but it also becomes accessible only beyond the edge of reason. 
Thus each story simultaneously questions religion and argues for it employing arguments 
that do not obey the rules of exclusively logical disputes.  
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The self-irony of “The Silver Crown” is increased by setting the plot in a business 
context. The protagonist, the “young Gans, Albert, a high school biology teacher” (536) is 
the embodiment of rationality: a teacher of sciences, who has to face the limits of rational 
knowledge when his father becomes fatally ill and the specialists disagree about both 
diagnosis and treatment. As someone with nothing to lose, he consults a “faith healer” 
(536) against his better judgment. The healer is a rabbi, Jonas Lifschitz, who deals with 
producing silver crowns, explaining that “[t]he crown is not a medicine, it is the health of 
your father. We offer the crown to God and God returns to your father his health” (540). 
The humor of the dialogues between Lifschitz and Gans derives primarily from the clash of 
the two worldviews: the client repeatedly asks for intellectual analysis and factual evidence 
in vain whereas the rabbi speaks the completely different language of mystical tradition. 
The humor is especially powerful when Gans points out the split within the mystical 
system: if the crown is a sacred offering operating with such immeasurable qualities like 
love and health, why Lifschitz has two price categories? Finally, Gans unveils Lifschitz as 
a fraud. The rabbi tries to defend himself by telling that all his profit was necessary for 
taking care of his imbecile daughter, Rifkele. In their ultimate, heated fight, both men 
blame each other for what the other lacks: rational versus emotional truth, respectively. 
“Miracle,” Albert bellowed, “it’s a freaking fake magic, with and idiot 
girl for a come-on and hypnotic mirrors.” [...] 
“Be kind,” begged the rabbi [...] “Be merciful to an old man. Think of 
my poor child. Think of your father who loves you.’
“He hates me, the son of a bitch. I hope he croaks.” 
[...]  
“Aha,” cried the wild-eyed rabbi, pointing a finger at God in heaven. 
“Murderer,” he cried, aghast. 
[...]  
An hour later the elder Gans shut his eyes and expired. (552) 
Neither of the two contesting standpoints triumphs: Lifschitz’s mysticism is disclosed as a 
bogus enterprise financially exploiting people in dire need but at the same time Gans’ lack 
of love for his father is also revealed. All through his story, Malamud is primarily 
concerned with systematically and humorously displaying the incompatibility of the two 
worldviews, still, he finishes the narrative with self-ironically pointing out the fatal 
consequences of living one’s life imprisoned in either. 
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 Each of the stories mentioned above represent Judaism challenged by diverse 
aspects of modern life but their self-irony might tell a lot about the double trap involved in 
any communal identity based on a shared ideological system. Since any such system is 
established by the rejection of some Other—the immoral, the irrational, the people of 
different ethnicity or religion etc.—it is permanently threatened by whatever it has 
expelled. The modern and postmodern multicultural American scene is especially abundant 
in situations of this Other—for example, the immigrant—rightfully claiming for 
integration. On the other hand, letting the formerly excluded Other in always carries the 
risk of not simply modifying but completely destroying the system resulting in the collapse 
of the individual’s life formerly organized along recently questioned principles, losing both 
its theoretical basis and the support of a stable community working along consensual 
values. So a devout Jewish American mind constantly has to face the double challenge of 
maintaining Judaism as a key component of identity and getting integrated in an American 
society based on somewhat different ideologies. The self-irony of these stories allows the 
authors to depict both sides of the coin without making a judgment in favor of either. 
Besides, their humor enhances a more extensive, multifaceted exploration of the particular 
situations revealing the most problematic points without an offensive edge. 
2.4 From Yiddish to English 
 In contrast to the previous examples full of sympathy, irony in Jewish American 
fiction can manifest itself in a sarcastic voice as well, especially when the theme is the 
Yiddish literary circles in the U.S. This is the case, for instance, in two short stories by I. 
B. Singer, both told by a first person singular narrator, who is an acknowledged American 
Yiddish immigrant writer, strikingly reminiscent of the author himself. The opening of 
“The Cafeteria” describing this milieu is worth quoting at length.  
Even though I have reached the point where a great part of my earnings is 
given away in taxes, I still have the habit of eating in cafeterias when I am by 
myself. I like to take a tray with a tin knife, fork spoon, and paper napkin and 
to choose at the counter the food I enjoy. Besides, I meet there the landsleit
from Poland, as well as all kinds of literary beginners and readers who know 
Yiddish. The moment I sit down at a table, they come over: “Hello, Aaaron!” 
they greet me, and we talk about Yiddish literature, the Holocaust, the state of 
Israel, and often about acquaintances who were eating rice pudding or stewed 
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prunes the last time I was here and are already in their graves. [...] and our eyes 
ask mutely, Whose turn is next? [...] I cannot spend too long with these 
Yiddishists, because I am always busy. I am writing a novel, a story, an article. 
I have to lecture today or tomorrow [...] It can happen that an hour after I leave 
the cafeteria I am on a train to Chicago or flying to California. But meanwhile 
we converse in the mother language and I hear of intrigues and pettiness about 
which, from a moral point of view, it would be better not to be informed. 
(Collected, 287)  
The speaker clearly distinguishes between his “new” American life and the “old” 
Yiddish scene. The oppositions are clear and manifold. The narrator is successful and rich 
while the cafeteria can only boast of tin utensils and cheap, self-service food. It is small 
and bound to its location while Aaron travels often and far all over the U.S.A. All the other 
guests are marginal characters eager to greet him, who, in contrast, has only a limited 
amount of time for them since he is an active professional who has managed to emerge 
from this community, unlike the others. He does not even try to unite the two worlds since 
he descends to the cafeteria only when he is by himself. His activities described in detail 
are in sharp contrast with the timeless stability of the cafeteria and the ghosts of deceased 
friends who seem to populate not only the conversations but the place as well; and who 
turn out to be the real protagonists of the plot. The allegedly superior position of the 
speaker and his resulting irony—most striking in his final remark about the pettiness of 
local gossips—dominate the whole narrative although the edge of his patronizing tone is 
somewhat taken off by the humorous mock-complaint of the first sentence and his 
nostalgic approach. 
Death is the central theme not only in the guests’ conversations but in the whole 
narrative. Aaron has a love affair with an attractive young woman called Esther, who 
regularly attends the cafeteria. The hierarchy in their relationship complies with the general 
power structure of the story: all the other guests crave for Esther in vain since she 
exclusively admires the narrator’s work and person, who, on the other hand, is not 
interested in her enough to maintain the liaison very long. Still, they meet a few times and 
on one occasion she claims to have seen Hitler—or his reincarnation—in the cafeteria. The 
narrator doubts her sanity but later on, with an esoteric turn, he also meets her ghost in the 
street at around the time when she commits suicide: she appears in the company of another 
elderly, Yiddish friend, who has already passed away, too. Aaron reflects on the incident 
afterwards in the same ironic tone with which he previously criticized her menial job of 
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sorting buttons at a factory. “Yes, corpses do walk on Broadway. But why did Esther 
choose that particular corpse? She could have got a better bargain even in this world” 
(300). Although his sarcastic evaluation prevails in the end, his representation of the dead-
end street of “these Yiddishists” is not void of self-irony either: from the very first page on 
he is just as involved in the community’s permanent meditation on their own approaching 
death as the others, and his world, just like Esther’s, is haunted. 
 A similar shift from irony to self-irony can be observed in “The Joke”. In the 1982 
edition of Isaac Bashevis Singer’s Collected Stories, arranged by the author, this story 
immediately follows “The Cafeteria” obviously not by accident. Chronologically, the plot 
takes place much earlier than the preceding story, between 1933 and 1938, but the milieu is 
the same and the emphasis is more on self-irony. The plot develops from a nasty prank 
played on Dr. Alexander Walden, a professor of Hebrew living in Berlin, by a rich Yiddish 
publisher, Liebkind Bendel, an immigrant to the U. S.  The aging professor infuriates 
Bendel by not answering any of his letters so the publisher invents a young, female 
American millionaire—modelled on Walden’s former wife—madly in love with the 
professor, and they start to correspond in her name. The narrator gets involved in the story 
when Dr. Walden is persuaded under the increasing pressure of Nazi threat in Germany to 
travel to New York where an encounter in person with his imaginary correspondent cannot 
be avoided and Lebkind asks the narrator to help him warding off the exposure of his 
cheating by telling Walden that his beloved died in a plane crash. The professor is reluctant 
to accept the explanation and not much after the incident he falls sick and dies. The last 
scene represents him at his funeral lying on the bier with “a hint of a smile that seemed to 
say, ‘Well, ja, my life was one big joke—from the beginning to the end.’” (316).  
The positions within the ironic structure change all through the story. In the 
beginning, Dr. Walden is the butt of the joke not only from Bendel’s point of view but also 
from that of his appreciative audience. The narrator depicts Walden as a caricature of the 
presumptuous scholar gaining his high social due to someone else’s money. Like Bendel’s 
collaborators—for instance his wife and another woman translating his letters into 
German—the reader is also inclined to laugh at the professor’s self-conceit and gullibility. 
Later on the whole incident is placed in the larger context of the imminent World War II, 
where everybody is the butt of an impersonal and cruel fate of irony. The superiority felt 
by the prankster and his collaborators over their victim is replaced by sympathy and a 
sense of responsibility or even guilt. The publisher, who treated Walden with mock 
reverence all through the unharmful farce, ironically falls entrapped in his own scheme at 
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the professor’s tragic appearance. From this point on, Bendel is the most comical character 
in the narrative as he tries to flee the consequences of his deeds. Dr. Walden regains his 
superiority first by seeing through the prank, then at his funeral, which is attended not only 
by the physicist Einstein, whose presence endows the event with the intellectual prestige 
that Dr. Walden was gradually losing, but also by “a young woman dressed in black” 
(316), who looks just like the embodiment of the imaginary correspondent. The boundaries 
between fiction and reality are humorously blurred as the narrator draws the conclusion, “I 
realized [...] that whatever anybody can invent already exists somewhere” (316). In 
addition, it is uncannily self-ironic of the narrative that the last laugh is attributed to the 
dead.  
These changes of status are clearly indicated by shifts between languages. “Why 
should a Polish Jew in New York publish a literary magazine in German?”, poses the 
narrator a rhetorical question in the opening sentence of the narrative. “Liebkind Bendel’s 
only language was Yiddish” (302), still, as soon as he became rich on the stock market and 
in real estate in New York, he used his fortune to launch a German magazine edited by his 
wife. His gesture might be explained by the usual ambition of the parvenu to express his 
financial success by possessing something of high intellectual and social status. The 
reputation of German as the language of culture as opposed to Yiddish, the inferior 
vernacular on the European stage is elucidated by the narrator at another point of the story. 
“[T]he knowledge that Dr. Alexander Walden had for a time been the husband of a 
German heiress and wrote in German made the Hebraists stand in awe of him. Since he 
ignored them, they accused him of being a snob. He avoided even speaking Yiddish, 
though he was the son of a rabbi from a small village in Poland” (303). In the American 
context, however, English, and not German is the mainstream language therefore Bendel’s 
magazine makes the impression of being so outdated that it becomes its own parody.  
The European knowledge regarding languages proves to be inadequate in case of Dr. 
Walden as well. After his arrival, he tries to communicate with the narrator in German in 
vain so he finally changes to “Yiddish, with all the inflections and pronunciations of the 
village he came from” (309). He also complains that “I know English from reading 
Shakespeare. [...] But here they speak an English that sounds like Chinese. I don’t 
understand a single word they say” (310). He experiences the breakdown of his European 
erudition and his being forced back into the disdained Yiddish of his childhood as the 
collapse of culture. “What do you write in the Yiddish newspapers? What is there to write 
about? We are returning to the jungle. Homo sapiens is bankrupt. All values are gone—
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literature science, religion. Well, for my part I have given up altogether” (311). It is worth 
mentioning though that the status of Hebrew remains intact in course of the whole 
narrative; it is considered to be the subject and the medium of well-respected scholarly 
investigation and not the field for power games.  
In fact, the question of languages and of Yiddish in particular was a crucial issue in 
the first decades of Jewish literature in America. Most of the Jewish immigrants arriving to 
the U. S. spoke Yiddish as their mother tongue so Yiddish literary circles and periodicals 
flourished in the first half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, “[i]mmigrant writers 
of the early twentieth century were still addressing the artistic problem of how to bring 
Jewish experience to the American reader” (Wisse, 272). In addition, authors with a Jewish 
family background in the U. S. also had to face the challenge of launching their careers 
within the framework of the primarily English-speaking majority literature of the country. 
As a result, different authors were experimenting with a wide range of individual answers 
to these dilemmas. “Antin made herself over into a genteel writer and Cahan 
accommodated the English reader by treating Yiddish as a foreign language, Yezierska 
brought the immigrant streets to life by imitating their cacophony and fractured English” 
(272-273), lists Ruth R. Wisse some of the possible approaches. 
Systematically, the immigrant Jewish author could choose between three options: 
insisting on the mother tongue; trying to mediate between the two cultures; or entirely 
giving up the Jewish heritage for the sake of joining mainstream American literature. The 
first possible approach was not unfamiliar for Jewish writers long used to living in the 
European Diaspora where an educated man would pursue religious studies in Hebrew, 
spoke Yiddish at home and knew enough of the official language of the country he 
happened to live in to be able to get a degree or to conduct business transactions with 
majority citizens. However, confining themselves to Yiddish always involved the risk of 
remaining forever closed in the ghetto of minority literature. Still, the lively Yiddish 
literary life in America, especially in New York City in the first half of the twentieth 
century offered a significant opportunity for many authors like Morris Rosenfeld (1862-
1923), the most notable representative of the “sweatshop poets”, who addressed the 
difficulties of impoverished immigrant laborers at around the turn of the century. 
Obviously, the financial and social difficulties described by them were the chief reason for 
hindering first-generation immigrants’ acculturation in English and consequently their 
insistence on expressing themselves in their mother tongue but it is also not by accident 
that many of the exclusively Yiddish writers were most active in the field of poetry, which 
57 
is more bound to the formal conventions already developed in and therefore bound to a 
particular language than prose.  
Most of the Jewish authors living in America realized soon that success necessarily 
meant succeeding in English so they represented Jewish experiences in the language of 
their new, chosen homeland. This recognition was also in line with the direction of Jewish 
Assimilation movements in Europe, which began in Germany as early as the end of the 
eighteenth century but developed in other countries only very slowly and gradually, 
motivating primarily urban Jewish writers to adapt to producing literature in the majority 
language of their country. Abraham Cahan, for instance, was a first generation immigrant 
and bilingual writer: the competent editor of Yiddish periodicals and the ardent organizer 
of Yiddish literary life wrote his semi-autobiographical novel, the archetype of the 
immigrant novel: The Rise of David Levinsky (1917) in English. Still, it needed to be 
rediscovered by Isaac Rosenfeld in 1952 to be acknowledged as a major accomplishment 
of American literature (Wisser 271). Similarly, Henry Roth’s Call It Sleep (1934), the 
other great example of the genre also received due attention only belatedly, after its reprint 
in 1964.  Apparently, the immigrant status and themes were more of a stigma and therefore 
an obstacle to literary success until the aftermath of the World War II when the 
postmodern trends—not independently of the lessons learnt from the historical 
cataclysm—brought so-far marginal minority issues into the focus of interest. 
Some authors chose the third way: they preferred to establish a career in mainstream 
American literature. It would be probably too far-fetched to propose that such an ambition 
required a conscious choice between the American and the Jewish culture. However, there 
are several texts insinuating or overtly expressing that an American versus a Jewish 
identity was conceived as an either-or question on both sides in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. David Levinsky’s concludes his fictive autobiography by emphasizing 
the ultimate irreconcilability of his two identities: “My past and my present do not comport 
well. David, the poor lad swinging over a Talmud volume at the Preacher's Synagogue, 
seems to have more in common with my inner identity than David Levinsky, the well-
known cloak-manufacturer” (Cahan 372). In Cahan’s dichotomy, Jewish spirituality is set 
in contrast with American materialism, however, the split does not always take the form of 
two opposing values but can be also manifest in one identity completely oppressed or 
replaced by the other.  
It is telling, for example, that Gertrude Stein, who came from a German-Jewish 
family and unquestionably belonged to the first rank of American High Modernism, never 
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addressed Jewish issues directly, although many of the dominant immigrant themes are 
present in her oeuvre. The family saga of The Making of Americans (1925) represents the 
individual’s complex psychology in terms of the rich and ambivalent heritage of a three-
generation family history. Moreover, it speaks of the American identity as the result of the 
self-conscious act of “making”. “A man in his living has many things inside him, he has in 
him his important feeling of himself to himself inside him, he has in him the kind of 
important feeling of himself to himself that makes his kind of man; this comes sometimes 
from a mixture in him of all the kinds of natures in him” (149). Stein was also 
exceptionally sensitive to minority issues. According to the distinguished African 
American writer, Richard Wright, her novella, “Melanchta” (1909) was “the first serious 
literary treatment of Negro life in the United States” (145), quotes Stephen J. Whitfield, 
who also suggests a possible connection between the first person narrative and Stein’s own 
oppressed identity. “Perhaps Stein showed such a gift for ventriloquism precisely because 
her Jewish consciousness was very limited or absent” (145). 
A sense of incompatibility regarding Jewish and American identities appears in 
various texts of Jewish American literature describing the first half of the twentieth century 
in retrospective, too. For instance, David Zimmer, the narrator in the novel The Book of 
Illusions by Paul Auster writes about the first and second decades of the twentieth century 
that “[i]t wasn’t a crime to be a Jew in Hollywood back then. It was merely something that 
one chose not to talk about” (86). More significant is Philip Roth’s relevant passage in his 
summative analysis of Saul Bellow’s work, which celebrates the opening of Bellow’s third  
novel precisely because it  managed to create a full-fledged American  identity by getting 
rid of his Jewish immigrant identity.  
Bellow once told me that “somewhere in my Jewish and immigrant blood there 
were conspicuous traces of doubt as to whether I had the right to practice the 
writer’s trade.” He suggested that, at least in part, this doubt permeated his 
blood because “our own Wasp establishment, represented mainly by Harvard-
trained professors,” considered a son of immigrant Jews unfit to write books in 
English. These guys infuriated him. It may well have been the precious gift of 
an appropriate fury that launched him into beginning his third book not with 
the words, “I am a Jew, the son of immigrants” but, rather, by [...] flatly 
decreeing, without apology or hyphenation, “I am an American, Chicago born. 
[...] This assertion of unequivocal, unquellable citizenship in free-style 
America [...] was precisely the bold stroke required to abolish anyone’s doubts 
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about the American writing credentials of any immigrant son like Saul Bellow. 
Augie at the very end of his book exuberantly cries out, “Look at me, going 
everywhere! Why I am a sort of Columbus of those near-at-hand.” Going 
where his pedigreed betters wouldn’t have believed he had any right to go with 
the American language, Bellow was indeed Columbus for people like me, the 
grandchildren of immigrants, who set out as American writers after him.” 
(Roth, Introduction xi-xiii) 
The last lines of the quotation provide the reader with a further clue to Philip Roth’s first 
collection of stories, Goodbye, Columbus published in 1959, six years after The Adventures 
of Augie March, revealing the self-irony of the title. Roth’s book was, on the one hand, one 
of the most acknowledged representations of Jewish American immigrant milieu, on the 
other hand it is both a celebration of and a farewell to the immigrant tradition and status, 
offering portrays of male characters in each stage of life struggling with and trying to break 
free of their heritage: as a schoolboy (“The Conversion of the Jews”), a student (“You 
Can’t Tell a Man by the Song He Sings”), a soldier (“Defender of the Faith”), a young 
adult (“Goodbye, Columbus”), a mature professional (“Eli, the Fanatic”) or an aging man 
(“Epstein”). Besides the passage above might explain why Roth—like many of his 
colleagues—keeps protesting against being labeled a Jewish American author. “Those 
kinds of considerations are newspaper cliches. Jewish literature. Black literature. Everyone 
who opens a book enters the story without noticing these labels” (“It No Longer Feels”), 
says Roth in an interview made in 2005, when the public interest in minority literatures is 
obviously high. 
 Cynthia Ozick’s novella, “Envy, or Yiddish in America” also addresses the issues 
outlined above. The protagonist, “Edelshtein, an American for forty years, was a ravenous 
reader of novels by writers “of”—he said this with a snarl—“Jewish extraction” (Ozick, 
The Pagan Rabbi 41). The first sentences introduce him as a character of bitter irony 
regarding Jewish American authors. Edelshtein, a Yiddish poet himself, claims to be 
annoyed by the inauthenticity of his fellow authors conveying a false image of Yiddish 
heritage. However, his harsh criticism is soon exposed as mere jealousy directed primarily 
against another Yiddish novelist, Yankel Ostrover, “a thinly disguised caricature of Isaac 
Bashevis Singer” (Friedman 78). On the pretext of their personal conflict, the narrative 
depicts a lively tableau of the Yiddish literary life in the 1960s complete not only with a 
range variety of the characteristic figures and dilemmas in this subculture but also with its 
genres from samples of poetry and diverse forms of fiction to jokes and personal letters. 
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Besides supporting the multifaceted representation of a complex situation, the mixture of 
genres has another essential function: it allows rapid shifts between points of view thus 
fostering the reassessment of opinions and situations often revealing their overt or implied 
irony. 
 The participant constellation—in Katharine Barbe’s terminology—of the ironic 
structure is rarely so clear as in this story, however, the roles of the victim of the irony, of 
the ironist and of the appreciative audience become visible precisely because they are so 
frequently redistributed among the characters. In the beginning, not only Edelshtein is 
introduced as the chief ironist with his contemptuous snarl but his collaborating audience, a 
fellow Yiddish author, Baumzweig, and the butt of their irony, Ostrover both make their 
first appearance in these roles. “Edelshtein’s friendship with Baumzweig had a ferocious 
secret: it was moored entirely to their agreed hatred for the man they called der chazer. He 
was named Pig because of his extraordinarily white skin [...] They also called him Yankee 
Doodle. His name was Yankel Ostrover, and he was a writer of stories” (46). At this point, 
the narrator still seems to comply with Edelshtein’s approach: Ostrover’s nicknames 
precede his real name as if his being laughed at dominated over his actual existence. The 
label “Pig” is especially offensive as it denotes the emblematically impure animal 
according to kashrut, the Jewish dietary laws. In contrast, the next mocking label, Yankee 
Doodle is double-edged: on the one hand, it similarly expresses a sense of being unclean—
not Jewish enough because too Americanized—on the other hand, it refers to the same 
feature that makes Ostrover the object of envy in Edelshtein’s and Baumzweig’s eyes: 
namely, his success in the United States. The same ambiguity of mixed contempt and 
jealousy is present in Edelshtein’s appreciation of Western Culture in general. “Take away 
the Jews and where, O so-called Western Civilization, is your literary culture?” (41), he 
cries out on the first page and on the last he complains that “I lost everything, my whole 
life” because “I have no translator!” (100). This state of mind is in harmony with Sheldon 
Norman Grebstein’s description of what he calls Jewish humor.  
Traditionally, Jewish humor is stark, edged, cynical. It communicates the 
double view of the man who is supposedly superior to the common run of 
humanity because he has been chosen, but finds in actuality that he has really 
been singled out for extra knocks on the head, dealt by those to whom he is 
presumably superior. Consequently, Jewish humor mocks, sneers at human 
foibles and pretensions, and delivers ironic observations about itself and its 
practitioners, the chosen people. Frequently it verges on self-hatred (“An anti-
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semite is a man who hates Jews more than he should.”), or conveys the 
desperation of a wisdom about moral conduct which is impossible to practice. 
(186) 
The bitter self-irony described above dominates Edelshtein’s evaluation of the 
desperate situation of the Yiddish language after World War II. It is a subject on which “he 
lectured for a living” (43) spicing his speeches with jokes, some of them quoted verbatim 
in the novella, like the one on the editor of the last Yiddish daily left, who catches sight of 
a Yiddish funeral procession in the street and immediately warns his colleague, “Hey 
Mottel, print one less!” (43). Edelshtein repeatedly laments that both him “and his 
audiences found the jokes worthless. Old jokes. [...] To speak of Yiddish was to preside 
over a funeral” (43) for “the langue was lost, murdered. The language—a museum” (42) 
and the novella invokes this museum-like effect of Yiddish by inserting numerous Yiddish 
words in the English text, which then need to be translated or at least explained somehow 
by the context for the English reader. The use of sporadic Yiddish expressions to evoke a 
Jewish atmosphere is a frequent narrative tool is Jewish American literature, like in the 
already mentioned examples of Cahan “treating Yiddish as a foreign language” (Wisse 
272) or Singer’s “landsleit” or Philip Roth’s short story, “Defender of the Faith”, in which 
a soldier’s Jewish identity is unveiled by his comrade when he happens to say “shul” 
instead of “church” (Roth, Goodbye 165). Still, the exuberance of Yiddish words and even 
sentences in Ozick’s text turns into the means of irony, as they are considered by 
Edelshtein the only authentic medium of conveying meaning and at the same time they are 
practically the obstacles hindering understanding. Therefore the text speaks about the 
difficulties regarding Yiddish not only in a descriptive but also in a performative way. 
 Telling a story in English about characters who allegedly speak and write 
exclusively in Yiddish has further consequences, too. First of all, the Yiddish words 
mentioned above stand out from the text although they are the only “true” samples of the 
“original” plot, which is one of the means of calling the reader’s attention to the fictive 
nature of the narrative. Besides, Edelshtein accuses Ostrover of his spoiled use of Yiddish, 
which cannot be reproduced in the text—proving or refuting the indictment—so the 
contrast between the two authors is mirrored in a different way by Ozick, by the use of 
diverse genres. Ostrover’s expresses himself in carefully constructed texts: samples of his 
fiction and the public dialogues of interviews and “Question and Answer” sessions. In 
opposition, Edelshtein’s medium is the outdated, much less popular genre of poetry and the 
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various forms of private utterances: conversations, letters, jokes and stream of 
consciousness passages.  
This opposition influences the participant constellation of the ironic structure as well. 
While all of the texts by Ostrover are on a professional level, the paragraphs told or written 
by Edelshtein make the impression of being contingent, occasionally amateurish and often 
hysterically fragmented—especially towards the end when Edelshtein gets feverish 
hallucinations—therefore inferior and less convincing. For example, the middle section of 
the story is a flashback from the end of the 1940s when Ostrover had a short liaison with 
Edelshtein’s wife, both of them recording and publishing the incident afterwards as 
literature, in the form of a fable versus a four-line “malediction” (49), respectively. The 
tight structure and the elegantly impersonal voice of the fable ending in a funny punch line 
easily triumphs over the short poem displaying only an offensive, transparently personal 
tone and old-fashioned rhymes. This impression is enforced on the level of the plot as well. 
At the start, Baumzweig takes sides with Edelshtein but as the story unfolds he joins 
Ostrover’s audience at a public reading laughing at an anecdote overtly parodying 
Edelshtein. Since the conflict between the two antagonists is a literary contest, Ostrover’s 
superiority of style involves an overall victory, turning the original ironic constellation 
completely upside down. This general, social triumph gained through the medium of 
literature also highlights the prevalence of “fiction”—of what exists in the mind—over 
“reality”; which is in line with the Schlegelian understanding of irony. 
The only poem by Edelshtein unanimously celebrated by all the characters as his best 
is one of his early pieces. Addressing his ancestors, “Little fathers, little uncles, you with 
your beards and glasses and curly hair...” (69), the speaker in the poem concludes “I have 
no business being your future” (70). The poem is quoted in a conversation by a young 
woman, Hannah when she is introduced to Edelshtein and recognizes him as the author of 
the poem above, which her grandfather used to tell her as a child. The poet is deeply 
impressed by being acknowledged by the future generation and tries to convince Hannah to 
translate some of his poetry into English but she rejects him. Thus the implicit irony of the 
poem is dramatized in the novella. The lyrical voice both celebrates his forefathers’ 
tradition and grieves over its end, still, the only form of empathy he can offer for the ones 
addressed in the poem is joining them in an imaginary death: “let me fall into your graves” 
(70). Hannah’s appreciation of Edelshtein’s poem first gives him the hope that it might 
indicate her willingness to continue the tradition with his poem serving as a bridge between 
the generations. However, she takes the standpoint expressed in the poem “I have no 
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business being your future” so she ironically refuses to cooperate with the poet on the 
common ground of his own words. 
Translation is the central concern of the novella. Ostrover becomes popular in 
English translation while Edelshtein blames his lack of success on not having a translator 
and most of the plot consists of his repeated attempts to get one in vain, via letters written 
to publishers and translators, phone calls, personal encounters and finally an overwhelming 
hallucinatory finale, in which the reader can no longer decide which sentences depict 
reality and which are only imagined by Edelshtein in his delirium. These last pages 
ironically reproduce the poet’s plight: the more precisely they describe his state of mind 
focusing on the untranslatability of the tradition he represents the more excluded he gets 
from the communication between and the mental reality of the others.  
Translation is the primary theme of the conversations, too. Various characters voice 
diverse aspects of the problem pointed out by Lawrence Venuti. “Translation never 
communicates in an untroubled fashion because the translator negotiates the linguistic and 
cultural differences of the foreign text by reducing them and supplying another set of 
differences, basically domestic, drawn from the receiving language and culture to enable 
the foreign to be received there” (468). Edelshtein emphasizes the loss resulting from the 
shift and, in accordance with him, Ostrover’s translator also sees language as the primary 
component of a literary text, “Who makes the language Ostrover is famous for? [...] I’m 
the one” (55). In contrast, Ostrover accentuates the meaning of a literary work independent 
of the actual language transmitting it in a fable on the bad poet who is given the gift of 
writing in numerous languages by Satan but who has to throw every poem he wrote out the 
window “because it was trash anyhow” (61). A fable is an ironic genre in itself, as it 
communicates its often critical message only when the reader recognizes how the 
characters of the story represent human beings and behaviors alluded to by the author (or 
explained in the moral appended to the story). In this case, the irony is increased by the 
presence of its butt, Edelshtein, at the public reading of the text. When he, offended and 
furious, runs out of the room he is only comforted by a mad mathematician, Vorovsky, 
who gives the briefest summary of the novella’s primary issue, “Translation is no 
equation” (66) but who cannot offer any other way out of the dilemmas indicated above 
than laughing at them. “Despair up your ass. I’m a happy man. I know something about 
laughter”, he tells Edelshtein trying to console him, however, his argumentation works 
rather against himself as the chief symptom of his madness is the series of uncontrollable 
fits of laughter he has been suffering from for seventeen years, since he accomplished the 
64 
compilation of his mathematical dictionary, which he judges to be good only for toilet 
paper (65). 
It is not easy to locate the position of the author among these conflicting opinions. 
Still, it cannot be neglected either for Ozick is not only the writer of the narrative but is 
also implied among its themes as a “so-called Jewish novelist” herself, frequently mocked 
by Edelshtein, for example in the following passage. “In a so-called novel by a so-called 
Jewish novelist [...] the hero visits Williamsburg to contact a so-called “miracle rabbi”. 
Even the word rabbi! [...] You have to KNOW something! At least the difference between a 
rav and a rebbeh! [...] Otherwise where’s the joke, where’s the satire, where’s the 
mockery? American-born! An ignoramus mocks only himself. Jewish novelists” (79). In 
other words, Edelshtein proposes to set a linguistic prerequisite for a proper Jewish 
identity: a solid knowledge of Yiddish. Apparently, this idea tends to recur in the field of 
Jewish American literature. In 2008, for instance, Leon Wieseltier gave a keynote lecture 
with the title “Language, Identity and the Scandal of American Jewry” blaming American 
Jewish authors for their “Jewish illiteracy”. However, Wieseltier, unlike Ozick’s character, 
claimed for proficiency not in Yiddish but in Hebrew. In the light of this still ongoing and 
passionate dispute, Ozick’s self-ironic tableau of the literary milieu in the 1960s, which she 
was also part of, seems to highlight the complexity of the issue and the hopelessness of 
trying to settle the debate once and for all. At the same time, the character of Vorovsky 
embodying the extreme case of self-irony with his uncontrollable laugh demonstrates that 
simply laughing over the futility of any effort in this regard is sheer madness. So in my 
reading, Ozick’s story playing out different ironies against each other dramatizes the 
recognition that in a complicated situation like a transition of identity one cannot take a 
plausible stand without acknowledging the subjectivity and the contingency, therefore the 
only temporal validity, of any such decision.   
Ozick explained her own views on the issues above in the essay “Toward a New 
Yiddish”, which is the published version of a speech she delivered at a conference in 
Rehovoth, Israel in 1970. There she investigates “the position of Jewish culture in the 
American Diaspora” (170) by giving an overview of some of the great cataclysms of 
Jewish history, highlighting two crucial periods. First she points out the role of the 
Academy of Yavneh in the survival of Jewish culture after the destruction of the Second 
Temple in Jerusalem in 70 AD (173-174) and draws a parallel between the Jewish 
community there and the one in the United States after the Holocaust claiming it to be the 
responsibility of Jewish American intelligentsia to preserve the values of Jewish culture 
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like the rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai and his colleagues managed to do in Yavneh by 
recording the rabbinical literature in the writings of the Aggadah. Then she suggests that 
the medium of the current survival for Jewish culture should be English considered as 
“New Yiddish” (174) transmitting Jewish tradition in a vernacular already in use and 
relying on the solid and great literature of the host language, like it happened in the case of 
Yiddish based on German. Consequently, Ozick argues that Jewish American authors 
should not try join mainstream American literature at the expense of giving up Jewish 
tradition. On the contrary, she says that the only opportunity for Jewish writers is to 
address minority issues or else they will not be able to say anything of importance. 
According to her by now famous metaphor, “If we blow into the narrow end of the shofar, 
we will be heard far. But if we choose to be Mankind rather than Jewish and blow into the 
wider part, we will not be heard at all; for us America will have been in vain” (177). 
Ozick’s proposition sounds reasonable enough. The question still remains though: if a 
minority is supposed to get rid of its homelands, its language, its religion and all its 
customs incompatible with its host country—in this particular case, of everyday American 
life—for the sake of survival then what is left that could be blown into the narrow end of 
the shofar apart from the stories resulting in such questions? 
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3 THE HOLOCAUST IN JEWISH AMERICAN LITERATURE 
3.1 Introduction: European Survivors and American Contemporaries 
“I entered literature [...] [t]hrough silence” (907) writes Elie Wiesel in his crucial 
essay “Why I Write” on the position of the survivor. On the one hand, his writing is 
motivated by the compelling moral obligation of the witness to testify. “I believed that, 
having survived by chance, I was duty-bound to give meaning to my survival, to justify 
each moment of my life. I knew the story had to be told. Not to transmit an experience is to 
betray it; this is what Jewish tradition teaches us” (907). On the other hand, he constantly 
struggles with the unspeakability of the Holocaust.
We all knew that we could never, never say what had to be said, that we could 
never express in words, coherent, intelligible words, our experience of madness 
on an absolute scale. [...] All words seemed inadequate [...] hoarse shouting, 
screams, muffled moanings, savage howling, the sound of beating [...] This is 
the concentration camp language. It negated all other language and took its 
place. Rather than link, it became wall. Could it be surmounted? Could the 
reader be brought to the other side? I knew the answer to be negative, and yet I 
also knew that “no” had to become “yes”. It was the wish, the last will of the 
dead. [...] Remember, said the father to his son, and the son to his friend. [...] 
Such was the oath we had all taken: “If, by some miracle, I emerge alive, I will 
devote my life to testifying on behalf of those whose shadow will fall on mine 
forever and ever.” (907-908) 
The metaphor of silence in Wiesel’s text refers both to the silence of the dead, who 
cannot talk any longer so they need the author lending them a voice and to the silence of 
language proving unsatisfactory for any narrative attempt on this subject. It is also in 
harmony with the concept of silence as a psychological symptom of PTSD (post-traumatic 
stress disorder) syndrome. Trauma, as Cathy Caruth defines it in her essay on “Unclaimed 
Experience: Trauma and the Possibility of History”, “describes an overwhelming 
experience of sudden, or catastrophic events, in which the response to the event occurs in 
the often delayed, and uncontrolled repetitive occurrence of hallucinations and other 
intrusive phenomena” (181). Accordingly, silence results from the traumatized individual’s 
“effort to forget the appalling event, leading to the avoidance of any-trauma-related stimuli 
that activate the memory of the traumatic situation” (Kolá  7) usually accompanied by 
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“repetition compulsion, perpetually re-experiencing the overwhelming event(s) in 
flashbacks, dreams, hallucinations” (Kolá  7). Consequently, these two phenomena often 
appear in Holocaust literature.  
For example, they are the two principles organizing the narrative structure of Edward 
Lewis Wallant’s Holocaust novel, The Pawnbroker, the title character of which is Sol 
Nazerman, a Holocaust survivor living in New York City. The primary plot taking place in 
the 1950s portrays the taciturn protagonist, who lives with his sister and her family and 
supports her lover and her family, too, yet is unable to have a meaningful, intimate 
conversation with any of them. The reader is informed about his concentration camp 
memories only in the form of hallucinatory flashbacks and nightmares written in italics 
interrupting the development of the plot at irregular intervals. “Sol tried to object. He 
reached down for his voice but was able only to bring up an immense strangling pain” 
(Wallant 276). The only person Sol feels attached to is his young nephew, Morton, who 
attends an art school so communicates not so much verbally as visually. He is glimpsed 
sitting at his table “drawing his Uncle Sol from a tiny snapshot” (Wallant 245) and he is 
the only person Sol wants to talk to after the climax of the story: the second trauma of a 
robbery and a murder the pawnbroker is forced to witnesses. “‘Morton,’ I want to speak to 
Morton,’ he said as soon as he heard the phone picked up at the other end. [...] ‘Morton,’ 
he insisted. It was as though only that word kept the drowsiness at bay” (Wallant 274). So 
the main plotline is defined by Sol’s silence whereas the passages in italics represent his 
repressed memories, and the wordless bond between Morton and Sol illustrates that 
communication regarding the Holocaust requires something beyond the capacity of 
ordinary language. 
Language fails at the representation of Holocaust not simply because it lacks the 
vocabulary necessary to transmit experiences “of madness on an absolute scale” (907), as 
Wiesel put it. The other reason for its failure is its recognized corruption as the ultimate set 
of mental frameworks which themselves made the Holocaust possible. Mihály Szegedy-
Maszák calls the attention to this in his essay on “The Outsider and the Involved: the Irony 
of Understanding” (“A kívülálló és az érintett: a megértés iróniája”), in which he celebrates 
Imre Kertész’s Fateless for its irony foregrounding the immense tension between the 
narrator-protagonist’s contemporaneous knowledge and the reader’s posterior 
interpretation of the tragic events (Szegedy-Maszák 401). In one of Szegedy-Maszák’s 
examples (401), the narrator comments on an elderly lady travelling on the same train to 
the concentration camp and dying of thirst: “But we knew that she was sick and old; under 
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these circumstances everyone, myself included, thought the event was completely 
understandable” (Kertész 55). This sentence as well as other frequent elements certifying 
the adolescent protagonist’s compliance with the ideological system that victimized him 
make evident the essential problem of the only language available yet already disqualified 
to comprehend the events. So his memorably enigmatic and ironic final thoughts on “the 
happiness in those camps” (Kertész 191) might refer to the state of mind when his belief in 
language—and the social norms and consensual understanding it is supposed to 
represent—was still intact. The collapse of language and, inseparably, the collapse of 
identity result in a situation where neither the subject nor the media of communication 
available for him are reliable any longer so it is impossible for the narrator to write directly 
about his experiences; he can only allude to them ironically in Szegedy-Maszák’s term, or 
self-ironically, as I prefer to call it. 
Besides the inadequacy of language, the authenticity of the speaking voice is also 
problematic. Speaking on behalf of someone else—those who perished, as Wiesel 
claims—always involves the risk of misinterpretation. Even first generation survivors 
themselves do not have a full access to the entire tragedy and to the ultimate experiences of 
the deceased ones, or else they would not be alive and could not speak. In case of 
American contemporaries, the distance between the author and the theme is bigger 
therefore the result is more questionable. However, the moral obligation to address these 
issues is still present, or possibly more urging due to the unharmed contemporary’s sense 
of guilt.  This dilemma has frequently been addressed by several Jewish American writers. 
Arthur Hertzberg, for examples, explains that in his essay “A Generation Later”.  
I did not die at Auschwitz nor did I survive it. As a statement of fact this is 
obvious, but I say it nonetheless because I am tired of the impertinent 
metaphors among the novelists and theologians who play-act with this theme. 
They must, for men must cope as best they can with the memory of their own 
or other people’s helplessness. (61) 
Cynthia Ozick is also conscious of the embarrassing trap of feeling compelled to address 
the subject of the Holocaust but being aware at the same time the she can never do that 
with fully satisfying authenticity.  
INTERVIEWER 
The Holocaust figures in many of your stories. Is the Holocaust a subject you 
feel you must confront in your writing? 
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OZICK 
I write about it. I can’t not. But I don’t think I ought to. [...] Now we, each one 
of us, Jew and Gentile, born during or after that time, we, all of us, forever 
after are witnesses to it. We know it happened: We are the generations that 
come after. I want the documents to be enough; I don’t want to tamper or 
invent or imagine. And yet I have done it. I can’t not do it. It comes, it invades. 
(Ozick, Paris Review) 
 Consequently, Jewish American authors writing about the Holocaust often choose 
an ironic or self-ironic approach to their theme. Similarly to Imre Kertész, they emphasize 
their necessarily limited understanding of their subject and the obstacles to giving a true 
representation of it. In most of the cases to be analyzed in the following subchapters, this 
effect is achieved by the juxtaposition of two plotlines and at least two definitive 
viewpoints mutually questioning and re-interpreting each other. However, actual 
realizations of this basic pattern greatly differ according to the logic of the survivors’ 
succeeding generations and the individual authors. 
3.2 First Generation Survivors 
 Empathy is a key concept in the representation of the Holocaust by Jewish 
American authors contemporaneous with the World War II. By definition, most of them do 
not have a first-hand experience of the Holocaust therefore they can approach the theme 
only through empathy. Empathy is also of essential importance regarding this paper as it is 
the feature distinguishing self-irony from irony. Irony is “pure negation” (267) as 
Kierkegaard put it, whereas a self-ironic text is the result of the oscillation between the 
speaker’s initial position and other contrasting yet equally justifiable alternatives 
contemplated with empathy. On the one hand, empathy is necessary for the community as 
it enhances tolerance and cooperation, on the other hand it might question and thus 
destabilize the individual’s identity calling for its revaluation in a context where the 
speaker no longer possesses the central position but is observed only as one among other, 
similarly important subjects: the ones that the speaker empathizes with. The following 
short stories addressing the issue of the Holocaust from the point of view of the American 
contemporary reflect on these problems: the necessity but also the limits and effects of 
empathy.  
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 The first two narratives to be discussed in this chapter are “representative short 
stories—Bernard Malamud’s ‘The German Refugee’ [...] and Philip Roth’s ‘Eli, the 
Fanatic’— [... which] capture the complex national ironies and metaphysical dissonances 
that drive the narratives of departures and arrivals stemming from the Nazi era” (Muller 
32). Besides their outstanding canonical position, they are also of interest for the decisive 
importance of ironical and self-ironical elements in both. Evelyn Avery, for instance, 
speaks of the “ironic and tragic ‘German Refugee’” (xii), whereas Victoria Aarons locates 
the first appearance of ambiguity as a central structural principle of Roth’s oeuvre in “Eli, 
the Fanatic”. 
“I am me. They are them”—the ambiguous language with which Eli attempts 
to free himself only makes his uncertainty increasingly clear. The comically 
confused, shifting pronominal bantering between Eli and his antagonist—“You 
are us, we are you... They are you... No... You are you”— sets the conditions 
for the kind of doubling and redoubling that will haunt Roth’s characters 
throughout his fiction (Aarons, “American Jewish Identity” 14) 
 “It’s the commuting that’s killing” (Roth, Goodbye, Columbus 250) says the title 
character in “Eli, the Fanatic” as he first enters the dim room of Rabbi Tzuref and the scene 
of Philip Roth’s short story. In the context of the initial dialogue, Eli’s remark refers to the 
transportation between New York City, where he works and the suburban town of 
Woodenton, where he lives but it also insinuates his middle-man position, which makes 
him the central character in the conflict between “The Jews of Woodenton” (262), as they 
call themselves, and the “Yeshivah of Woodenton” (262). The former label is chosen by 
the local community of well-assimilated second and third generation Jewish American 
immigrants while the latter includes the rabbi and eighteen children, all of them first 
generation Holocaust survivors. These two meanings of generations in a Jewish American 
context—outlined in Chapter 2.1—imply opposing ambitions: the Jews of Woodenton 
strive for assimilation and want to enjoy undisturbed what they have already accomplished 
along that way whereas the newly settled Tzuref and the children hold on to Jewish 
customs since there is nothing else left to them. Their arrival foregrounds the question of 
identity, which their already assimilated fellow citizens would like to forget about so the 
Jews of Woodenton try to get rid of the Yeshivah, entrusting Eli Peck, the young attorney 
to find some legal opportunity for it. The available formal excuse against the Yeshivah 
(Jewish school) is a local law that prohibits the establishment of any school in a residential 
area. Eli as the member and the chosen representative of the assimilated Jewish community 
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tries to mediate a compromise between his clients and the newcomers. In course of the 
narrative, the conflict of the two groups is gradually relocated into his own person both in a 
physical and a psychological sense, dramatizing how the social dissent turns into a crisis of 
identity on the level of the individual.  
 The contrast of the two groups is manifest on every level of the narrative from 
interpersonal relationships to language use or various symbolical elements. The Yeshivah 
is located on the top of a hill, above Woodenton, which might imply moral superiority, 
reminiscent of the topography in “The Conversion of the Jews” published in the same book 
as “Eli, the Fanatic”.  It consists of about twenty people but has only two discernible faces: 
Rabbi Tzuref and an unnamed, mute character mostly referred to as the “greenhorn” (255) 
or “greenie” (281) by the Jews of Woodenton, who, on the other hand, include several 
more or less elaborately portrayed characters with first and last names, families, friends, 
professions and explicitly verbalized opinions. In other words, the citizens of the town are 
represented as a group of individuals while the Yeshivah makes the impression of a 
monolithic community. Eli is under pressure in both sites: he is just about to become a 
father, which is considered by his wife and all their friends in Woodenton as both a happy 
perspective and some sort of psychological crisis in a man’s life, whereas the Yeshivah is 
full of children who have just lost not only their fathers but all their families and homes, 
invoking the young lawyer’s sympathy. Accordingly, the prevailing rhetoric is different, 
too: the Yeshivah is dominated by the rabbi’s “Talmudic wisdom” ( Roth, Goodbye, 
Columbus 267) relying on the historically accumulated communal knowledge of Judaism 
and voicing the similarly collective experiences of the Holocaust while Eli’s wife is an 
ardent believer in Freudian psychotherapy, which concentrates on the individual’s psyche. 
Eli is irritated by both, still he tries to negotiate between them although “[t]oo often he 
wished he were pleading for the other side; though if he were on the other side, then he’d 
wish he were on the side he was” (254). 
 Eli’s double perspective is supported by the ambiguity of numerous textual 
elements. The sensitivity to the controversial interpretations of the same phrase in different 
contexts is evoked early in the story, during the first conversation of Tzuref and Eli, as a 
response to the attorney, who calls the rabbi’s attention to the local regulation prohibiting 
the Yeshivah. 
“The law is the law,” Tzuref said. 
“Exactly!” Eli had the urge to rise and walk about the room. 
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“And then of course”—Tzuref made a pair of scales in the air with his hands—
“The law is not the law. When is the law that is the law not the law?” He 
jiggled the scales. “And vice versa.” (251) 
Tzuref points out the contrast between the eternal divine Law of humanity and the 
ephemeral, man-made legislation, while Eli desperately tries to defend his fellow citizens’ 
standpoint he is entrusted to represent. However, when he gets home, he argues just as 
desperately against his wife’s psychological approach. 
“Eli, you’re upset. I understand.” 
“You don’t understand.”” 
She left the room. From the stairs she called, “I do, sweetheart.” 
It was a trap! He would grow angry knowing she would be “understanding”. 
She would in turn grow more understanding seeing his anger. He would in turn 
grow angrier... (257) 
The narrator acutely analyzes the power struggle underlying the word “understanding”, 
which is meant to express empathy but at the same time ironically implies aggression: the 
attempt to force an interpretative system on the other. Miriam’s gesture of understanding 
means that she wants to diminish her husband’s growing distress as just another symptom 
of Eli feeling upset about the coming of their baby, a minor discomfort to be treated by 
psychotherapy. However, this is the very approach Eli wants to elude: he rejects the all too 
familiar and selfish routine of ignoring the world and seeking solution exclusively in one’s 
private sphere. Quite on the contrary, he wants to experience his anxiety to its full depth in 
order to act on the level of the community, motivated by what Hana Wirth-Nesher calls 
“Jewish Americans’ ethical unease regarding their European brethren” (119). In line with 
the ambiguities above, the description given by Eli’s friend of the Yeshivah self-ironically 
fits the assimilated inhabitants of Woodenton insensible to world history just as well. “All 
the place is, is a hideaway for people who can't face life. [...] They have all these 
superstitions, and why do you think? Because they can't face the world” (277). 
 Besides verbal ambiguities, other levels of the narrative are also rich in doubles. 
Most significant is the parallel between Eli and his counterpart, the “greenhorn”. He is first 
glimpsed wearing his traditional kaftan: “Eli saw him. At first it seemed only a deep 
hollow of blackness—then the figure emerged” (253). The two young men are of similar 
age, and have similar roles providing the link between the two communities—the 
greenhorn does the shopping for the whole Yeshivah, being the only one who ever 
descends from the hill while Eli is the only Jew from Woodenton who ever enters the 
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Yeshivah— but they are just as much the opposite of each other, too. The man without a 
name never talks while most of the story consists of Eli’s various communications—face 
to face dialogues, phone calls, letters etc.—and the newcomer possesses nothing whereas 
the attorney is a married and prosperous young professional. In an attempt to reconcile the 
two groups, Eli gifts his own green suit to the survivor so he can mix unnoticeably among 
the others in Woodenton; the pun hidden in the gesture is deeply ironic since the man is 
expected to be dressed in green in order not to be mocked as a “greenie”.  As a response, 
the man not only starts to wear the newly received clothes but leaves his kaftan and his 
underwear in a box for Eli, who also puts them on. The blackness of the traditional clothes 
are not simply in sharp contrast with the colorful world of Woodenton—“Harriet Knudson 
was giving her stones a second coat of pink” (287) —but they also allude to the 
unspeakable and universal tragedy, to death as the ultimate lack of light, which is in 
harmony with the muteness of the bestower. When Eli opens the box, the “shock at first 
was the shock of having daylight turned off all at once. Inside the box was an eclipse” 
(285). The exchange of clothes not only symbolizes an exchange of personalities but 
literally affects the local community as such: the citizens of Woodenton repeatedly mistake 
one young man for the other, resulting in a series of bitterly comic scenes. Moreover, the 
attorney himself feels a transformation of identity. When meeting his counterpart, “Eli had 
the strange notion that he was two people. Or that he was one person wearing two suits" 
(289).  
 The self-ironic conclusion of the story leaves all the ambiguities suspended. On the 
one hand, Eli finally yields to the Yeshiva people’s call for empathic identification and 
visits his newborn son in the hospital dressed in the kaftan. On the other hand, his 
transformation is perceived and treated in the hospital as a nervous breakdown. In Allen 
Guttman’s reading—determined by the context of his book The Jewish Writer in America: 
Assimilation and the Crisis of Identity—this ending suggests that “[t]here is only one path 
across the psychic abyss that separates Woodenton from the yeshiva—madness” (71). But 
even Eli’s madness is a question left open by Roth, who both emphasizes the substantial 
need for empathy and simultaneously undermines this interpretation by depicting its 
destabilizing effects in a comic style. 
  While the self-irony in Roth’s story questioned the identity of the protagonist 
representing assimilated American Jewry, Malamud’s “The German Refugee” articulates 
dilemmas regarding Holocaust narratives. It is the story of “Oskar Gassner, the Berlin 
critic and journalist” (Malamud, Complete Stories 357) told by a first person Jewish 
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American narrator, a college student who makes his living by giving English lessons to 
refugees recently arrived to the United States. “To many of these people, articulate as they 
were, the great loss was the loss of language—that they could not say what was in them to 
say. You have some subtle thought and it comes out like a piece of broken bottle” (360). 
The student describes a summer’s hard work spent in close cooperation on mounting 
language barriers and overcoming Gassner’s psychological inhibitions in order to prepare 
him for his new job as a lecturer on the German progenitors of Whitman in the fall 
semester. The first lecture proves to be a success, still, Gassner commits suicide two days 
later, after receiving news that his gentile wife left at home was killed by the Nazis. 
The turn is bitterly ironic not only as it suggests the ultimate inescapability of being 
victimized by the Holocaust in the conclusion of a narrative on someone’s efforts who, 
apparently, has just been rescued. It is also ironic how the grand narrative of historical 
threat and liberation finally falls prey to the petty sentiments and inadvertences of a 
household romance. Gassner’s wife stays in Germany since the couple has been somewhat 
estranged for several reasons, including the wife’s mother, a “dreadful anti-Semite” (365). 
Still, the woman is killed because she converts to Judaism in the absence of her husband; 
presumably as a gesture expressing her love and wish for their reunion, ironically leading 
to their deaths and thus their final separation. So Gassner’s suicide is motivated by his 
sense of guilt, an absurd yet frequent feeling even among survivors personally not 
responsible for anyone’s tragedy (Prot 63). It adds to the ironic distance that the reader gets 
no direct information: the details are learnt from the mother-in-law’s obviously not 
unbiased letter reporting on the circumstances of her daughter’s death and from the 
narrator, who—by his mere presence as a language teacher and translator and also by his 
professional remarks—permanently calls the reader’s attention to the difficulties and losses 
involved in translation. Therefore Malamud simultaneously celebrates literature—
regarding Gassner’s lecture, which provides a link between German and American 
cultures—and self-ironically highlights the inaccessibility of actual stories lying hidden 
beneath what can be verbalized—regarding communication breakdown in Gassner’s 
family as well as his death not prevented by his friend and tutor—an observation often 
emphasized in Holocaust literature. Kenneth M. Price points out a similar double 
connotation implied in a passage by Whitman quoted in Gassner’s lecture: “And I know the 
Spirit of God is the brother of my own, / And that all the men ever born are also my 
brothers” (Malamud Complete Stories 367). According to Price, “Malamud responds to the 
attractiveness of Whitman’s dream of brotherhood and questions whether it can have any 
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meaning in an age haunted by the Holocaust” (85); a clear description of what I call a self-
ironic attitude. 
Another short story by Malamud, “The Loan” addresses the theme of the Holocaust 
somewhat indirectly. The plot takes place in the bakery of a Jewish Russian immigrant, 
Lieb, who is visited by his childhood friend, Kobotsky. The visitor asks for a loan for his 
wife, more precisely, to set up a stone on her grave, a gesture of commemoration he has 
not been able to afford for five years due to a whole series of misfortunes, including 
sickness, poverty and sudden death in the family. Lieb is on the verge of yielding but his 
wife, Bessie prevents him from sharing their meagre savings with the visitor by telling her 
own series of tragedies, finishing her reminiscences with the sad appraisal of her “elder 
brother in Germany, who sacrificed his own chances to send her, before the war, to 
America, and himself ended, with wife and daughter, in one of Hitler’s incinerators” 
(Malamud, Complete Stories 98). The black humor lying in the competition of personal 
tragedies for the petty reward of 200 dollars pries into the most difficult questions of 
empathy. On the one hand, Bessie’s ultimate, unsurpassably triumphant argument is the 
Holocaust: the moral imperative that she has to give meaning to her brother’s sacrifice by 
sustaining her life and taking care of her future. This argumentation is also in harmony 
with the title, which might refer not only to the loan Kobotsky asks from Lieb but also to 
life received as a temporary gift, a loan—provided either by God or by one’s ancestors—
that one is obliged to use effectively. At the same time, the duty of commemoration is a 
substantial element of and the main motive for Holocaust literature. In that sense, 
Malamud ironically turns the usual logic of Holocaust fiction inside out: Bessie argues for 
the priority of life over the symbolical bond with the deceased ones relying on the 
Holocaust, a context in which commemoration is usually of utmost importance. The 
ambiguity is emphasized in the final scene of the story evoking the image of concentration 
camp crematoria. “Bessie [...] ran into the rear and with a cry wrenched open the oven 
door. A cloud of smoke billowed out at her. The loaves in the trays were blackened 
bricks—charred corpses” (99). Thus Malamud warns the reader that the prolonged 
conversation on death results in the baker forgetting about nourishing life. However, the 
image also serves as an involuntary yet symbolical reminder of the deceased ones haunting 
the story, in other words, as the very memorial Bessie has been successfully arguing 
against all through the conversation. Thus “The Loan” can be read as a self-ironic parable 
on the theme of survival after the Holocaust. The dilemma is not resolved but deepened by 
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the closing sentences. “Kobotsky and the baker embraced and sighed over their lost youth. 
They pressed mouths together and parted forever” (99).  
Malamud’s narrative would be worth reading in comparison with another short 
story, “A Small, Good Thing” by Raymond Carver, as it shows numerous remarkable 
parallels with “The Loan” in many respects. Since Carver does not belong to Jewish 
American literature, a full-fledged analysis would go out beyond the scope of this study. 
Still, a few comparative observations might be revealing to the interpretation of both 
stories. “A Small, Good Thing” also concentrates on survival: its protagonists are young 
parents who just lost their son, Scotty, in a car accident on his birthday, right before the 
party. Since in the turmoil they completely forget about the birthday cake, the annoyed and 
uninformed baker keeps calling them asking “Have you forgotten about Scotty?” (Carver 
399). Many elements of the final scene, in which the characters figure out the 
misunderstanding, resemble Malamud’s “The Loan”. Both uncanny conversations take 
place in a bakery and both contemplate on the issue of surviving after having lost a beloved 
person. However, the closure of Carver’s narrative seems to be just the opposite of “The 
Loan”. Malamud’s bread is charred while Carver’s baker feeds the grieving parents with 
sweet and appetizing “cinnamon rolls just out of the oven” (404). In contrast to Kobotsky’s 
final, bitter departure, Carver’s characters “talked on into the early morning, the high, pale 
cast of light in the windows, and they did not think of leaving” (405). In other words, 
Malamud’s characters part because they have run out of words, whereas Carver’s story 
ends where introspection begins. The baker and the parents enter a conversation, the 
intimacy and depth of which is triggered by the tragedy. This open ending so characteristic 
of Carver’s minimalist style is interpreted as black humor by Jingqiong Zhou in his book 
on Raymond Carver’s Short Fiction in the History of Black Humor.  
[O]ne feature in Carver’s fictional forms of black humor, however, is an ending 
that can dislocate, or relocate epiphanies. [....] Carver’s fiction is replete with 
understatement, indirection, and suggestion. [....] Many of Carver’s stories [....] 
can bring characters to a point where they cannot see how much insight they 
will gain or what will come as a result of it. Insight, if there is any, is left 
suspended. (Zhou 12) 
Apparently, Carver’s black humor results from the juxtaposition of incongruent yet 
undeniably coexisting facts: the young boy’s birthday and the day of his death, the baker’s 
petty annoyance and the parents’ fatal tragedy, the impossibility and the obligation of 
survival; and the open ending claims for a mental framework that could embrace all of 
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life’s absurdity. Malamud’s story, on the other hand, rather sets in contrast diverse possible 
interpretations of events in form of rational arguments for everyday life versus the moral 
and emotional duty of commemoration and various tragic personal narratives. Although 
Bessie wins the debate, the narrator’s description of the final scene dominated by the burnt 
and the destructed friendship self-ironically works against the logic exposed on the level of 
the dialogues. Thus Carver’s black humor reveals the absurdity of life whereas Malamud’s 
self-irony emphasizes the unsatisfying nature of the available interpretive paradigms and 
personal responses. 
Both Roth and Malamud represent the Holocaust from the contemporary American 
Jewry’s point of view. Each of the three stories is based on attempts at and the failures of 
empathy, indicating “the untranslatability of both the trauma of the Holocaust and the 
culture of the survivors” (Wirth-Nesher 119). Thus the self-ironic structures allow the 
authors to articulate acute and dramatic questions pointing towards various possible 
interpretations, leaving the choice to the reader.    
3.3 Second Generation Survivors 
In an interview made with Art Spiegelman for the BBC on the occasion of his 
recently published MetaMaus, the writer starts his response with the funny observation that 
“there’s something very mad about being interviewed about a book that’s built around an 
interview that’s built around another book around an interview” (Spiegelman, Interview 
1:05—1:18). The repetitive structure of his remark not only parodies the several layers in 
and between his two books, Maus I-II, which tell the story of the author’s father, a 
Holocaust survivor, and MetaMaus: A Look Inside a Modern Classic: Maus, which 
purportedly provides the reader with all the available background material and authorial 
comment Spiegelman felt worth sharing with his audience, including recorded 
conversations with his father and family photos as well as the author’s feedback on his 
own work and its afterlife in the form of a great and thorough interview. He also insinuates 
that there is no unprocessed reality—raw documents, original story, authorial intent etc.—
separable from fiction—the artefact itself—no artistic form—e. g. the printed book or its 
genre—separable from its meaning—e. g. messages directly exposed in an oral 
conversation—but themes and interpretations are interdependent, continuous constituents 
of the same phenomenon, which might even exchange positions, functions and media, 
depending on the actual situation and its participants.  
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Spiegelman’s attitude illustrated by the quotation above defines his major work, 
Maus I-II., an emblematic piece of Holocaust fiction addressing the theme of second 
generation survivors. Amy Hungerford calls it “self-reflexive irony” (96) in her book On 
The Holocaust of Texts: Genocide, Literature and Personification whereas Andreas 
Huyssen labels it as “self-reflexivity, self-irony” (30) in his essay “Of Mice and Mimesis”. 
In harmony with the terminology used in this paper, I also examine the self-reflexive 
features of Spiegelman’s book mostly under the headline of self-irony but numerous 
observations in my analysis inevitably coincide with other interpretations, whose writers—
like Hungerford, for instance—prefer to categorize these elements as examples of irony. 
Either way, the doubts and questions expressed by Art Spiegelman’s self-irony—or ironic 
self-reflexivity—primarily concern both his narrative and his identity as the author and the 
namesake narrator of the story but many of them have a relevance regarding Holocaust 
literature in general, too.  
It can be argued that the double plot of Maus is driven by the intergenerational 
transmission of trauma: the idea that trauma may be transmitted from survivors of a 
traumatic event to their children, who then in turn experience their own identities as 
survivors, too (Hunger 92). This observation in line with what Eli Wiesel writes about his 
second generation survivor students in an essay, “The Heirs”: “their parents’ tragedy 
becomes their own, and they know it is up to them to give it meaning” (41). Similar 
demands seem to dominate the short, introductory chapter at the beginning of Maus I, in 
which the narrator appears as a child roller skating in the street with other kids but falling 
over and being abandoned by his companions. When he complains about the accident to 
his father, he receives the following enigmatic outburst: “Friends? Your friends? If you 
lock them together in a room with no food for a week... THEN you could see what it is, 
friends!” (I/6). The irrelevance of the answer to the actual incident ironically reveals that 
the young Art is expected by his father to interpret everyday events of his life in the 
framework of the Holocaust, a situation he has no direct knowledge about. Therefore 
Maus—the story of the son, Art, trying to reconstruct the story of the father, Vladek—can 
be read both as a response to the father’s unspoken request for empathy and the narrator’s 
attempt to overcome the inherited trauma. This double motivation is expressed in the self-
ironic image closing the second book. It features a tombstone with the inscription 
“SPIEGELMAN” followed by the names of Art’s parents, Vladek and Anja and their dates 
of birth and death. Below that, the ultimate line of the book is the author’s signature 
repeating the same structure: “art spiegelman 1978—1992” (II/136), the period during 
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which Maus was produced. So the accomplishment of the work culminates in death 
insinuating both the ultimate identification with the victims and the liberation of Art, the 
artist as a mere “Mirrorman” (the meaning of the name “Spiegelman” in German) so far 
overpowered by the task inflicted upon him by his parents’ fate. 
Besides the issues of motivation and identity, the media of representation is another 
permanent source of self-irony. At the time when Spiegelman started to work on Maus, 
comics was still considered a genre of popular or “low” culture incompatible with such a 
tragic theme as the Holocaust. It is telling that Maus II “became the first graphic novel to 
be awarded the Pulitzer Prize for Literature” in 1992 (Stringer 262), so the success of Maus 
I was a crucial step for the emerging genre of the graphic novel to be acknowledged as 
literature. Among other critiques, Marylin Reizbaum also voiced her initial doubts 
regarding the form.  “I could not avoid the question of degradation [...] in a work that 
makes a comic book of Holocaust lives” (123). However, Spiegelman very consciously 
and carefully turns the ostensible disadvantage of the only media available for him as a 
visual artist into the postmodern means of foregrounding the difficulties involved in telling 
any Holocaust story. On the one hand, there is the moral imperative of telling these stories; 
as Emily Miller Budick puts it in her essay on “The Holocaust in the Jewish American 
Literary Imagination”, “[f]or these American Jews what is threatened with extinction in the 
forgetting of the Holocaust is not merely the events themselves, with their historical 
meanings and lessons, but Jewish identity itself” (218). On the other hand, there are the 
numerous questions of inauthenticity, in part already mentioned in the previous chapters, 
and increasingly striking in case of comics. Moreover, Paul de Man’s observation that 
autobiography “deprives and disfigures to the precise extent that it restores” (de Man, 
“Autobiography as De-facement” 930) is doubly valid for Spiegelman's narrative, which is 
Vladek‘s autobiography recorded and reconstructed by his son, who is simultaneously 
telling his own autobiography. As a response to all these anxieties, Spiegelman emphasizes 
the artistic and artificial nature of his book, his own deficiencies and the contingency of his 
solutions as well the conceptual and visual language both enabling and limiting his 
comprehension. Thus he repeatedly points out the ultimate impossibility of an adequate 
representation yet convincingly insists on the importance of struggling for a better 
understanding. 
The length and the proportions of the present paper exclude the opportunity of 
giving a full, in-depth analysis of the entire Maus I-II yet it seems necessary to examine 
self-irony not only on the level of general narrative strategies but also in the 
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microstructures of the book. In addition, the intricate and essential relationship between 
textual and visual elements cannot be neglected in the interpretation of a graphic novel. 
Therefore I will focus on one page: page 41 in Chapter 2, Book II, selected as an 
exceedingly concise and complex example for numerous self-ironic tendencies 
characteristic of the whole work as well.  
The title of the chapter is “Auschwitz (Time Flies)”. The subtitle in brackets 
reappears on the first page of the chapter (II/41) twice: textually on the top of the page, and 
visually as flies swarming all over the page. The pun is based on a double shift: the short 
sentence consisting of a noun and a verb and referring to temporality is misunderstood 
grammatically for an adjective and noun structure and this second interpretation is 
visualized. The presence of the insects is justified not only by the pun: in the first four 
pictures they emerge as minor annoyances disturbing the author immersed in his work, 
while in the last frame they enter a shockingly different context as maggot flies teeming 
above a pile of corpses representing the other plotline of the Holocaust. The reader’s 
attention is called to the ironic ambiguity of language by a second pun at the bottom of the 
page, too, where the word “shooting” implies both the cameraman’s activity and murder by 
gun. Thus Spiegelman dramatizes twice—both in image and text—the capacity of 
language for deconstructive irony, the various ways in which signs might contingently 
elude or even sabotage authorial intention by evoking unwished-for associations and by 
arbitrarily linking disparate contexts, like the indifferent flies timelessly wandering 
between the different scenes.  
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 The two puns above are good illustrations to the debate over the adequacy of humor 
in the context of the Holocaust. Katalin Orbán, for instance, argues against Sander L. 
Gilman’s opinion exposed in his essay: “Is Life Beautiful? Can the Shoah be Funny? Some 
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Thoughts on Recent and Older Films”. She quotes Gilman, who “dismisses this black 
humor as ‘virtually foolish in [its] inadequacy’, laughter in response to this humor by 
others than the survivors as ‘inexplicable’ [...] ‘Why is it that, if humor does have a 
function in ameliorating the effects of the Shoah, we are so very uncomfortable imagining 
laughter in the context of the Shoah?’” (Orbán 38-39). I agree with Orbán that should 
Maus “retain any ‘comic, humorous, or witty content or intent,’ this does not automatically 
mean that the work is a comic representation of the Holocaust” (38) since “most of the 
black humor and wit is related to the present family dynamic, relationship, and 
personalities, and to Art’s problems of representation, which are haunted by the Holocaust, 
but are different from it” (38). (Quotations in Orbán’s text are taken from Gilman’s essay.) 
Both views are worth citing at length because of two of their distinctions essentially 
important and relevant to this paper. First, Gilman differentiates between survivors’ versus 
other people’s laughter in the context of the Holocaust, approving of the former and utterly 
rejecting the latter. This sharp contrast seems to support the substantial need for a 
terminological distinction between irony and self-irony: morally, there is a whole world of 
difference between self-ironically laughing at our own anguish “ameliorating the effects” 
of a desperate situation, in Gilman’s words, or ironically laughing at someone else’s 
distress, which I also disapprove of in such a tragic context. The second distinction is made 
by Orbán, who defends Spiegelman by pointing out that the subject of the humor in Maus
is not the Holocaust but the author’s own difficulties with his family and his writing. In 
other words, Spiegelman’s humor is justified by Orbán as being not ironic over its theme, 
the Holocaust, but mostly self-ironic; a statement supported by the analysis of the two puns 
above as well.  
 Structurally, both puns above are enabled by juxtaposition, which is one of the 
principles organizing Spiegelman’s book. Primarily, the two plotlines—Vladek’s 
autobiography covering the 1930s and 1940s, focusing on his marriage and the Holocaust 
and Art’s autobiography, concentrating on the period of writing Maus— are juxtaposed 
permanently, like in case of the terse facts and dates listed in the first four pictures of page 
41. But the same approach is manifest on various other levels as well, like the level of 
characters and genres. For example, the second volume is dedicated both to the writer’s 
newborn daughter and to his elder brother, who perished as a child during the war. The 
double motto: “For Richieu and for Nadja” (II/5) as well as the back covers of both 
volumes featuring maps of Central Europe and Auschwitz in the Nazi period along with 
maps of the writer’s neighborhoods in New York as a child and then as an adult 
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emphatically enforce the invitation to read either plotline in light of the other. This double 
view consciously maintained all through the book becomes not simply a constant source of 
humor—like in case of the word “shooting”— but rather a permanent warning for self-
revision, regarding both author and reader. Spiegelman’s gestures of inserting not only 
documents—maps, family photos, quotations from contemporary articles etc.—in Maus
but also “Prisoner on the Hell Planet” (I/100-103), his own former graphic narrative on his 
mother’s suicide, permanently express his simultaneous ambition to remind the reader that 
what we read is not the truth but merely one of its possible representations and to offer as 
multifaceted an approach as possible, even if his attempts result in diverse aspects of the 
same element looking absolutely incompatible.  This effort is most striking in the portrait 
of the father, who appears as a tragic hero in the Holocaust story and as a quarrelsome and 
petty-minded old man in the contemporary plotline, “the racist caricature of the miserly old 
Jew” (I/131), as Art comments on his own work-in-progress self-reproachfully. 
Spiegelman’s doubtfully self-inquisitive remarks and his rapid shifts between positions—
from son to father-to-be, from writer to the subject of his own story etc.—, genres, media 
etc. repeatedly and deliberately reveal that whatever he writes and draws is just one of the 
possible interpretations bound both by the subjective position of the author and by the 
available clichés of the discourse he relies on. Thus juxtaposition becomes one of the key 
techniques in Spiegelman’s self-ironic narrative strategy.  
 The juxtaposition most powerfully dominating the page is the picture of the author 
who broods over a heap of dead bodies. According to Reizbaum, “[i]f nothing else has 
compelled us to wonder, here we must: Was he the murderer all along for telling—for 
telling in the way he was, for telling at all? (The subtitle of Miller’s essay, by the way, is 
“Portrait of the Artist as a Young Murderer.”)” (133). Personally, I disagree with this 
interpretation since it is the crew and not Spiegelman who is “ready to shoot”, moreover, 
Spiegelman is the target of this imminent shooting therefore he seems to share more of the 
victims’ position than that of the murderer. This reading is also in line with the overall 
tendency of Maus, which depicts Art’s gradual identification with his father. For instance, 
the title of the first volume: “My Father Bleeds History” still keeps distance between 
narrator and protagonist whereas the title of the second book: “And Here My Troubles 
Began...” refers both to the father entering Auschwitz and to the increasing doubts and 
difficulties of the son.  Still, Art’ sense of guilt over the “critical and commercial success” 
(II/41) and the professional exploitation of his parents’ personal tragedy is perceptible in 
these frames and is explicitly articulated in the following pages. However, it could also be 
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argued that his sense of guilt—often referred to all along the book—is rather rooted in the 
inherited feeling of survivor guilt or even a fear of inferiority in comparison to the 
idealized image of Art’s young deceased brother. As the narrator tells about Richieu to his 
wife, “[h]e was mainly a large, blurry photograph hanging in my parent’ bedroom. [...] 
They didn’t talk about Richieu, but that photo was a kind of reproach. [...] It’s spooky 
having sibling rivalry with a snapshot!” (II/15). In other words, Maus frequently offers 
diverse explanations for any single phenomenon, and it is almost impossible to exclude any 
of them as absolutely incorrect. My impression is that Spiegelman rather warns the reader 
to be cautious with condemnatory labels like “murderer”. For example, he ends the first 
volume with applying the same word to his father when he learns that Vladek destroyed 
Anja’s diaries after her suicide. It is self-ironic of the narrator that he calls the very person 
a murderer whom he represents in two volumes length as the victim of murderers since his 
exaggeration immediately insinuates that he cannot be right. At the same time, it sounds 
reasonable that extinguishing the mother’s narrative feels like a murder for the son, 
especially in a context where narratives iare of utmost significance. So Spiegelman seems 
to suggest that there is no good choice: silence is just as reproachable as telling and thus 
inescapably distorting the story.  
 One of the most debated features of Maus is its representation of human beings as 
animals. On the one hand, these characters fit well into the genre of comics, which has a 
long tradition of anthropomorphic animals. On the other hand, Spiegelman turns this 
tradition inside out: in his book, it is not the animals that act and speak as if they were 
human but human beings are treated as if they were animals. His choice is partially 
grounded on Nazi propaganda, a sample of which is ironically used as the motto of the 
second volume. “Mickey Mouse is the most miserable ideal ever revealed... [...] Away with 
Jewish brutalization of the people! Down with Mickey Mouse!” (II/3) Spiegelman’s ironic 
rejection lies in “taking that rhetoric and turning this notion of the subhuman back on 
itself” (Spiegelman, “Interview” 3.29-3:34), as he explains it in the above mentioned 
interview. He does not simply display Jews as mice, Germans as cats and Poles and Pigs 
but he also reflects on the arbitrariness of these clichés. For example, the narrator has a 
lengthy conversation with his wife on how she should be portrayed: as a frog, since he is 
French or as mouse, since she converted to Judaism (II/11-12). Or the narrator’s 
psychiatrist ends their session saying that “I still have to walk my dogs” (II/46), 
foregrounding the difference between actual pets and Americans depicted as dogs.  
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The other frequent technique reminding the reader of the irony hidden in the animal 
characters appears on page 41, too, where the author sitting at his drawing board wears a 
mouse mask. The masks tend to recur in those self-reflexive passages which are primarily 
concerned with the difficulties of producing the book, like page 41. It is important to 
observe, though, that in the third frame it cannot be seen that the author wears a mask—we 
only know it from the neighboring pictures—; seen from that particular angle, the mouse 
mask appears to be his own face just as much as this illusion is maintained in most of the 
book. Thus Spiegelman not only points out that he represents his characters using 
simplifying and distorting clichés—as it happens with any symbolic representation to some 
extend—but carefully demonstrates how easy it is to mistake one’s socially attributed role 
or identity—embodied by the mask—for his real face, which could signify his true self. It 
is worth noting that Spiegelman never draws a face without a mask. The actual features 
from his characters taken from real life are only recalled by photographs, which might help 
the reader to imagine them better but do not evoke a full sense of reality, either, since the 
photos are archaic, static and speechless portrays, who stand apart from the dynamic, 
dramatic story of the plot. Therefore Spiegelman simultaneously attempts to give an 
exceptionally multifaceted representation but self-ironically emphasizes the only partial 
authenticity of each approach. 
The second generation Holocaust survivor’s position is similar to that of the Jewish 
American contemporary to World War II. In both cases, the authors’ dilemmas arise from 
feeling trapped between the moral obligation and the personal inadequacy of trying to 
address the theme of Holocaust. Each work analyzed so far responds to these doubts 
regarding identity and expression with some version of self-irony combined with other 
means of narrative strategies. However, each writer stresses different aspects of the same 
issue. Roth’s primary concern is the ultimate inaccessibility of the Holocaust experience 
for ordinary outsiders; Bellow focuses on the tragic breakdowns of communication; 
whereas Spiegelman highlights the distorting tendency implied in any conceptual 
framework. The humor of the stories allows the writers to take the edge off these desperate 
observations as well as to offer multifaceted and attractive representations without the false 
illusion of a final resolution. 
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3.4 Third Generation Survivors 
 The narrative strategies of Everything Is Illuminated by Jonathan Safran Foer, a 
widely celebrated piece of third generation Holocaust fiction, show numerous similarities 
with Maus. Structurally, both novels consist of double plotlines: one is roughly 
contemporaneous with the time of writing and it depicts a young male protagonist’s quest 
for identity through an attempt at discovering and retelling his family history, which makes 
up the other plotline. Both books foreground the difficulties of narration by highlighting 
the distorting quality of the transmitting media. In both cases, there is a narrator with the 
same name as the author, and Foer, just like Spiegelman, emphasizes his dilemmas and 
uncertainties by the means of self-irony and humor. However, there are significant 
differences between the two books as well. Besides their shared dilemmas regarding 
literature, the two authors articulate doubts concerning different aspects of Holocaust 
narratives. Most of the questions posed by Spiegelman are psychological—how much one 
can understand another person, to what extend is one’s identity defined by belonging to a 
group and how family heritage influences one’s ability to fulfill certain social roles etc.—
whereas Foer concentrates on the political level, asking if there can ever be a consensual 
narrative acceptable for every opponent. In other words, Spiegelman as a traumatized 
second generation survivor aims at reconciliation with his personal heritage and identity 
while Foer as a third generation survivor seeks reconciliation with the former enemy.  
  One of the plotlines in Everything Is Illuminated is a hilarious picaresque. Foer’s 
namesake, a young Jewish American student in his early twenties arrives in the Ukraine to 
visit Trachimbrod, the small shtetl which his grandfather escaped from during the 
Holocaust, and to find a woman called Augustine, who allegedly helped the grandfather 
flee Nazi persecution and to whom the grandson wants to express his gratitude for his own 
existence. Since he does not speak Ukrainian, Jonathan hires two local people to help him: 
a boy called Alex as a translator and his grandfather as a tour guide. Alex is a few years 
Jonathan’s junior and an ardent student of English, portrayed as a parody of young 
common people in the post-Soviet area, who were enthusiastic in the early 1990s  about the 
“ennobled country America” (Foer 3). His grandfather, who drives the car, claims that he 
is blind, which not only enhances the absurdity of their trip but also implies the irony of 
being guided in local history by someone who cannot—or, as it turns out, rather does not 
want to—see.  
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Foer plays a game similar to that of Gertrude Stein in The Autobiography of Alice 
B. Toklas, in which Stein portrayed herself as if the book had been written by her 
companion named in the title. Similarly, Foer’s personal story—the quest for his heritage 
and his identity—is told by Alex, while the author’s autonomous narrator tries to 
reconstruct the history of Trachimbrod, which he never finds because it was completely 
destroyed during World War II. Thus with a self-ironic authorial gesture Foer makes both 
stories in the book be told by a highly incompetent outsider: Jonathan’s work is hindered 
by his insufficiency of knowledge on local history and Alex lacks the necessary language 
skills in English. Besides, this structure allows Foer to play out various ironies against each 
other. For example, Alex as a narrator gives a rather disdainful portray of Jonathan, the 
protagonist: “When we found each other, I was very flabbergasted by his appearance. This 
is an American? I thought. And also, This is a Jew? He was severely short. He wore 
spectacles and had diminutive hairs” (31). At the same time, Jonathan as the author gives a 
similarly disdainful portray of Alex through the deficiencies of his language use. All in all, 
the double ironies add up to a self-ironic effect. 
Jonathan and Alex are counterparts in numerous respects. They are of similar age, 
both of them are working on their first novel—Alex’s novel tells the story of their shared 
trip, chapters of which he sends to Jonathan as the attachments of his letters commenting 
on the novel in progress and supplementing them with information after Jonathan’s return 
back to the States—and their grandfathers both come from the same region, the 
neighboring shtetls of Kolki and Trachimbrod. Their narratives also supplement each 
other: Jonathan explores the past while Alex’s text covers the present, and the two plotlines 
meet at the tragic intersection: the succeeding destructions of the two shtetls. On the other 
hand, they first act as enemies or at least rivals. Alex’s family appears as representatives of 
Ukrainians infamous for their former anti-Semitic pogrom, while Jonathan’s identity is 
defined by his Jewish refugee ancestors. At the beginning of the novel, Alex, who is 
familiar with the local situation and language, dominates over Jonathan: the American boy 
is forced to travel on the back seat of the car cramped up next to a dog although he is afraid 
of dogs, he receives no answers to his questions and he is repeatedly mocked for being a 
vegetarian. Later on, the power relationships turn upside down. It becomes clear that 
Jonathan is more or less the person that Alex would like to be once: he is not only a few 
years older and financially much better off but he possesses English as a mother tongue 
and lives in the United States, where Alex would wish to immigrate as an adult. Moreover, 
it is finally revealed that Alex’s grandfather not only lived in Kolki but is also Jewish, who 
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concealed his identity all through his life because he is ashamed of having betrayed his 
best friend to the Nazis in order to save his family. This information turns Alex and 
Jonathan into something like brothers: as grandchildren of survivors of the same 
cataclysm, they embody highly different outcomes of the same story. However, this 
reconciliation is not free of doubts, either. The third generation’s freedom of their 
burdensome past requires the elimination of the previous two generations: Alex’s 
grandfather commits suicide not much after revealing his secrets; and Alex’s father, who 
grew into a violent, dysfunctional man under his own father’s hidden burden, is sent away 
from the family by Alex.   
Self-ironic ambiguity prevails in the title of the novel, too. The word “illuminated” 
insinuates both revelation and destruction, as exposed most thoroughly in Chapter 29, 
which bears the title “Illumination” itself. On the one hand, most of the family secrets 
haunting the book and motivating the quest are revealed here. On the other hand, the 
central event of the chapter turns out to be a fire consuming the synagogue in Kolki, which 
is burnt by the Nazis, with almost all the local Jews deliberately locked up in the building. 
Thus understanding and annihilation appear as closely linked ideas both in the title of the 
book and in its final pages reporting on the grandfather’s suicide. Foer exposes some of the 
various and controversial meanings of the title in an interview, adding that he “wouldn't 
call it ‘ironic,’ though. That implies distance. So much of the book has to do with 
perspectives, different ways of seeing things” (Foer, “Questions”). In other words, he 
rejects the label “irony” because it would involve the ironist’s superior position over his 
subject—referred to as “distance” by Foer, who uses a horizontal term instead of a vertical 
one, yet the idea is quite similar—and he rather stresses the awareness of the simultaneous 
presence of embarrassingly incongruent meanings within the same phenomena and their 
narrative exploration, which is an essential feature of self-irony.  
  Foer himself, however, prefers to use the word “humor”, which is not only an 
important aspect of the novel but a key term on its thematic level as well. Alex, for 
example, is anxious to distinguish between the involuntarily comic and the intentionally 
humorous. “Do you think that I am a humorous person? I signify humorous with intentions, 
not humorous because I do foolish things. [...] Not desiring to be laughed upon in the 
wrong way” (Foer, Everything is Illuminated 101). In another letter, also addressed to 
Jonathan, he writes: “you asked me not to alter the mistakes because they sound humorous, 
and humorous is the only truthful way to tell a sad story” (Foer, Everything is Illuminated
53). The apparent oxymoron condensed in the sentence is never fully explained but can be 
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interpreted in the context of the book as a proposition that a sad story always involves the 
tragic conflict of differently biased characters and an authentic representation must depict 
each of these, sometimes mutually exclusive aspects of the same series of events. The 
statement might also imply that humor brings the incongruities hidden in any narrative to 
the surface, quite in the spirit of deconstructionism. Another possible interpretation is 
suggested by Paul McDonald, who claims that “this novel celebrates the redemptive 
potential of humour” (51). This is well illustrated by one of the crucial scenes in which the 
so far insufferable tension between Jonathan, Alex and his grandfather is relieved by 
laughter triggered by the accident of a potato falling from the table to the floor. “Then I 
started laughing. Then the hero started laughing. We laughed with much violence for a 
long time. [...] It was not until very much in the posterior that I understanded that each of 
us was laughing for a different reason, for our own reason, and that not one of those 
reasons had a thing to do with the potato” (Foer, Everything is Illuminated 67). 
McDonald’s idea of redemption in Foer’s book might refer both to the third generation 
survivors’ reconciliation with their past and to the reconciliation of former opponents. But 
as the prerequisite of this reconciliation is apparently the elimination of the previous 
generations, Everything Is Illuminated, in harmony with its title, seems to argue self-
ironically both for the decisive importance of memories and at the same time for the 
essential need to move on. 
The humor is often the result of what Katrin Amian calls “parodic destabilization” 
(163). It characterizes both narratives, which the book consists of, but the means by which 
it is achieved are entirely different. Jonathan’s imaginary historiography takes “the form of 
magical realism” (Ascari 126) with abundant self-reflexive elements questioning his own 
book’s authenticity and functionality. For instance, he inserts the self-reflexive allegory of 
a never accomplished house in his novel which both imitates and questions the actual work 
in progress. 
He loved the skeleton of makeshift beams and rafters more and more as 
construction progressed, loved them more than the house itself, and eventually 
persuaded the reluctant architect to draw them into the final plans. Workers, 
too, were drawn into the plans. Not workers, exactly, but local actors paid to 
look like workers [...] The blueprints themselves were drawn into the 
blueprints, and in those blueprints were blueprints with blueprints with 
blueprints [...] like a man on a desert island who retells and embellishes the 
only joke he can remember. His dream was for the Double House to be a kind 
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of infinity, always a fraction of itself—suggestive of a bottomless money pit—
always approaching but never reaching completion. (162) 
Another passage paraphrases one of the provocative postmodern dilemmas whether reality 
precedes fiction or the other way round. “Memory begat memory begat memory. Villagers 
became embodiments of that legend they had been told so many times” (258). In another 
example, Foer contemplates on the futility or even the oppressive nature of literature and 
history, which have a strong tendency to replace rather than record reality. “The Book of 
Antecedents, once updated yearly, was now continually updated, and when there was 
nothing to report, the full-time committee would report its reporting, just to keep the book 
moving, expanding, becoming, more like life: We are writing... We are writing... We are 
writing...” (212). Thus the parodies of various genres from annals through folk legends to 
mock documents and the subjective and magical destabilization of history in Jonathan’s 
narrative are primarily the means of voicing some of the great dilemmas of postmodern 
literature. 
In the other plotline, however, destabilizing “[h]umour is created by the disparity 
between Alex’s idiosyncratic English and the standard form” (52), as McDonald points 
out. Jonathan’s parody and criticism is mostly aimed at the conventions of formally 
constructed, written legacy whereas Alex parodies everyday language use. Both narratives 
permanently highlight the mediated nature and thus the unreliability of any utterance but in 
Jonathan’s case this is the conscious strategy of the professional postmodern writer while 
Alex’s naivety seems to divulge that ambiguity is not an exclusive feature of postmodern 
literature but it is a substantial component of ordinary life as well. For example, Alex, 
waiting for Jonathan’s arrival, ironically observes that the guest might mistake decoration 
in Ukrainian colors for his own. “The station was not ordinary, because there were blue 
and yellow papers from the ceiling. They were there for the first birthday of the new 
constitution. [...] Perhaps he would think that the yellow and blue papers were for him, 
because I know that they are the Jewish colors” (31). The substantial necessity of a shared 
code not simply for comprehension but for mere survival, yet at the same time the 
arbitrariness and thus the only transitory validity of these codes is humorously exposed in 
the following, hilariously complicated sentence depicting the encounter of the urban 
travelers and some local people in the countryside. “I commanded the hero not to speak, 
because at times people who speak Ukrainian who hate people who speak a fusion of 
Russian and Ukrainian also hate people who speak English” (Foer, Everything is 
Illuminated 112). 
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 Foer repeatedly directs the reader’s attention to the fact that there is no truth; there 
are only consensual interpretations accepted and thus functioning as truth for a while. This 
idea prevails not only in the pointedly fictive shtetl history or the humorously distorted 
travelogue but in many of the micro-narratives of the book, too. The 120 times renewed 
mock marriage contract of a couple, for example, lists chronologically each of their 
conflicts and resolutions insinuating how carefully detailed individual agreements are 
necessary to maintain cooperation.  
The 120 marriages of Joseph and Sarah L The young couple first 
married on August 5, 1744, when Joseph was eight, and Sarah six, and first 
ended their marriage six days later, when Joseph refused to believe, to Sarah’s 
frustration, that the stars were silver nails in the sky, pinning up the black 
nightscape. They remarried four days later, when Joseph left a note under the 
door of Sarah’s parents’ house:  I have considered everything you told me, and 
I do believe that the stars are silver nails. [...] Their marriage contract still 
hangs over the door of the house they on-and-off shared nailed to the top post 
and brushing against the shalom welcome mat: It is with everlasting devotion 
that we, Joseph and Sarah L, reunite in the indestructible union of matrimony, 
promising love until death, with the understanding that the stars are silver nails 
in the sky. (208) 
On the one hand, this is in striking contrast with the generalizing prejudices causing the 
tragic historical conflicts which are both the starting point and the permanent background 
of the plot. On the other hand, the parody raises doubts as well. Firstly, if a simple 
marriage of two people requires a document of 120 amendments, how long and detailed a 
contract should be so that it could harmonize with all the needs and interpretations of two 
or more ethnic, religious or other groups of people? Secondly, the very first item already 
makes it clear that consensus is sometimes very far from being equal to truth. Thirdly, the 
frequent revisions suggest that a shared interpretation does not promise stability either as it 
constantly changes according to the incalculable and ineluctable changes of the interpreters 
themselves.   
 Foer not only joins the Jewish American tradition of self-ironic fiction on 
Holocaust but also widens its horizon. As in case of contemporaries of the events and 
second-generation survivors, his self-irony is aimed not at the Holocaust itself but at its 
representation. However, Everything Is Illuminated adds to the list of dilemmas. While the 
primary concern for the first and the second generations was whether Holocaust can be 
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communicated—adequately represented and fully comprehended—at all, Foer focuses on 
the questions of reconciliation. Yet his emphasis on the unreliability of any narrative seems 
to insinuate his postmodern scepticism regarding the possibility of an all-encompassing, 
final, common understanding acceptable for every participant. His novel rather depicts the 
permanent reconfiguration of incompatible interpretations, which endlessly struggle for 
authority, and which can be tolerated and survived only with humor.  
3.5 Holocaust Literature and Metafiction 
 Paul Auster is one of the most acknowledged contemporary American writers yet 
he is hardly ever discussed among Jewish American authors. Taking a look at some recent 
examples of canonizing authority, we can see that his work is completely absent from the 
Jewish American Literature: A Norton Anthology and his name is mentioned only once in 
The Cambridge Companion to Jewish American Literature. However, there are also critics 
who discuss his work in the context of Jewish American literature, like Kathrin Krämer in 
her monograph Walking in Deserts, Writing Out of Wounds: Jewishness and 
Deconstruction in Paul Auster’s Literary Work, or James Peacock in Understanding Paul 
Auster. The reason for this ambiguity regarding Auster’s canonization as a Jewish author 
by different scholars is presumably the fact that he almost never addresses Jewish issues as 
central concerns on the thematic level of his writing. As Lily Neilan Corwin points out, 
“[t]hough most of Auster’s protagonists are Jewish and there are occasional references to 
the Holocaust, usually the effects of the Shoah and the difficulty in asserting a particularly 
Jewish identity are less blatant in his work than in Bellow’s or Roth’s” (123). Yet it can be 
argued that Holocaust literature is intensely present in Auster’s oeuvre although in an 
indirect way, which is not very surprising of a writer whose work is so often studied as an 
outstanding example of metafiction. Moreover, many of Auster’s self-reflexive, self-ironic 
gestures usually discussed as features of metafiction show remarkable similarities with 
ideas, narrative strategies and symbols familiar from Holocaust literature.  
The New York Trilogy, Auster’s first novel is mentioned by Amy J. Elias as an 
example of “intertextual metafiction” (“Postmodern Metafiction” 23). Dennis Barrone, on 
the other hand, prefers Linda Hutcheon’s category “historiographic metafiction” regarding 
Auster’s oeuvre. 
Postmodern fiction, or more precisely, historiographic metafiction is about 
“issues such as those of narrative form, of intertextuality, of strategies of 
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representation, of the role of language, of the relation between historical 
fact and experiential event, and, in general, of the epistemological and 
ontological consequences of the act of rendering problematic that which was 
once taken for granted by historiography—and literature” (Hutcheon xii). Paul 
Auster’s fiction is about all of these issues, too. (21-22) 
Linda Hutcheon’s A Poetics of Postmodernism quoted by Barrone above is of special 
interest for this paper as the author emphasizes in this book “the governing role of irony in 
postmodernism” (4) in general, and the substantial connection between irony and 
metafiction in specific, suggesting that “[h]istoriographic metafiction’s [...] strategy 
subverts [...] through irony” (xii). But regardless of subcategories like historiographic or 
intertextual, Patricia Waugh’s impressionistic list collecting the most prominent and most 
widely acknowledged features of metafiction also seems relevant to Auster’s fiction:  
a celebration of the power of the creative imagination together with an 
uncertainty about the validity of its representations; an extreme self-
consciousness about language, literary form and the act of writing fictions; a 
pervasive insecurity about the relationship of fiction to reality; a parodic, 
playful, excessive or deceptively naïve style of writing (Metafiction 2). 
The metafictional qualities of Auster’s work have been addressed in several book-
length works, for example Metafiction, Intertextuality and Subjectivity in Paul Auster’s 
The New York Trilogy, The Book of Illusions and Oracle Night by Stella Bogliani. 
Therefore the current analysis focuses only on those elements in some of Auster’s works 
which seem to be in parallel with phenomena familiar from Holocaust literature outlined in 
the previous chapters. I will concentrate on three texts by Auster, The New York Trilogy, 
The Book of Illusions and “Why Write?” but the list could undoubtedly be extended by 
numerous further examples. 
The first part of The New York Trilogy, “City of Glass” tells the mystery of Peter 
Stillman Jr., whose case is investigated by the protagonist, David Quinn under the 
pseudonym Paul Auster. The young Peter spent most of his life locked up in a dark room 
since early childhood as the victim of his father, who hoped to discover “God’s language” 
(New York Trilogy 20) as a result of the lifelong experiment. Stillman’s speaking name 
refers to his taciturn, enigmatic being, at the same time it does not reveal so much what he 
is but rather what he inherited from his autonomous father; a logic reminiscent of traumas 
passed on between generations, however, Peter Stillman senior is clearly not the 
traumatized person but the oppressor. William G. Little also speaks about “the survivor of 
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his father’s Holocaust, Peter Stillman” (88). Stillman Jr. is not only characterized by the 
lack of language—which would enable him to communicate his experiences, a project 
never fully accomplished all through the novel—but also by the lack of colors. “Everything 
about Peter Stillman was white. White shirt, open at the neck; white pants, white shoes, 
white socks. Against the pallor of his skin, the flaxen thinness of his hair, the effect was 
almost transparent” (New York Trilogy 17-18). His absolute, blank whiteness, the absence 
of everyday colors, shades and distinctions insinuate the incommunicability of his 
experience. This symbol operates similarly to the color black used by Philip Roth in “Eli, 
the Fanatic”, as analyzed in the subchapter 3.3. In addition, the futility of the father’s 
search for God’s language echoes the ideas of God’s silence during the Holocaust. The 
dark room in the center of Auster’s story recalls Eli Wiesel’s thoughts in “Why I Write”: 
“[w]herever one starts from one reaches darkness. God? He remains the God of darkness. 
Man? Source of darkness” (908). A similar idea is articulated by Geoffrey H. Hartman in 
his study “On Traumatic Knowledge and Literary Studies”, who describes the traumatized 
subject’s experience as “a solitude so vast that God Himself seems to be absent. In such a 
world mediation through speech has become impossible. What Lacan calls the symbolic 
order [...] presents itself only as an impossible desire, because of its violation” (542).  
Accordingly, one of the central themes of The New York Trilogy is distrust in 
language. The anxieties regarding the corruption of language are articulated most 
succinctly by the elder Peter Stillman, who explains them to Quinn while collecting junk in 
the street:  
our words no longer correspond to the world. When things were whole, we felt 
confident that our words could express them. But little by little these things 
have broken apart, shattered, collapsed into chaos. And yet our words remained 
the same. [...] Hence, every time we try to speak of what we see, we speak 
falsely, distorting the very thing we are trying to represent (92-93).  
His post-apocalyptic vision of language which used to work adequately but has become 
dysfunctional recalls Wiesel’s post-Holocaust observation: “[t]he word has deserted the 
meaning it was intended to convey” (“Why I Write” 907). 
 Not only words but the larger units of expression are also questioned in The New 
York Trilogy. Madeleine Sorapure calls the genre of the novel a “‘meta-anti-detective’ 
story” (72), by which she means “an elaborate parody of the detective novel in which, 
despite the narrator's best intentions and efforts, there is no crime, no solution, and, by the 
end, no hero” (84). Barone extends Sorapure’s argumentation by adding that Auster’s 
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employment of the genre suggests more general doubts: the author “parodies detective 
novel conventions to comment upon processes of signification” (23). Since Linda 
Hutcheon points out that parody “both legitimizes and subverts that which it parodies” 
(Politics 97), Auster’s “meta-anti-detective” novel can be read as a self-ironic version of 
the mystery genre: a book simultaneously rejecting and confirming the literary conventions 
it is built upon. 
 Besides the available media of representation, the other source of uncertainty in The 
New York Trilogy, just like in Holocaust literature, is identity. Names, pseudonyms and 
autonomous names are passed between characters, like in case of the two Stillmans or 
Quinn, how is mistaken on the phone for a private detective called Paul Auster just like the 
author but who also produces his fiction under the penname William Wilson, a reference to 
a character by Edgar Allen Poe. In addition to the permanent game played with exchanged 
or hidden identities, Auster’s protagonists’ stories often unfold and their identities are 
created as the results of their attempts at reconstructing someone else’s story, similarly to 
second or third generation survivors’ stories like Maus or Everything Is Illuminated. Quinn 
investigates Peter Stillman’s life in “City of Glass”; Blue spies on Black in “Ghosts”; and 
the narrator of “The Locked Room” is haunted by his childhood friend’s, Fanshawe’s 
disappearance and manuscripts. However, each of these investigations fails to discover and 
express the truth it is aimed at, in harmony with Holocaust literature, in which the ultimate 
inaccessibility and inexpressibility of the traumatic experience is a frequently recurring, 
crucial idea. “The Locked Room” is concluded by the narrator emphasizing his failure to 
apprehend his friend and the book written by him, confessing that “I read those words with 
my own eyes, and yet I find it hard to trust in what I am saying” (371). His remark 
regarding the uncertainty of the authorial position summarized here and characteristic of 
the whole novel sounds very similar to Wiesel’s doubts: “[n]o, I do not understand. And if 
I write, it is to warn the reader that he will not understand either” (“Why I Write” 909).  
Like The New York Trilogy, The Book of Illusions also consists of a structure of 
double plotlines familiar from Maus or Everything Is Illuminated. Its narrator, David 
Zimmer, tries to recover from the grief over his wife and children lost in a plane crash by 
immersing himself in writing a book, The Silent World of Hector Mann, a collection of 
essays on a silent movie actor, Hector Mann, who allegedly disappeared in 1929. Just like 
in Holocaust fiction, the present—in this case the 1990s—seems to be worth speaking 
about only to the extend it is the means of reconstructing the past. Although there is no 
direct reference to the Holocaust in Auster’s novel, numerous elements might remind the 
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reader of Holocaust literature. Like Wiesel, who felt obliged to speak on behalf of the 
dead, Zimmer is also preoccupied with writing Mann’s biography and with translating 
Chateubriand’s Mémoires d’outre-tombe, which bears the title “Memoirs of a Dead Man” 
(62) in Zimmer’s translation. Another important shared feature with Holocaust fiction is 
the narrator’s position as a survivor of both his own personal tragedy—the loss of his 
family—and of Mann’s story.  
The redemptive power of humor, which is the organizing principle of Foer’s novel, 
is essential in this case, too. The Book of Illusions begins with the grief-stricken Zimmer 
sitting at home, unable to talk to anyone, watching TV drunk and alone, and happening to 
laugh at a silent movie scene: “it was the first time I had laughed at anything since June, 
and [...] I understood that [...] there was still some piece of me that wanted to go on living” 
(9). This laugh triggers the secondary plot: the investigation after Mann, the actor who was 
able to make Zimmer laugh. Besides, the book starts and finishes with complete 
destruction—all the characters who have a name die in the beginning and in the end as 
well, except for Zimmer in both cases—still, there is a decisive difference between the first 
sentence: “[e]veryone thought he was dead” (1) and the last one: “I live with that hope” 
(321). What changes between the two tragedies is Zimmer’s response to them. When his 
family died on the plane, he went catatonic with depression; when all the characters die 
who participated in Mann’s story, including Zimmer's lover, Alma, he is able to overcome 
trauma and—as the reader learns on the final pages—makes a new start in life, finding a 
new partner with time, too. In this sense, The Book of Illusions describes the process of 
overcoming trauma, another essential theme in Holocaust fiction illustrated both by Foer’s 
and Spiegelman’s books. 
In addition to structural and thematic similarities, some of the vocabulary in 
Auster’s novel also recalls the Holocaust. Zimmer gets involved in Mann’s life when 
Alma, the actor’s secret collaborator invites him to join Mann’s family, explaining that she 
asks for Zimmer’s presence “[b]ecause I need a witness” (105); and all of Holocaust 
literature is based on witnesses’ testimonies. Besides, Anna relates to her own stigma, a big 
purple birthmark on her left face, similarly to the way Spiegelman turned the derogatory 
concept of mice designating Jews back against the Nazi rhetoric by voluntarily employing 
it in form of animal masks in Maus. Anna also turns her being stigmatized into a key 
feature of her identity, ironically using it against the people by whom she felt persecuted.  
The birthmark is who she is. Make it vanish, and she vanishes along with it. 
[...] Other people carried their humanity inside them, but I wore mine on my 
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face. [...]  I also knew that I would always be defined by that purple blotch on 
my face [...]  It was the central fact of my life and to wish it away would have 
been like asking to destroy myself. [...] I knew what people were thinking. [...]  
The birthmark was the test of their humanity (121).
The title of the third selected text by Auster, “Why Write?” seems to be a 
paraphrase of Eli Wiesel’s often quoted essay, “Why I Write”. The only difference is that 
Auster omits the personal pronoun, which clearly indicates the distance between the two 
authors’ positions. Wiesel’s essay is a confession on his Jewish identity and his Holocaust 
experiences presented as his personal motives for writing whereas one of the central 
concerns in Auster’s stories is the problematic nature of identity. The similarity of the two 
titles can certainly be an involuntary coincidence, but in case of an author like Auster so 
well-versed in American and French literature, and in case of a book like The Red 
Notebook, which repeatedly calls the reader’s attention to the utmost importance of 
coincidences, such a phenomenon is at least suspicious. Besides, intertextuality works even 
if a certain reference is not intended by the writer but is brought in the context by the 
reader. (It must be noted here that Auster’s stories can also be read in light of Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s crucial essay “Why Write” focusing on the interaction between the author’s and 
the reader’s freedom mediated by the literary text, a theme highly relevant to metafiction 
and intertextuality. However, this parallel is out of the scope of Jewish American literature 
so it will be not investigated in detail in the present paper.) 
“Why Write” is composed of five allegedly true stories, an assumption often 
emphasized in The Red Notebook, which includes “Why I Write” as its last section. This 
structure is self-ironic in itself as the whole book claims to represent “reality” not fiction, 
at the same time the writer—notorious for the metafictional games with identities 
abounding in all his oeuvre—carefully inserts the sources of the anecdotes, some of which 
are taken from his own life, some others told to him by friends or recorded by complete 
strangers in letters addressed to him. Thus both the unreliability of the narrators and the 
distance between the experience and its recording are permanently emphasized, which are 
concerns belonging to the conventional techniques of metafiction used to focus the readers’ 
attention to the created and thus fictive nature of any story.  
The fourth anecdote tells about the post-war marriage of a young Belgian man and 
a German girl, whose fathers used to fight as adversaries during the World War II. More 
precisely, “[t]he German father had been a guard in the prison camp where the Belgian 
father had spent the war” (392) as a Prisoner of War. Auster concludes the story with a 
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happy ending. “As the woman who wrote me the letter hastened to add, there was no bad 
blood between them. [...] The greatest joy in both their lives is the grandchildren they have 
in common” (392). The story is reminiscent of the conflict and of the self-ironic resolution 
in Everything Is Illuminated, which simultaneously offered a positive outcome and 
questioned its validity by the context. Auster’s protagonists are mentioned not by 
individual names but by their nationalities—“the German father” versus “the Belgian 
father”—however it is precisely these identities defined by national narratives that have to 
be overcome by each character in order to achieve family happiness. The narrator’s remark 
that the woman writing the letter “hastened to” report on the harmony in their family, 
confirms the impression that such a substantial revision of identity is generally conceived 
as being far from unproblematic. Yet these problems remain utterly untold: the woman 
writing the letter uses the currently prevailing clichés taking reconciliation and the priority 
of the individual’s life over one’s belonging to a country for granted, just like the clichés of 
dominant national narratives during the World War used to be taken for granted. The 
narrator’s pretended naivety with which he juxtaposes the two temporal and ideological 
layers without any attempt to explain the transition between the two has an effect of 
questioning the validity of both narratives and of motivating the reader for reflection on the 
gap between them.  
The third story is based on a childhood memory. The narrator and other school 
children are hiking in the woods when a sudden storm hits upon them. Trying to flee to a 
local farm, they have to “crawl under a barbed-wire fence” (389) and one of the kids next 
to the narrator is struck to death by lightning. “It was the barbed wire that did it, I suppose. 
[...] I didn’t think, One or two seconds later, and it would have been me. What I thought 
about was holding his tongue and looking down at his teeth. [...] Thirty-four years later, I 
still remember them” (390). Barbed wire is an emblematic motif of concentration camps 
often recalled in Holocaust literature just like the idea of unexpected, meaningless and 
violent death, the observation that survival is a question of sheer luck or the constraint of 
focusing on minor details because the trauma as a whole exceeds one’s capacity to 
conceive it. But it is not so much motifs familiar from World War II that recall the 
Holocaust in the stories of “Why Write” but rather what Wiesel calls “the fear of 
forgetting” (“Why I Write” 908), in other words the drive behind the meticulous care with 
which Auster tries to record each life, unique, precious and vulnerable as they are, and the 
empathy with which he turns to each individual, as if any trifle incident stood for all 
humanity, as if our mere existence were a miracle. 
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Several more examples for direct and indirect references to the Holocaust made by 
Auster could be enumerated, from his early post-apocalyptic dystopia, In the Country of 
Last Things, which represented a city where our entire civilization has collapsed and 
human bodies are burnt for fuel by the central administration, and which originally bore 
the working subtitle “Anna Blume Walks through the 20th Century” (A Companion to 
Twentieth Century United States Fiction 532) to his essay on the “Book of the Dead” 
suggesting that in Jabés’ poetry “[t]he question is the Jewish Holocaust, but it is also the 
question of literature itself” (571). But what I want to point out instead is rather the shared 
concerns of Holocaust literature and metafiction. One of these features is an intense 
awareness of intertextuality. In Wiesel’s words: 
The presence of the dead then beckons in such tangible ways that it affects 
even the most removed characters. [...] Technically, so to speak, they are of 
course elsewhere, in time and space, but on a deeper, truer plane, the dead are 
part of every story, of every scene. [...] After Auschwitz, everything brings us 
back to Auschwitz. When I speak of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, when I evoke 
Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai and Rabbi Akiba, it is the better to understand them 
in the light of Auschwitz (“Why I Write” 909-910). 
Many of Auster’s narrative strategies and themes are crucial in Holocaust fiction, 
too. His preoccupation with the position of the survivor and the ways trauma can be 
overcome; the decisive force of heritage and yet the uncertainty of identity; the distrust in 
language; the narrative structures in which the primary plot is often the result of a 
preceding plotline; the self-ironic employment of rhetoric and ideological conventions 
played out against each other; humor as a possible source of both psychological relief and 
of ambivalence; the ambiguous constraint to remember and to move on—all of these 
elements are equally prominent in metafiction and Holocaust literature. Besides, Auster’s 
ultimate self-irony lies in his gesture of apparently neglecting his Jewish identity and at the 
same time addressing many of the crucial issues related to it indirectly yet forcefully. This 
might be interpreted as a way to exceed some outdated and burdensome literary and 
ideological conventions, many of which have so tragically failed in the past—for example 
the routine of being automatically labeled by belonging to a certain minority or thinking in 
terms of the necessary conflicts of majority society versus minority groups—yet to 
maintain the valuable ideas gained along the way. In addition, the intensely self-reflexive 
structure of narration accompanied by the mock naivety of the narrative voice and the 
ironically embarrassing ambiguities is likely to motivate the reader to reconsider first 
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impressions and implied ideologies, an imperative central to both metafiction and 
Holocaust literature.        
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4 THE DILEMMAS OF MINORITY CONTRA MAJORITY POSITIONS 
4.1 Introduction: “The Jew” as a Metaphor 
 The awareness of minority position has always been an important component of 
Jewish identity. From the Israelite Exodus from Egypt commemorated by the annual 
holiday of Pesach through the Cossack pogroms as depicted, for example, in Isaac 
Bashevis Singer’s novel, Satan in Goray, to the vast corpus of Holocaust literature, there 
are numerous texts bringing Jewish experiences of a persecuted minority in the foreground. 
However, the experience of being oppressed is not unique to Jewry but is more or less 
shared by other minorities, too, as pointed out by several authors. Simone de Beauvoir, for 
instance, writes in the “Introduction” to her crucial feminist book, The Second Sex that 
“’[t]he eternal feminine’ corresponds to ‘the black soul’ and to ‘the Jewish character’” 
(44). Beauvoir subtly indicates with the quotation marks that these generalizing concepts 
involve the dangers of stereotypes therefore they are to be treated carefully and she “ends 
up drawing an impassable distinction between the situation of women and that of Jews” 
(Susan S. Shapiro 315) suggesting that “to the anti-Semite the Jew is not so much an 
inferior as he is an enemy” (Beauvoir 44). Yet the parallels drawn between the fates of 
various minority groups are dominant ideas often leading to productive debates in both 
popular and scholarly discourses on minority issues, thus being worth some investigation. 
Especially since any such comparison places diverse phenomena of minority experience in 
a double context, which tends to provide a fertile soil for ambiguities and for self-irony. 
According to Karl Shapiro’s already quoted “Introduction” to his Poems of a Jew, 
Jewish identity has been widely conceived since the Holocaust as the metaphor for 
oppressed minorities. 
The hideous blood purge of the Jews by Germany in the twentieth century 
revived throughout the world the spiritual image of the Jew, not as someone 
noble and good, or despicable and evil, not as the father of Western religions or 
the murderer of Christ, but as man essentially himself, beyond nationality, 
defenseless against the crushing impersonality of history (xii). 
His impression is confirmed by several colleagues, Jewish and non-Jewish alike. In the 
essayistic short story, “The Imaginary Jew” written by the confessional poet John 
Berryman in 1945, the first person singular narrator tells about an insult on the grounds of 
religion. While walking home in Manhattan, he is mistaken for a Jew and consequently 
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attacked by some Catholic Irishmen. The narrator keeps asserting in vain that he is 
Catholic himself, and in the appendix of the story he draws the conclusion:  “My 
persecutors were right: I was a Jew. The imaginary Jew I was was as real as the imaginary 
Jew hunted down, on other nights and days, in a real Jew” (132). As James E. Young reads 
the story in his book on Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the 
Consequences of Interpretation, “‘the imaginary Jew’” figured only one kind of ‘Jewish 
knowledge’ for Berryman: victimization” (116). The same impulse for discovering and 
expressing one’s own vulnerability through identifying with the persecuted Jews, or in 
other words the attempt at understanding the victims from an assumed inner point of view 
and understanding ourselves through the metaphoric image of the Jew might account for 
the international popularity of a line by the Russian symbolist poet Marina Tsvetayeva: Vse 
poeti zhidy zhyidi, “All poets are Yids.” (Hollander 40). The original poem was written 
before the World War II but it was made famous by the Jewish poet Paul Celan quoting it 
in Russian as an epigraph to a poem of his own written in German after the Holocaust. The 
Jewish American poet, John Hollander cites both fellow poets and the shared line as a 
central thought in his essay on “The Question of American Jewish Poetry”. “It is not 
merely that modern poets and Jews are outsiders, by nature itinerant no matter how locally 
rooted. It is more that both [...] carry the burden of an absolutely inexplicable sense of their 
own identity and history” (40).  
The metaphoric use of the Holocaust appears as a dominant idea in not only in 
primary literature but in the scholarly discourse on minority cultures, too. Ellen Schiff 
suggests in her book, From Stereotype to Metaphor: The Jew in Contemporary Drama that 
“[t]he Jew as outsider becomes a workable symbol when the misfortunes that befall him by 
sole reason of his ethnicity have their parallels in the adversities endured by other minority 
groups” (153). Similarly, Jeffrey C. Alexander writes in his essay on the “Social 
Construction of Moral Universals” that “[i]n each Holocaust Museum the fate of the Jews 
functions as a metaphorical bridge to the treatment of other ethnic, religious, and racial 
minorities” (64). He also adds that  
[i]n the 1960s and 1970s [... c]ritics of earlier American policy, and 
representatives of minority groups themselves, began to suggest analogies 
between various minority “victims” of white American expansion and the 
Jewish victims of the Holocaust. This was particularly true of Native 
Americans, who argued that genocide had been committed against them (52). 
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However, Efraim Sicher observes in his book on The Holocaust Novel that “the 
appropriation of the Holocaust as a metaphor for universal suffering by emerging minority 
groups” (xvii) is rather problematic since “[w]hat is not agreed upon is what constitutes 
legitimate use of the Holocaust” (xvii).  
One of the most controversial examples for the metaphorical employment of the 
Holocaust is the poem “Lady Lazarus” by Sylvia Plath. The poem is a dramatic monologue 
delivered by the female lyrical self, who is recovering from a suicide attempt. She 
repeatedly blames various male figures addressed as “Herr Doktor” (18), “Herr Enemy” 
(18), and “Herr God, Herr Lucifer” (19) for her sufferings. Accordingly, her own condition 
is described by elements taken from stock imagery of Holocaust fiction: “my skin / Bright 
as a Nazi lampshade” (16); “My face a featureless, fine Jew linen” (16); “I turn and burn. 
[...] Ash, ash—[...] A cake of soap, / A wedding ring, / A gold filling” (18). Jacqueline 
Rose offers an overview on the opinions of many prestigious authors outraged by Plath’s 
poem. 
‘The metaphor is inappropriate... I do not mean to lift the Holocaust out of the 
reach of art. Adorno was wrong—poetry can be made after Auschwitz and out 
of it... But it cannot be done without hard work and rare resources of the spirit. 
Familiarity with the hellish subject must be earned not presupposed. My own 
feeling is that Sylvia Plath did not earn it, that she did not respect the real 
incommensurability to her own experience of what took place’. [...] Wieseltier 
is not alone in this criticism. Similarly, Joyce Carol Oates objects to Plath 
‘snatching [her word] metaphors’ for her predicament from newspaper 
headlines’; Seamus Heaney argues that in poems like ‘Lady Lazarus’, Plath 
harnesses the wider cultural reference to a ‘vehemently self-justifying 
purpose’; Irving Howe describes the link as ‘monstrous, utterly 
disproportionate’; and Marjorie Perloff describes Plath’s references to the 
Nazis as ‘empty’ and ‘histrionic’, ‘cheap shots’, ‘topical trappings’, ‘devices’ 
which ‘camouflage’ the true personal meaning of the poems in which they 
appear’. (22)   
Most of all, I agree with Heaney, who criticizes Plath for using Holocaust motifs as if they 
were in themselves unproblematic vehicles conveying the tenor of the speaker’s personal 
concerns without deserving much attention on their own. Such an approach treats the 
Holocaust as a petrified set of clichés that belong to the past and thus need no further 
consideration regarding the present, which implies the double dangers of irreverently 
104 
forgetting the uniqueness of the historical events and victims as well as repeating the 
mistakes induced by past narratives precisely because they are regarded as merely past.  
 Adrienne Rich’s “Yom Kippur, 1984” seems to be a much more balanced poem on 
the subject of persecution. It is a long meditation trying the answer the question posed in 
the first line: “What is a Jew in solitude?” (124) with a combination of personal examples, 
philosophical ideas and literary allusions. The question is self-ironic to start with as it 
simultaneously states and negates Jewish identity, since feeling oneself a member of a 
group or to be considered as such by others presupposes the existence of a definitive 
community. However, Rich emphasizes “solitude”, the absence of any other person or 
community, also foregrounding the ambiguity hidden at the core of most lyrical poems in 
general: namely, that they are presumably the subject’s most intimate meditations most 
publicly disclosed. So the poet’s initial rhetorical question both creates a lyrical voice and 
questions the relevance of the only available information about its identity; a strategy 
consistently maintained all through the poem from the first “I”, which appears not as the 
first person singular pronoun standing for the speaker of the poem but as a quotation from 
another poem by Robinson Jeffers to the grammatical oxymoron of shared solitudes: 
“when our souls crash together, Arab and Jew, howling our loneliness within the tribes” 
(127).  Like Plath, Rich also relies on Holocaust imagery: “a solitude of barbed-wire and 
searchlights, the survivalist’s final solution” (125). But her dramaturgy is quite different. 
“Lady Lazarus” culminates in the revenge of the female voice over the male enemy: “Out 
of the ash / I rise with my red hair / And I eat men like air” (19), whereas Rich completely 
rejects the whole paradigm of strike and revenge bearing further revenge wishing to rejoice 
over the loss of the enemy. The speaker in “Yom Kippur, 1984” does not hope relief from 
designating any scapegoat, be it a man, a woman, a Jew, an Arab, God or Lucifer: “the 
pick-up with a gun parked at a turn-out in Utah or the Golan Heights / is not what I mean” 
(125).  
In her vision “women and men are fellow-sufferers as Jews, Blacks, and 
homosexuals” (Murphy 110). 
“young scholar shot at the university gates on a summer evening walk, his 
prizes and studies nothing, nothing availing his Blackness / Jew deluded that 
she’s escaped the tribe, the laws of her exclusion, the men too holy to touch her 
hand; Jew who has turned her back /  on midrash and mitzvah (yet wears the 
chai on a thong between her breasts) hiking alone / found with a swastika 
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carved in her back at the foot of the cliffs (did she die as queer or as Jew?)” 
(Rich 126) 
The lyrical self clearly identifies with the victims, yet the title self-ironically mentions the 
Jewish holiday Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement when one is expected to revise one’s 
own crimes committed against others, not the crimes one has been victimized by, thus 
calling for self-reflection instead of revenge. Plath’s exclamation marks are replaced here 
by questions seeking reconciliation although also revealing the embarrassing lack of 
satisfying answers. Besides, the structure based on the juxtaposition of different minority 
narratives exposes the underlying contradictions as well. Homosexuality, for example, is 
renounced by Orthodox Judaism while both Jews and homosexuals used to be persecuted 
by the Nazis, so the provocative question “did she die as a queer or as a Jew” (126) 
demands an answer that could go beyond already existing and obviously already failed 
conceptual frameworks. This demand is reinforced by the intertextual evocation of 
Whitman’s poetry, as explained by Adrienne Rich in her essay “The Genesis of ‘Yom 
Kippur, 1984’”. The mockingbird mentioned in line 75 is a reference to Whitman’s “out of 
the mockingbird’s throat, the musical shuttle” (Rich 256) and the mockingbird as the 
species named after its habit to mimic other animals’ voices is a self-ironic image in itself.  
Besides, Rich’s list of crimes: the “’faggot kicked into the icy river, woman dragged from 
her stalled car,’and so on—is a kind of Whitmanesque catalogue, naming and evoking the 
different kinds of people that make up the American landscape, the American city. [...] The 
America of violence, the America that humiliates people on the grounds of their difference. 
Whitman himself welcomed those differences” (Rich 256). Thus Riches expresses her 
dissatisfaction with contemporary American society by ironically recalling the poetic form 
introduced by Whitman to voice her anxieties that “[t]his isn’t the America that Whitman 
understood, that he conjures up in his poetry” (256).   
A similar claim for the revision of identity is articulated by Isaac Deutscher in his 
essay “Who is a Jew?”. He locates the essential common factor of diverse Jewish identities 
in their minority position, self-ironically explaining his idea by the metaphor based on the 
fate of another minority, the African American slaves. However, Deutscher does not stop 
at using the clichés of slavery as an illustration, taking that narrative for granted and 
settled. Instead, he invites the reader to explore the contradictions hidden in the 
complicated relationships of the two communities.  
The Jew in American or in Soviet society? [...]  In each of these societies the 
position of the Jew is different. What common denominator is there between 
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the attitudes, roles and functions of Jews in such different circumstances? [...] 
in the United States [...] the Jew is always aware [...] that in the Great 
Democracy he is ‘the other’ Negro: a white-skinned one. And how very often 
he gets his own back on the black Negro: in the Southern States more often 
than not it is the Jew who is one of the most fanatical upholders of white 
supremacy. How difficult it is in this tangle of emotions, fears, prejudices, and 
racial arrogance to find one’s identity. (43) 
In the introduction to his essay collection, A szám zött nyelv (Language in Exile), 
Imre Kertész’s follows an indirect strategy regarding the issue of identity, which resembles 
Deutscher’s approach quoted above. Kertész writes: “I like that sentence by Cioran in 
which he says he can best communicate with Jewish people because he, just like Jews, 
feels like “an outsider to humanity”; the most precise expression ever for the state of mind 
I lived in for decades2” [my translation]. Kertész’s whole oeuvre is defined by his 
Holocaust experience, still—or rather as a result of that—he is reluctant to simply take 
over clichés on Jewish identity. Instead he creates a self-ironic distance from the core 
statement that he, a Jew himself, “like Jews, feels like ‘an outsider to humanity’” by citing 
it from another text. In addition, his carefully chosen source is Cioran, a Romanian-French 
philosopher, who spent a significant part of his career in France, a country different from 
his original homeland, reminiscent of Kertész—who also lived abroad, in Berlin, for 
decades—and recalling the concept of exile in the title. Besides, in the context of the 
World War II—which haunts not only every book by Kertész but also Eastern European 
public discourse at the time of writing and publishing A szám zött nyelv—Cioran as 
Romanian was supposed to be an adversary to the Hungarian Kertész. Moreover, the 
young Cioran used to sympathize with fascism in the 1930s (Stone 11). So in Kertész’s 
sentence stereotypical Jews as well as their former enemy as well as the supposedly lucky 
survivors of the conflict feel like “an outsider to humanity”, no matter if they live in 
Romania, Hungary, France or Germany any time during the second half of the twentieth 
century. But if anyone, from either side of the barricade and at any time anywhere in 
Europe feels like that then the question emerges who could be imagined as the “insider”? 
As a result of these multiple layers, Kertész simultaneously affirms and questions his 
Jewish identity in the sense of being an outsider as well as raising general doubts whether 
                                                 
2 „Szeretem Cioran-nak azt a mondatát, amely szerint f ként zsidókkal tud igazán szót érteni, mert akárcsak a 
zsidók,  is „kívül érzi magát az emberiségen”: soha még ilyen pontos megfogalmazása az állapotnak, 
amelyben évtizedekig éltem.” (Kertész, A szán zött nyelv 5) 
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one’s identity can be defined by birth, country, profession or any other factor. 
Understanding his statement requires from the reader a careful and thorough revision of 
numerous stereotypes regarding identity as conceived in the post-war European context.  
The diverse examples above have been collected to illustrate that Jewish identity 
reconsidered in the context of other minorities is a frequent theme of Jewish literature often 
resulting in self-irony. Therefore, the following subchapters will examine the relationship 
between representations of Jewish identity and other minority positions in various 
situations. In case of Israel, the conflict between the position of the oppressed minority—
the persecution of the Jews as the historical background to the foundation of the Israeli 
state—and that of the oppressive majority—in relationship to Palestinians—is united 
within Jewish identity. The subchapter on African American and Jewish American 
identities focuses on the parallels between these two American minority groups with 
different backgrounds but sometimes rather similar ambitions. Finally, the last subchapter 
concentrates on the coincidence of two different and often antagonistic minority positions 
within one identity: the stories of female Jewish authors address issues of feminism 
emerging in a specific Jewish environment. In each case, minority position, which is a key 
component of Jewish American identity, is represented in a double context as it is also 
embodied by the African American counterpart or by the Palestinian opponent, or is 
repeated, although in a rather different version, by the feminist standpoint. The questions 
and dilemmas arising from these controversial situations often result in the uncertainty of 
the narrator’s and the characters’ identities, an enhanced self-reflexivity of narratives and 
thus self-ironic narrative strategies. Obviously, the discourse on these issues is far from 
being unilateral. To name just one of the countless examples, Toni Morrison engages in the 
same debate with the motto of her novel on slavery. “The dedication of Beloved to “Sixty 
Million and more” who died during slavery and the Middle Passage has been read as a 
comparative reference to the six million victims of the Holocaust” (Durrant 4). Therefore 
the picture could be complete only with a study on the representations of these themes by 
Palestinian, African American and non-Jewish feminist authors as well. However, these 
works fall out of the scope of the present paper so they could be addressed only in a 
subsequent analysis.   
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4.2 Identity and Politics in the Diaspora and Israel 
“Whose Jewish experience?” (12) ask many of Gold’s friends and relatives when he 
tells them that he has been asked “to write about the Jewish experience in America” (11). 
The protagonist of Joseph Heller’s novel, Good As Gold, is skeptical about the mission, 
too.  
“How can I write about the Jewish experience,” he asked himself on the 
Metroliner returning to New York, “when I don’t even know what it is? I 
haven’t the faintest idea what to write. What in the world for me was the 
Jewish experience? I don’t think I’ve ever run into an effective anti-Semite. 
When I grew up in Coney Island, everyone I knew was Jewish. [...] We had an 
Irish family on our block with a German surname and there were always a 
couple of Italians or Scandinavians in my class who had to come to school on 
Jewish holidays and looked persecuted. I used to feel sorry for them because 
they were the minority.” (11) 
Gold’s father also questions his son’s competence: “‘What does he know about being 
Jewish?’ he roared. ‘He wasn’t even born in Europe’” (30). Heller’s humorous game of 
turning minority position inside out by changing the perspective from a the overall scale of 
American society to the local milieu of a New York City neighborhood confirms the 
suggestion in the “Introduction” to this chapter of the present paper  that minority position 
is usually conceived as an essential factor of Jewish identity. On the other hand, the whole 
first section of his novel called “The Jewish Experience” self-ironically reveals that there is 
no such thing as one definite, general “Jewish Experience”. Every character entering the 
dialogue on this theme insists on it that there are as many Jewish experiences as there are 
people voicing them.  
Jewish identity is substantially different from the point of view of someone living 
in Europe or in the America, in the Diaspora or in Israel, at the same time each of these 
perspectives is challenged both by each other as well as their local political contexts. 
Cynthia Ozick starts her already quoted speech, “Toward a New Yiddish”—originally 
delivered at a conference in Israel— by quoting a Jewish author, George Steiner, born in 
Europe, who “offered Exile as a metaphor for the Essential Jew, and himself as a metaphor 
of Exile” (Ozick, “Toward a New Yiddish” 154). Steiner, like the fictive Gold’s father, 
sees European Diaspora as the source of authentic Jewish identity. In contrast, Ozick 
argues for the outstanding importance of American Jewry as the greatest Jewish 
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community surviving World War II thus destined to maintain the tradition. Yet another 
approach is outlined by Hannah Hever explaining “the tension between Jewish ethnic 
continuity and Zionist discontinuity” (205) in her essay on “Mapping Literary Spaces: 
Territory and Violence in Israeli Literature”. 
We have, on the one hand, a story of Jewish continuity, of the Jewish people 
returning to their land and undergoing a process of territorialization. On the 
other hand, there is a parallel story of rupture and rebellion: the story of the 
Hebrews’ rejection of the Diaspora Jew. The “New Jew”, the newly 
territorialized Hebrew, seeks to shed his or her Jewish past in order to assume 
citizenship in the Israeli state. (205) 
 On this complicated map of diverse Jewish identities, Heller depicts the satirical 
portrait of the assimilated American Jewish Bruce Gold, who tries to succeed in the field of 
American politics. However, he is reminded of his Jewish identity the first moment he gets 
contacted by his friend, Ralph offering him a job at the White House.  
“That’s why it’s good you’re a Jew.” 
That word Jew fell with a crash upon Gold’s senses. “Why, Ralph?” he 
managed to say. “Why is it good to have someone... who is Jewish?” 
“That will make it easier at both ends, Bruce” Ralph explained with no change 
of tone. “Jews are popular now and people don’t like to object to them. And a 
Jew is always good to get rid of whenever the right wing wants us to.” (Heller, 
Good As Gold 53) 
However, the ironically self-contradictory rhetoric of politics does not exclusively apply to 
Jewish subjects in Heller’s parody; he unveils this hypocrisy as a general feature of 
political life. 
“What would I have to do?” 
“Anything you want, as long as it’s everything we tell you to say and do in 
support of our policies, whether you agree with them or not. You’ll have 
complete freedom.” 
Gold was confused. He said delicately, “I can’t be bought, Ralph.” 
“We wouldn’t want you if you could be, Bruce,” Ralph responded. “This 
President doesn’t want yes-men. What we want are independent men of 
integrity who will agree with all our decisions after we make them.” (Heller, 
Good As Gold 52-53) 
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Heller starts Good As Gold with the standard disclaimer putting his killing satire 
between quotation marks: “This book is a work of fiction. Names, characters, places, and 
incidents either are products of the author’s imagination or are used fictitiously. Any 
resemblance to actual events or locales or person, living or dead, is entirely coincidental” 
(4). On the other hand, he continues with a motto self-ironically contradicting the 
ostensible distance just created between reality and fiction: “I dedicate this book / to / The 
several gallant families / and / Numerous unwitting friends / whose / Help, conversations, 
and experiences / play / so large a part” (5). Philip Roth plays a very similar game, just the 
other way round, in his novel, Operation Shylock, which allegedly tells about an operation 
in which Roth participated as the agent of the Israeli intelligence service. At the end of the 
book, the narrator’s Israeli contact, Cheeseburger tries to convince him to employ the 
disclaimer for reasons of discretion demanded by international diplomacy. Roth rejects the 
suggestion, claims his book to be documentary, and resolves the political dilemma by 
omitting the details of the operation itself. Thus his novel focuses on the preliminary 
events getting him involved in the actual action, which is ironically absent from the text. 
The self-ironic game regarding the reality components of both books increases the 
incisively sarcastic effect of the most provocative remarks by both authors. 
Sylvia Barack-Fishman writes in her essay on “Homelands of the Heart: Israel and 
Jewish Identity in American Jewish Fiction” that “[f]or Roth’s Jewish characters in The 
Counterlife and Operation Shylock, personal identity is intimately tied up with Jewish 
identity and with Israel. In his books—as in reality—secular and traditionalist Jews in 
Israel and in America each have very different assumptions about what makes a Jew 
Jewish” (282). The possible positions concerning these dilemmas of identity are voiced by 
separate characters in Operation Shylock. The first person narrator and protagonist, called 
Philip Roth, embodies the assimilated Jewish American author, highly reminiscent of the 
real Philip Roth as known from his documentary texts. Self-ironically, his counterpoint 
also names himself Philip Roth. He is an ardent advocate of the Palestinian cause, who 
preaches his doctrine: “Diasporism: The Only Solution to the Jewish Problem” (32), an 
ironic reverse of Zionism, claiming that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be 
resolved by the Israeli Jews returning to their original European Diaspora homelands. The 
third Jewish position is articulated by the Mossad agent, who first introduces himself to 
Roth under the persona of an American millionaire, Smilesburger, financially supporting 
Israel. Finally, the Palestinian standpoint is represented primarily by a friend of Roth’s 
from college, George Ziad, “a Harvard-educated Egyptian enrolled at Chicago to study 
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Dostoyevsky and Kierkegaard” (119) returning to Israel in order to become “not a stone-
throwing Arab [... but] a word-throwing Arab” (121).  
Structurally, Operation Shylock is built on a series of self-ironic doubles, parallels 
and splits. The title itself is a self-mocking allusion to Shakespeare’s play, The Merchant of 
Venice, which depicts a condemnatory picture of its Jewish title character, Shylock. Roth, 
the narrator and his doppelgänger, whom he calls Moishe Pipik, and whom many of the 
characters mistake for Roth for a while, can be understood—and are actually understood at 
certain points in the novel by the primary Roth himself—as two aspects of a split 
personality: “this Pipik of mine is none other than the Satiric Spirit in the flesh, and the 
whole thing a send-up, a satire of authorship!” (199). “The derogatory, joking nonsense 
name that translates literally to Moses Bellybutton” (115) is taken from Roth’s childhood 
memories, in which his uncle and other relatives called naughty children or adult 
schlemiels Moishe Pipik. However, the name implies not only a sense of inferiority but 
also a reference to Moses, who transmitted God’s laws to the Jewish people. Therefore 
Roth simultaneously deplores and admires Pipik: “Pipik, who sent you to me in my hour of 
need? Who made me this wonderful gift? Know what Heine liked to say? There is a God, 
and his name is Aristophanes. You prove it. It’s Aristophanes they should be worshipping 
over at the Wailing Wall—if he were the God of Israel I’d be in shul three times a day!” 
(204). Similarly, Ziad feels split, too. Although he was fed up during his American school 
years with his father’s worship of their Arabic heritage, he feels compelled to take his 
place after the father’s death and he ends up seeing his own wife and son recoiling from 
the plights his mission afflicts on them, the same way as he used to feel as a boy.  
Roth concludes that “I was thinking that the only son I’d seen yet in Greater Israel 
who was not in conflict with his father was John Demjanjuk, Jr. There there was only 
harmony” (144). His conclusion is highly ironic asthe senior John Demjanjuk’s trial for 
World War crimes is just going on as a secondary plotline of the novel, placing the primary 
plotline happening at the time of the First Intifada in the historical context of the 
Holocaust. Demjanjuk is also a double himself, as either he is falsely identified with the 
former dreaded guard of Nazi concentration camps—as he claims—and in this case he is 
the unlucky doppelgänger of the real mass murderer; or they are the same person—as he is 
accused of—and in that case his later self of an amicable American grandfather is 
completely split from his former self of a war criminal. Consequently, John Demjanjuk 
Jr.’s apparently resolute belief in the innocence of his father appears as either as simple-
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mindedness or as a mere lie in the context of all the other characters facing the ambiguities 
of their lives. 
Why couldn’t the Jews be one people? Why must Jews be in conflict with one 
another? Why must they be in conflict with themselves? Because the 
divisiveness is not just between Jew and Jew—it is within the individual Jew. 
Is there a more manifold personality in all the world? I don’t say divided. 
Divided is nothing. Even the goyim are divided. But inside every Jew there is a 
mob of Jews. The good Jew, the bad Jew. The new Jew, the old Jew. The lover 
of Jews, the hater of Jews. The friend of the goy, the enemy of the goy. The 
arrogant Jew, the wounded Jew. The pious Jew, the rascal Jew. The coarse Jew, 
the gentle Jew. The defiant Jew, the appeasing Jew. The Jewish Jew, the de-
Jewed Jew. Shall I go on? Do I have to expound upon the Jew as a three-
thousand-year amassment of mirrored fragments to one who has made his 
fortune as a leading Jewologist of international literature? Is it any wonder that 
the Jew is always disputing? He is a dispute, incarnate! (334) 
The rhetoric of Roth’s exuberant list above works self-ironically. On the one hand, its 
repetition of the word “Jew” ostensibly serves the purpose of emphasizing that Roth’s 
statement gives a picture of the Jewish people and of himself as one of them. On the other 
hand, the same repetition gradually turns the proper noun into a word with the effect of a 
pronoun while the middle of the section with so general adjectives as good, bad, new, old 
etc. reveals that Roth’s observation is valid for anyone, independently of ethnicity, who has 
the courage to face the complex and controversial nature of one’s own personality and 
heritage.  
The split is present in the novel not only on the level of two plotlines, two historical 
contexts or among and within the characters but also regarding the concepts of the 
imaginary versus the real. Besides playing with the genre of his own book either as a 
memoir or as a piece of fiction, Roth addresses this theme in many other components of 
Operation Shylock, too. Roth offers two alternative endings to his own story, indicating the 
arbitrariness of any fiction. There are travel diaries written by Leon Klinghoffer—a Jewish 
man killed by Palestinian terrorists—presumably discovered but later on turning out to be 
fake. Or there is a character called Apter, who is Roth’s cousin, a Holocaust-survivor, who 
lives in the streets of Jerusalem on selling paintings of the local sights. 
In Apter’s stories, people steal from him, spit at him, defraud and insult and 
humiliate him virtually every day and, more often than not, these people who 
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victimize my cousin are survivors of the camps. Are these stories accurate and 
true? I myself never inquire about their veracity. I think of them instead as 
fiction that, like so much of fiction, provides the storyteller with the lie through 
which to expose his unspeakable truth. (48) 
Highlighting all these ambiguities regarding truth versus fiction and blurring the line 
between the two, Roth foregrounds the crucial problem of identity in his novel: the split 
within Jewish identity in the context of the fight between Palestinian and Jewish people in 
Israel. 
 The conflict can be read as the collision of two grand narratives. On the one hand, 
there are the victims of the Holocaust—and of other, not infrequent periods when Jews, as 
a minority, were persecuted in Europe as—who rightfully seek for a land where they can 
feel safe. On the other hand, there are the Palestinian people living in Israel, who take over 
the position of the minority feeling persecuted as a result of the Zionist movement. The 
problem of split sympathy and thus of split identity is clearly addressed, among many other 
texts, in the Nobel Acceptance speech by Eli Wiesel, who in the first passages identifies 
with the victims of the Holocaust and then cannot resist to voice his sympathy for the 
Palestinian victims, either. 
This honor belongs to all the survivors and their children and, through us to the 
Jewish people with whose destiny I have always identified. [...] Human rights 
are being violated on every continent. More people are oppressed than free. 
How can one not be sensitive to their plight? Human suffering anywhere 
concerns men and women everywhere. That applies also to Palestinians to 
whose plight I am sensitive but whose methods I deplore when they lead to 
violence. Violence is not the answer. Terrorism is the most dangerous of 
answers. They are frustrated, that is understandable, something must be done. 
The refugees and their misery. The children and their fear. The uprooted and 
their hopelessness. Something must be done about their situation. Both the 
Jewish people and the Palestinian people have lost too many sons and 
daughters and have shed too much blood. 
Similar concerns are articulated in Operation Shylock, self-ironically, by the Mossad agent 
Smilesburger echoing the phrases of post-colonial criticism.  
What we have done to the Palestinians is wicked. We have displaced them and 
we have oppressed them. We have expelled them, beaten them, tortured them, 
and murdered them. The Jewish state, from the day of its inception, has been 
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dedicated to eliminating a Palestinian presence in historical Palestine and 
expropriating a land of an indigenous people. The Palestinians have been 
driven out, dispersed, and conquered by the Jews. To make a Jewish state we 
have betrayed our history—we have done unto the Palestinians what the 
Christians have done to us: systematically transformed them into the despised 
and subjugated Other, thereby depriving them of their human status. (349) 
 Obviously, Roth cannot offer a resolution to the dilemma, as it is indicated in the plot by 
the emphatic and ironic absence of the Mossad operation, in which he allegedly actively 
participated. But due to the self-ironic structure, both the dilemma and the point where one 
can no longer avoid the responsibility of taking stands are clearly expressed. 
 Michael Chabon addresses the same issue of Israeli-Palestinian conflict in his 
novel, The Yiddish Policemen’s Union. The plot takes place an alternative history, in which 
Jewish refugees of the Holocaust were admitted in the United States and settled down in 
the Sitka District of Alaska, according to the Slattery Report, a plan that actually existed 
but was never implemented. The hilarious detective story gives a frosty parody of Israel, 
with conflicts between Jews and local Native American instead of Palestinian people, and 
with a protagonist, Detective Landsman just as much at odds with his own identity as the 
narrator of Operation Shylock.  However, Chabon’s thought experiment ironically leads to 
the same outcome as actual history: the Jewish community is tolerated by the States only 
as a temporary settlement, therefore their need to find a permanent homeland does not 
change, and eventually a local Jewish maffia in Alaska initiates a terrorist attack against 
Jerusalem, simultaneously parodying Palestinian terrorism and the Jewish invasion of 
Israel. 
 The arbitrariness of borders is expressed by the metaphoric character of Zimbalist, 
the boundary maven, responsible for the Jewish ritual enclosure called eruv, who is also a 
key participant in the terrorist plot.  
Landsman has put a lot of work into the avoidance of having to understand 
concepts like that of the eruv, but he knows that it’s a typical Jewish ritual 
dodge, a scam run on God, that controlling motherfucker. It has something to 
do with pretending that telephone poles are doorposts, and that the wires are 
lintels. You can tie off an area using poles and strings and call it an eruv, then 
pretend on the Sabbath that this eruv you’ve drawn—in case of Zimbalist and 
his crew, it’s pretty much the whole District—is your house.” (53) 
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While Landsman puts “a lot of work into the avoidance” of his Jewish identity, the most 
decent and devout Jewish character of the novel is, self-ironically, his colleague and best 
friend, Berko, born to a Native Indian mother by a Jewish father, in other words, not 
Jewish according to orthodox Judaism. Similarly to Roth’s book, the conclusion of 
Chabon’s novel offers no general resolution for the community, either. The only optimistic 
perspective is spared for the individual: Landsman reunites with his ex-wife with the hope 
that “[a] mere redrawing of borders, a change in governments, those things can never faze 
a Jewess with a good supply of hand wipes in her bag” (269). 
 The dark humor of Chabon’s, Roth’s and Heller’s books alike explore the 
ambiguities of Jewish identity in a world dominated by aggression. The conflicts between 
individual and community become especially visible when individual sympathy and group 
loyalty point into opposite directions, as in many scenes of Operation Shylock. Although 
each novel features a Jewish protagonist, the self-ironically expressed uncertainties 
regarding identity have a greater relevance to the chances and dilemmas of the individual 
in the precarious field of politics.  
4.3 African American and Jewish Identities 
The situation of Jewish American and African American people facing similar 
minority issues with very different historical backgrounds but equally aspiring for social 
integration in the United States has resulted in complicated relationships between the two 
communities ranging from solidarity to more or less latent conflicts. For example, E. L. 
Doctorow ostensibly rounds off his novel, Ragtime, with a happy ending.  
One morning Tateh looked out the window of his study and saw the three 
children sitting on the lawn. Behind them on the sidewalk was a tricycle. They 
were talking and sunning themselves. His daughter, with dark hair, his tow-
headed stepson and his legal responsibility, the schwartze child. He suddenly 
had an idea for a film. A bunch of children who were pals, white black, fat thin, 
rich poor, all kinds, mischievous little urchins who would have funny 
adventures in their own neighborhood, a society of ragamuffins, like all of us, a 
gang, getting into trouble and getting out again. Actually not one movie but 
several were made of this vision. (269-270) 
The idyllic tableau above is a miniature version of the great social tableau depicted by 
Doctorow. The three children are descendants of the three families whose intertwined 
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stories make up the plot taking place in New York City in the first decades of the 20th
century. The protagonists are not so much individuals as representatives of social 
categories, which is indicated by the way they are designated not by names but by the 
functions they fulfill: there are a WASP Father and a Mother with their young tow-headed 
son; a poor Jewish immigrant, Tateh—the Yiddish word for father—with his little 
daughter; and an African American couple, Coalhouse Walker, his lover, Sarah and their 
baby. The last family might seem an exception, however, Coalhouse Walker’s name and 
fate are closely reminiscent of the literary character, Michael Kohlhaas created by Heinrich 
von Kleist, whereas Sarah is a house servant, in whose profession it is usual to be called by 
one’s first name, so they are just as much the embodiments of abstract types as the others. 
In harmony with Ragtime’s genre, historical fiction, this set of Everyman-like protagonists 
is supplemented with a wide range of characters bearing the names and recalling the 
biographies of actual celebrities of the period. 
[H]istorical-fiction worlds bring together fictional persons with historical 
counterparts (e.g., Sigmund Freud) and fictional persons without such 
counterparts (e.g., Coalhouse Walker). The story of Ragtime is a blend of 
events lifted from chronicles of the day (Robert White’s murder) with those 
freely invented by the fiction maker (Coalhouse Walker’s “uprising” and 
occupation of the Morgan Library). (Duležel 94) 
Apparently, Ragtime represents the society of the United States as a successful 
melting pot. The three families are united in the end: Tateh marries Mother and makes a 
career in Hollywood, where they bring up the three children as siblings. At the same time, 
Doctorow permanently and self-ironically emphasizes that all the reader sees is imaginary: 
the final idyll turns in the vision of a filmmaker, the novel is full of characters modeled on 
literary predecessors and types taken from sociological theories, and this context 
foregrounds that the lives of historical figures as we know them are also always the 
construction of the creative mind producing fiction. Thus the novel attempts to understand 
American identities in terms of ethnic origin and history yet simultaneously questions the 
validity of the available narratives and their implied paradigms, including its own version. 
Ragtime fits well into a long tradition of stories by Jewish American authors 
sensitive to the plight of African American people, from Gertrude Stein’s already 
mentioned Melanchta to the texts discussed in this chapter. Doctorow represents 
Coalhouse Walker as a tragic hero with exceptional talents and morals yet ineluctably 
victimized by society for ethnic reasons. Similarly, Tillie Olsen’s short story, “O Yes” 
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“portrays the dissolution of a childhood friendship between the black Parialee and the 
white [...] Carol [... describing] the inevitable pain of girls growing up to face the 
restrictions of a middle-class culture” (Oxford Book of Women’s Writing 111). Likewise, 
Dorothy Parker—“who once called herself ‘a little Jewish girl trying to be cute’” (Bunkers 
25) but who is on the periphery of the Jewish American canon because she was a 
mainstream American author yet she hardly ever addressed Jewish themes—firmly 
rejected any kind of discrimination against African American people, too. For instance, 
one of her short stories, “Arrangement in Black and White” gives a sharp satire of racist 
discourse. The protagonist, a WASP upper middle class lady arrives to a party organized in 
honor of an African American singer and she is eager to be introduced to him. Although 
the story is supposed to represent her conversations first with the host and then with the 
celebrated guest, the text consists almost entirely of her monologue, which ironically 
illustrates the very racist rhetoric the speaker allegedly argues against.  
“Well, I think you‘re simply marvelous, giving this perfectly marvelous party 
for him, and having him meet all these white people, and all. Isn’t he terribly 
grateful? [...] I don’t see why on earth it isn’t perfectly all right to meet colored 
people. I haven’t any feeling at all about it—not a single bit.” (19)  
“Come on, let’s us go on over and talk to him. Listen, what shall I do when I’m 
introduced? Ought I to shake hands? Or what? [...] I wouldn’t for the world 
have him think I had any feeling. I think I’d better shake hands, just the way I 
would with anybody else. ” (21) 
Employing irony, Parker clearly makes her point of standing out against African 
American people’s segregation. However, the Jewish position in the twentieth century 
debate over minority rights in the American society implies ambiguities, too, as explored 
in Cynthia Ozick’s essay “Literary Blacks and Jews”. On the one hand, she writes that 
“Jews have always known hard times, and are therefore are naturally sympathetic to others 
who are having or once had, hard times” (93). On the other hand, she admits that in an 
“America felt simultaneously as Jewish Eden and black inferno” (95) the “[b]lack distrust 
of this heritage of Jewish sympathy is obviously a social predicament” (94). Her 
argumentation is based upon the analysis of two relevant narratives by Bernard Malamud: 
the short story, “Angel Levine” and the novel, The Tenants, and she reads Malamud 
turning more pessimistic in the meantime as reflected by “the redemptiveness of ‘Angel 
Levine’ and the murderous conclusion of The Tenants” (94).  
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The central issue of “Angel Levine” is identity. The first description of the 
protagonist, Manischevitz, an aging Jewish tailor, represents him reading his newspaper, 
focusing on the moment when “he realized, with some astonishment, that he was expecting 
to discover something about himself” (Malamud, Complete Stories 158). Then the title 
character arrives, and their first conversation is again preoccupied with the theme of 
identity. To Manischevitz’s question, “Who are you?” (159), the unexpected visitor, a 
young African American man gives a humorously circuitous answer foregrounding the 
uncertainties regarding identity: “If I may, insofar as one is able to, identify myself, I bear 
the name of Alexander Levine” (159). Accordingly, the recognition of identity is at the 
stake of the whole story as Levine promises help only if the tailor acknowledges that his 
visitor is an angel. The uncertainties of identity derive from the double paradigms 
simultaneously defining the logic of the narrative. On the one hand, “Angel Levine” was 
written in 1955, the year of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, which brought civil rights in the 
foreground of public interest in the United States. In that sense, the optimistic conclusion 
of “Angel Levine” celebrates the characters overcoming racial segregation. On the other 
hand, the short story is a paraphrase of Job’s parable and the two contexts permanently 
counterpoint and each other. 
Manischevitz is introduced as a modern Job, who “in his fifty-first year suffered 
many reverses and indignities” (157). He lost all his money due to a fire in his workshop; 
his son was killed in war; his daughter eloped with a lout; he is so sick he can hardly work 
and his wife is dying. When the young African American man enters Manischevitz’s flat 
and claims to have brought him salvation, the situation is ironic in many respects. First of 
all, Manischevitz feels he is the victim of some transcendental irony. “The tailor could not 
rid himself of the feeling that he was the butt of a jokester. Is this what a Jewish angle 
looks like?” (160). “What sort of mockery was it—provided that Levine was an angel—of 
a faithful servant who had from childhood lived in the synagogues, concerned with the 
word of God?” (159). It is also provocatively humorous how the supernatural and the 
ethnically different are rank by the old man as equally inconceivable. “A black Jew and 
angel to boot—very hard to believe” (161).  
The humor lying in the disparity of the two contexts—the religious plot and the 
reality of New York in the mid-fifties where it takes place—develops further during the 
succeeding visits paid by the tailor to Harlem as in his final despair Manischevitz tries to 
find the first rejected Levine. On his trip, he peers into a synagogue where a small group of 
African American men are studying the Torah.  
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“Neshoma,” said bubble eyes, pointing to the word with a stubby finger. “Now 
what dat mean?” 
“That’s the word that means soul,” said the boy. He wore eyeglases. 
“Let’s git on wid de commentary,” said the old man.  
“Ain’t necessary,” said the humpback. “Souls is immaterial substance. That’s 
all. The soul is derived in that manner. The immateriality is derived from the 
substance, and they both, causally an otherwise, derived from the soul. There 
can be no higher.” 
“That’s the highest.” 
“Over the top.” 
“Wait a minute,” said bubble eyes. “I don’t see what is dat immatierial 
substance. How come de one gits hithced up to de odder?’” (163-164). 
The community is a parody of a congregation not only because of their ethnicity unusual 
from the tailor’s point of view but also because each of the participants is designated by 
some physical defect or premature or too advanced age. Especially telling are the boy’s 
eyeglasses symbolizing that one cannot directly read the soul—the theme of the 
discussion—but always sees it through some distorting media: the body or the text. The 
contrast of the erudite debate and the slang conveying the ideas also humorously illustrates 
the distance between spirit and substance, thought and reality, God and human beings. The 
scene can be read as a symbol of heaven, especially if compared to the following site, a 
bar, where the tailor eventually encounters Alexander Levine. The place, Bella’s Bar is 
reminiscent of hell with its red and black colors and its teeming, drunken, noisy crowd. 
Levine is sitting at a table drinking whisky and playing cards—the devil’s bible—then he 
takes a dance with the owner, Bella, dressed in a frivolous purple gown. Thus Levine with 
his underworld features and his role of testing Manischevitz’s faith corresponds to the 
character of Satan in Job’s story. However, the tailor also tests the angel. “Carrying the jest 
further” (159), he asks his guest to “say the blessing for the bread [... and] Levine recited it 
in sonorous Hebrew” (160). Besides, the offensive racist remarks of both sides are 
ironically played out against each other. “Should he say he believed a half-drunk Negro 
was an angel?” (165), asks Manischevitz himself, whereas the local people at Bella’s bar 
shout at him: “Exit, Yankel, Semitic trash” (165). So in spite of the happy ending, “Angel 
Levine” implies just as many conflicts as The Tenants. 
 However, I agree with Cynthia Ozick that these tensions are more explicit in The 
Tenants. It is an allegorical novel on two young writers, the only people living in a huge 
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house doomed to be demolished and replaced by a new construction soon. Lesser, the 
professional Jewish writer is a regular tenant just about to finish his third novel whereas his 
colleague, whereas Willie is writing his first book and settles down illegally in one of the 
empty apartments seeking seclusion for his work. Their complicated relationship 
consisting of friendship as well as rivalry both in the field of literature and in love finally 
turns into a desperate fight ending with two protagonists tearing each other into pieces in a 
scene which can be read both as a piece of fiction written by either of the fictive authors or 
as reality experienced as a nightmare.  
Although The Tenants is not a humorous narrative but an overtly tragic vision on 
the failing dialogue between two minorities in a society ripe for total reconstruction, yet it 
includes a scene illustrating the redemptive power of humor. When Lesser is threatened by 
some of Willie’s African American friends he is saved by Willie suggesting that he and 
Lesser should play the dozens, a traditional game of exchanging insults between the 
participants (Malamud, The Tenants 121). Ironically, their most openly offensive dialogue 
serves not only as an opportunity of relief for the whole community but also as a gesture 
solidifying the two men’s friendship. This solidarity is expressed in the penultimate 
passage of the novel, too: “Each, thought the writer, feels the anguish of the other” (230). 
The context leaves it deliberately suspended whether the sentence is thought or written by 
one writer or the other, an ambiguity that might be interpreted as a moment of harmony 
amidst their shared agony. However, the novel is concluded by neither of them but by their 
Jewish landlord, Levenspiel, who pleads for mercy. As the owner of the property, he 
embodies the financial and social power Willie fiercely argues against all through the 
novel. Thus Levenspiel having the last word self-ironically questions the hope of sympathy 
and cooperation between the two tenants, which Lesser tried to advocate for all through the  
book and which its conclusion also tries to suggest. 
 Besides these two narratives, Emily Miller Budick also reads “The Jewbird”, 
another short story by Malamud as a parable on the shared fate of Jewish and African 
American people.  
Although most critics do not include “The Jewbird” among Malamud’s 
contemplations of black Americans, the fact that the Jewbird is a blackbird, 
named Schwartz, seems to me to make this link inevitable (schwartzer is the 
Yiddish word Jewish Americans use to refer, usually condescendingly, to 
blacks). (Budick, Blacks and Jews in Literary Conversation 14) 
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In the story of black humor, the imaginary “jewbird”—an amicable parody of the eternal 
outcast—finally falls victim to the hatred of a man, Mr. Cohen, whose family gives 
lodging and food to the homeless, speaking bird. Although Mr. Schwartz makes himself 
useful by tutoring the son, he is finally driven out by the father into the winter cold where 
he dies.  
In the spring when the winter’s snow had melted, the boy, moved by a 
memory, wandered in the neighborhood, looking for Schwartz. He found a 
dead black bird in a small lot by the river, his two wings broken, neck twisted, 
and both bird-eyes plucked clean. 
“Who did it to you, Mr. Schwartz?” Maurie wept.  
“Anti-Semeets,” Edie said later. (Malamud, Complete Stories 330).   
The bitter self-irony, with which Malamud represents a Jewish man, Mr. Cohen as the 
archetype of anti-Semitism and the victim in the form of an animal, directs the reader’s 
attention to the fact that any kind of discrimination is substantially the same.    
 Saul Bellow performs a very similarly self-ironic gesture at the end of his novel, 
Mr. Sammler’s Planet. He outlines a great and colorful tableau of middle class New York 
City in the 1960s seen from title character’s point of view. Sammler is an aging Holocaust 
survivor surrounded by diverse characters representing various lifestyles. Since most of 
them are related to his family, the whole narrative is dominated by an intense awareness of 
the Holocaust and its victims. Still, in the end it is an African American pickpocket who is 
almost beaten to death by a bag full of small metal sculptures and trinkets with Jewish 
symbols made by Sammler’s former son-in-law, an Israeli artist (Bellow, Mr. Sammler’s 
Planet 290-291). On the one hand, the pickpocket is a negative character haunting the 
whole novel, repeatedly threatening Sammler and initiating violence in the final situation, 
too, so his being killed could be considered more or less righteous. On the other hand, the 
fight represented with ethnic characters allows Bellow to point beyond the framework of 
the usual ethnic paradigms and give voice to an ultimate despair over aggression as a 
definitive force in history and in contemporary American society as well.  
 Philip Roth explores the parallels between Jewish American and African American 
identities in his novel, The Human Stain. The first person singular narrator, Nathan 
Zuckerman—an alterego of Roth in many of his novels—tells the biography of his friend, 
Coleman Silk. As Elaine B. Safer writes, Roth 
satirizes, ridicules, and tragically deplores an aspect of the political scene of 
post-World War II society; here it is the intolerance of the right minded, the 
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illiberalism of the liberals, and the fanaticism of the conservatives. The range 
of humor in The Human Stain constantly shifts from the grim tone of black 
humor to farce. Roth often makes us aware that we live in a world of black 
humor. (117) 
The black humor indicated by Safer results from the juxtaposition of various discourses on 
identity permanently and ironically played out against each other. 
 The protagonist, Coleman Silk is in the focal point of changing paradigms 
concerning identity in the United States during the twentieth century. Born in the late 
1920s in an African American family, Silk rejects a life determined by his ethnic origin. 
Making use of his atypical outlook and encouraged by his trainer, he enrolls in the army 
claiming to be Jewish in order to avoid the segregation his parents suffered from. Breaking 
up with his family, establishing his career as a professor of ancient Greek literature at 
Athena College and marrying a Jewish woman, Silk lives a long and successful life with 
his fictive identity until the ironic turn when he is forced to resign because he is accused of 
racism by two African American students misunderstanding a word of his, citing it out of 
context. While the oppressive ethnic policy of the first half of the century is clearly 
rejected by the narrator, the liberal hypersensitivity regarding ethnic issues and politically 
correct language use is depicted as equally ridiculous and off the point, since both 
paradigms foreground the ethnic aspect of identity at the expense of the individual.  
However, Silk’s complete refusal to think in terms of ethnic identity does not offer 
a solution, either. He not only loses contact with his mother and his siblings but his lies 
spoil his relationship with his son, Mark, too. Mark turns orthodox Jewish seeking the 
tradition he did not get from the family and when his father blames him for his professional 
failures and the lack of trust between themselves Coleman Silk’s argumentation recalling 
Mark’s childhood and his own devoted participation in his upbringing ironically speaks 
against itself.  
All the stuff we did and then to come back at me with this mentality? After all 
the schooling and all the books and all the words and all the superior SAT 
scores, it is insupportable. After all the taking them seriously. When they said 
something foolish, engaging it seriously. [...] Answering your questions. Your 
every questions. Never turning one aside. You ask about your grandparents, 
you ask who they were and I told you. They died.” (174-175) 
On the one hand, Coleman truly behaves as a responsible father providing his children and 
family with all the care and support they might wish for. On the other hand, Mark’s 
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suspicion about the fictitious paternal Jewish grandparents dying during the World War II 
is more than justified even though he never gains any direct proof of that. Thus Coleman 
Silk’s character goes along all the three possible paths regarding the relationship of 
individual and community proving each of them to be a dead-end street: the oppressive 
conservative value system, in which the individual’s identity is predetermined by his ethnic 
origin; the liberal views of the 1990s, with their often aggressive demands for equality and 
their exaggerated sensitivity concerning ethnic categories; and Silk’s own attempt at trying 
to step out all of these discourses each proves to be a failure in Roth’s parody.    
 Not only Jewish American and African American identities are contemplated in 
light of each other. The Human Stain is a carefully balanced structure of double or triple 
versions of similar themes, situations and characters functioning as ironic counterpoints. 
Coleman Silk’s lifelong struggle with ethnic identity is set in parallel with his relatively 
young lover’s, Faunia Farley’s life story including typically female types of predicaments 
from childhood abuse through divorcing a violent husband to her financially defenseless 
situation due to her lack of education In a tragicomic outbreak, she compares her 
immeasurable personal losses to those of Silk’s:  “it’s not a big deal. Two kids suffocating 
and dying, that’s a big deal. Having your stepfather put his fingers up your cunt, that’s a 
big deal. Losing your job as you’re about to retire isn’t a big deal” (234). Besides, Silk’s 
main plotline focusing on the parallel fates of Jewish and African people in the United 
States is supplemented by a subsidiary plotline on Faunia’s former husband, Les Farley, a 
Vietnam veteran suffering from PTSD syndrome and trying to reintegrate into society. The 
sadly burlesque scene of his first visit to a Chinese restaurant initiated by other veterans so 
that Les can relearn to live among Asian Americans, is a classic example for the black 
humor prevailing in The Human Stain.    
And the horror—a deranging horror against which there was no protection—of 
the smiling gook handing him a menu. The outright grotesquerie of the gook 
pouring him a glass of water. 
[...] 
“Fuckin’ waiter,” Les said. 
“He’s not a waiter, Les. His name is Henry. He’s the owner.” (217) 
Les Farley keeps thinking in terms he learnt in Vietnam, calling the Chinese waiter a 
“gook”—using the derogatory word from the time of the Korean War—and interpreting his 
approach as an attack. His friends, on the other hand, keep reminding him that these 
categories are not valid any longer: the people around them are Chinese and not 
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Vietnamese, moreover, they are all American, the place is an innocent restaurant and not a 
battlefield, and, above all, the person serving at their table is not just one of a crowd of 
faceless enemies but an individual with a proper name, Henry. Representing the two 
mutually exclusive discourses simultaneously, Roth raises the awareness that what one is 
inclined to consider as reality—an everyday lunch with friends, for example, or the way 
one thinks about fellow citizens—is already predetermined by implied discourses that are 
to be questioned whenever they become a threat for the individual or the community. 
 The self-ironic juxtaposition of these similarly organized passion stories, each with 
a very different content but showing remarkable similarities, enables Roth to pose adequate 
questions without pretending to offer general answers. On the contrary, he seems to evoke 
and parody many dominant political, social, literary and scientific discourses of the 
twentieth century—slogans of the Anarchists, the Civil Rights Movement and Feminism, 
ideas of New Humanism, Holocaust literature and the Yale deconstructionists etc.—not so 
much in order to call attention to the unsatisfying nature of any of them but rather to 
emphasize the individual’s responsibility in applying them to particular situations. On the 
one hand, each character is represented as the victim of his or her personal narrative. Even 
Delphine Roux, the daughter of a wealthy and prestigious French family, an attractive 
young woman advancing fast in the academic ranks conceives of herself as a person trying 
to flee an overdominant mother and thus falling victim to her first-generation immigrant 
status doomed to remain hopelessly single. Yet in the world of the novel, where everybody 
feels to be a victim, the very same characters also appear as the victimizers themselves, if 
seen from another character’s point of view standing for a different discourse: be it Silk 
betraying his family, Roux persecuting Silk, Les Farley harassing Faunia, or Faunia 
neglecting her children. While each of the characters uses the available discourses as 
exemptions from the major crimes and petty failures they have committed, it becomes 
clearer with each ironic turn of the plot that each of these paradigms can offer only partial 
explanation and none of them can absolve anyone from individual liability. 
  In the self-ironic narratives discussed above, Jewish American authors represent 
African American characters simultaneously as both the rival and the fellow victim. 
Exploring the parallel motives in their fates with the techniques of humorous juxtaposition 
and ironic revision in alternating contexts, these stories can reveal the limits of the 
available discourses on ethnic issues while they also employ the reconciliatory power of 
humor.  
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4.4 Female Points of View 
“Sometimes I feel I have seen too long from too many disconnected angles: white, 
Jewish, anti-Semite, racist, anti-racist, once-married, lesbian, middle-class, feminist, 
exmatriate southerner, split at the root—that I will never bring them whole” (238), writes 
Adrienne Rich in “Split at the Root”. According to its subtitle, her text is “An Essay on 
Jewish Identity” (224) yet it also addresses other essential aspects and complicated issues 
of the author’s identity, which derive from her multiply ambiguous position. Born to a 
Jewish father and a gentile mother from the south, then married into a traditional Jewish 
family and bearing three children for her husband whom she later left after her coming out 
as a lesbian, Rich finally feels compelled to come to terms with what she calls “my own 
ambivalence as a Jew; the daily, mundane anti-Semitisms of my entire life” (224). 
My mother is a gentile. In Jewish law I cannot count myself a Jew. If it is true 
that “we think back through our mothers if we are women” (Virginia Woolf)—
and I myself have affirmed this—then even according to lesbian theory, I 
cannot (or need not?) count myself a Jew. (225) 
If I call myself a Jewish lesbian, do I thereby try to shed some of my southern 
gentile white woman’s culpability? If I call myself only through my mother, is 
it because I pass more easily through a world where being a lesbian often 
seems like outsiderhood enough? According to Nazi logic, my two Jewish 
grandparents would have made me a Mischling, first-degree—nonexempt for 
the Final Solution. (226) 
I had three sons before I was thirty, and during those years I often felt that to be 
a Jewish woman, a Jewish mother, was to be perceived in the Jewish family as 
an entirely physical being, a producer and nourisher of children. [...] I felt [...] 
unable to sort out what was Jewish from what was simply motherhood or 
female destiny. (I lived in Cambridge, not Brooklyn; but there, too, restless 
educated women sat on benches with baby strollers, half-stunned, not by 
Jewish cultural expectations, but by the middle-class American social 
expectations of the 1950s). (235) 
As it can be seen from the quotations above, Rich rejects the idea of individual identity 
conceived as an item belonging to an easily labeled category. She rather juxtaposes several 
disparate paradigms: Judaism seen from within and as part of the Nazi rhetoric as well as 
various trends of feminism. Similarly to many other female Jewish American writers, she 
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claims not only for the recognition but also for the revision of these, often controversial 
discourses on identity. 
 But the comparative contemplation of the available, diverse paradigms requires 
time for self-reflection. Tillie Olsen addresses this need and the first steps towards a self-
conscious identity in many of her works, from “Tell Me a Riddle (1961), a collection of 
four short stories [...] a classic of working-class literature” (Gelfant 89) to her “feminist 
classic, Silences” (Berke 185). The latter starts with a confessional essay on various types 
of silences in an writer’s life: “natural silences [... the] necessary time for renewal” (6), 
“hidden silences; work aborted, deferred, denied” (8), “[c]ensorship silences” (9), 
“prevalent silence [...] the absence of creativity where it once had been” (9) and 
“foreground silences, before the achievement” (10). Olsen concludes that the meagre 
proportion of female writers in the literary world is due to their hidden silences and 
prolonged foreground silences. 
Where the gifted among women (and men) have remained mute, or have never 
attained full capacity, it is because of circumstances, inner or outer, which 
oppose the needs of creation. Wholly surrendered and dedicated lives; time as 
needed for the work; totality of self. But women are traditionally trained to 
place others’ needs first, to feel these needs as their own [...] their sphere, their 
satisfaction to be in making it possible for others to use their abilities. (17)  
In harmony with Olsen’s ideas outlined above, silence is also at the center of the 
novella, “Tell Me a Riddle”, which bears the same title as the book it was first published 
in. Self-irony in this story is aimed not so much at the ambiguity but rather at the absence 
of identity, at least in case of the female protagonist. The narrative tells about the final 
years of a quarrelsome, elderly Jewish couple. The source of their permanent conflict is 
their different visions regarding their years after retirement. The husband would like to sell 
their house, which was big enough to raise five children and is therefore too big for the two 
of them so he wants to move to a retirement community called Union Haven where he 
would be relieved of the difficulties of house maintenance, “the troubling of responsibility, 
the fretting with money” (689) and could enjoy “[h]appy communal life” (689). However, 
these pleasures seem inaccessible for his wife, “an entirely physical being, a producer and 
nourisher of children” (Rich 235) “traditionally trained to place others’ needs first” (Olsen, 
Silences 17). As she explains to her daughter, Vivi: “‘For him it is good. Not for me. I can 
no longer live between people.’ ‘You lived all your life for people’, Vivi cried. ‘Not 
with.’” (695). Therefore the old woman prefers the solitude of her home after all the 
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decades spent in service of her family, oppressed by “the perverse logic of exhausted 
house-wifery” (691), and her only wish is “[n]ever again to be forced to the rhythm of 
others” (691). Ironically, their constant debate is not represented as a heated dialogue but 
as the fight of silences. Whenever the old man argued for his point, “she turned off her ear 
button, so she would not have to hear” (690) and when the wife started a monologue on her 
point of view, “it was he who turned on the television loud so he need not to hear” (691). 
The difference in the ways they avoid each other is also telling: the wife tries to flee into 
her silent, inner self, whereas the husband seeks refuge in TV broadcasts imitating 
community life.   
The couple are completely defined by their marriage. They are introduced as such 
in the opening sentence: “For forty-seven years they had been married” (689). The reader 
does not even learn their names until the final pages, since they are only referred to by the 
roles they fulfill in their family, as Ma and Dad almost all through the story. Besides, the 
husband keeps calling his wife various improvised mock names: “Mrs. Enlightened! Mrs. 
Cultured!” (692), “Mrs. Take-It-Easy” (693), “Mrs. Live Alone and Like It” (694) or “Mrs. 
Miserable” (711). His irony works as it has an appreciative audience in the family and 
among his friends. In contrast, humor is not an available option for the wife. When her 
grandson asks her: “Tell me a riddle, Grammy” (700) she is compelled to answer: “I know 
no riddles, child” (700). The symbolical significance of the short dialogue is confirmed by 
raising it into the title. It not only highlights the grandmother’s lack of verbal skills but also 
the fact that riddles belong to the realm of carefree communication conveyed just for its 
sheer pleasure, a luxury she has never had time for. Moreover, knowing a riddle would 
involve knowing the punchline, the solution, and she is preoccupied with the painful 
absence of such answers concerning her own life. In other words, she cannot tell a riddle 
because she is herself the riddle unable to articulate herself. Accordingly, her name, Eva—
the archetypal name for the eternal feminine and the first female ancestor—is first 
pronounced by her husband only on her deathbed, as if he recognized her existence only in 
the moment of losing her. In return, she also says his name, David, only towards the end. 
However, this gesture is burdened with heavy, nonverbal irony as it is immediately 
succeeded by Eva—who is suffering from fatal cancer—starting to vomit. The ambiguity 
of the wife’s calling for the husband to help, along with her simultaneous efforts to get rid 
of him and their undigested common past—a theme that explicitly predominates the whole 
deathbed section as well as being metonymically symbolized by the act of vomiting—
clearly expresses the controversial relationship of the couple: the deep intimacy as well as 
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the irresolvable discord between them. In that sense, it is in parallel with another scene at 
the beginning of the story, when the husband leaves after a fierce fight.  
She was not in their bed when he came back. She lay on the cot on the sun 
porch. All week she did not speak or come near him; nor did he try to make 
peace or care for her. He slept badly, so used to her next to him. After all the 
years, old harmonies and dependencies deep in their bodies; she curled to him, 
or he coiled to her, each warmed, warming, turning as the other turned, the 
nights a long embrace. (694-695)  
Tradition is a central theme in the story. Ostensibly, Eva rejects it both in the 
personal and the religious sense of the word. When she is offered to be visited by a rabbi in 
the hospital, she refuses to talk to him. She asks her family to fill in the form on her data 
writing “Born, human, Religion, none” (697). Later, as the couple visit one of their 
daughters, Hannah, who married a religious Jewish man, and she respectfully asks her 
mother to light the Sabbath candles for the sake of the children so that “[f]rom the past 
they should have tradition” (697), Eva rejects the request, being reluctant to “look back on 
the dark centuries [...c]andles bought instead of bread” (698). On the other hand, she is an 
ardent reader of Russian and Yiddish authors like Chekhov and Peretz (690). Similarly, 
staying at the house of another daughter, Vivi, Eva is unable to hold her newborn 
grandchild since she feels to have an unsurmountable distance between herself and “Vivi 
in the maze of the long, the lovely drunkenness” (701) of mothering. In contrast, she 
develops an intense relationship with her adult granddaughter, Jeannie, appreciating not 
only her efforts as a professional visiting nurse to take care of her grandmother but also her 
ambitions as a visual artist. For example, Eva is deeply interested in a piece of Mexican 
folk art, “Pan del Muerto, the Bread of the Dead” (707) prepared by one of Jeannie’s 
patients and the two of them agree on its importance. Self-ironically, Eva seems to 
acknowledge tradition only via a tradition different from her own. Apparently, it is not so 
much heritage what she rejects but rather the transmission of unreflective automatisms 
from one generation to the other. She asks: “Heritage? But when did I have time to teach? 
Of Hannah I asked only hands to help” (698), and she concludes in her long, fragmented, 
delirious stream of consciousness monologue: “[a]ll that happens one must try to 
understand” (709), “[a]n unexamined life not worth” (711). In harmony with Eva’s views, 
reconciliation is also achieved through reflection at the end of the story. Jeannie draws a 
sketch of their grandparents holding hands and David, shocked by Eva’s agony, seems to 
rediscover and reproduce their deeply buried intimacy due to this representation: “as if he 
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had been instructed he went to his bed, lay down, holding the sketch as if it could shield 
against the monstrous shapes of loss, of betrayal, of death—and with his free hand took 
hers back into his. So Jeannie found them in the morning” (714).   
Similarly to Tillie Olsen, Grace Paley also emphasizes the importance of 
succeeding generations in recognizing one’s identity and revising priorities in “Faith in a 
Tree”, one of Paley’s stories on the protagonist, Faith Darwin. Her name implies the 
dilemma of religious versus materialist ideologies, however, the title of the narrative 
humorously insinuates that the belief in scientific interpretations of the world is also a 
question of conviction. The mutually mocking combination of the two approaches—an 
exceptionally clear example of bisociation—provides the humor of the description at the 
beginning of the story. “One God, who was King of the Jews, who unravels the stars to this 
day with little hydrogen explosions, He can look down from His Holy Headquarters and 
see us all” (175). The first person singular narrator introduces herself and her surroundings 
in the same playful tone, self-ironically imitating patriarchal religious and business 
rhetoric: “me, the creation of His soft second thought, I am sitting on the twelve-foot-high, 
strong, long arm of a sycamore, my feet swinging, and I can only see Kitty, a co-worker in 
the mother trade—a topnotch craftsman” (175-176). Thus Faith both describes her social 
situation and voices her uneasy feelings caused by her status of a full-time mother. She 
flees from it upwards, both in the spatial and spiritual senses of the word. Perching in a 
tree, she takes the archetypal position of the ironist, mapping her urban, multicultural 
environment and outlining sketches or rather caricatures of the people below. However, her 
irony is not completely fulfilled as it lacks audience: her humor can be enjoyed only by the 
reader and not by any of the characters, with whom she keeps chatting but her attempts at 
intellectual interpretation and her humor are restricted to her solitary, written monologue. 
The turn comes when a protest march against the war in Vietnam enters the park. Faith and 
her colleague mothers converse about it in the same casual tone as they have talked about 
the everyday issues of their lives but Faith’s son copies one of the sharply ironic slogans on 
the pavement. “In a fury of tears and disgust, he wrote on the near blacktop in pink 
flamingo chalk [...] “WOULD YOU BURN A CHILD? and under it, a little taller, the red 
reply, WHEN NECESSARY. And I think that is exactly when events turned me around” 
(194). Shocked by her son’s response, Faith descends from the seclusion of her private and 
intellectual life and joins the community. 
Her identity is no longer portrayed in terms of opposing choices—between Jew 
or American, between domesticated wife of lonely single mother, between 
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dedicated mother or career activist. No longer interested in seeking such a 
mutually exclusive definition of herself, Faith finds satisfaction within the 
parameters of each of these designations. (Mandel 92) 
In contrast to Olsen or Paley, Erica Jong’s concentrates not on the social but rather 
on the sexual aspect of feminism. The issues raised by her debut novel, Fear of Flying, are 
succinctly summarized in the introduction to the samples from her oeuvre in the anthology 
Redressing the Balance: American Women’s Literary Humor from Colonial Times to the 
1980s.  
Of all the popular feminist novels that were published in the 1970s, Erica 
Jong’s semiautobiographical Fear of Flying (1973) was not only the most 
financially successful but also the most sensational. Reviewed extensively by 
both male and female critics in popular and academic publications, Fear of 
Flying evoked both praise and damnation for its sexual frankness and raunchy 
language. Like other “consciousness-raising” novels emerging from the 
women’s movement, Fear of Flying deals with female ambivalence about love 
versus career and the need for security versus the desire for independence, as 
well as with the conflict between male definitions of women’s nature and roles 
and women’s experiences of themselves and the world. However, Jong’s work 
is unique in her use of often rollicking humor to expose the discrepancies 
between accepted notions of female and male sexuality and between her 
heroine, Isadora Wing’s sexual fantasies and the reality of her experiences. 
(386) 
Some other critics like Sabine Sielke also interpret the irony, self-irony and humor of the 
novel in terms of feminism. 
Susan Robi Suleiman is one of the few critics who recognize the self-irony and 
mocking tone in which Fear of Flying is soaked. Jong’s book, she claims has 
an “ironic awareness of [its] own unconventionality,” of the “flaunting use of 
obscenities in a novel signed by a woman and published by a major press.” 
Suleiman reads Jong’s use of obscene language as a “self-conscious reversal of 
stereotypes, and in some sense a parody of the tough-guy narrator heroes of 
Henry Miller and Norman Mailer,” calls her “reversal of roles and of 
language” a usurpation of “both the pornographer’s language and his way of 
looking at the opposite sex” (9). [...] Fear of Flying [...] turns out to be a case 
of mimicry, woman’s interim strategy of miming, parodying, paraphrasing, and 
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quoting male discourse while herself remaining “elsewhere.” Puzzling over the 
question “What do you women want?” writes Jong, Freud “never came up with 
much” (24). Neither does Isadora Wing.” (Sielke 170) 
Erica Jong herself sees Isadora Wing, the protagonist-narrator of Fear of Flying similarly 
in her retrospection, Fear of Fifty: A Midlife Memoir.  
Her self-mockery and her humor became her survival tool, because only 
through irony can you say X and mean Y. I think Isadora touched women of 
my generation because so many of us are similarly split. We are our mothers, 
but we are also women of the future. We earn our own livings, support our own 
children, fight for our careers in a world that still does not give us economic 
equality with men, but that dark undertow is pulling us back to our mothers, 
making us feel guilty even for the crumbs of autonomy we achieve. 
 All these opinions emphasize self-irony and humor as the means of voicing 
dilemmas arising from the Isadora’s position as a female character trying to find and 
express her identity in a world dominated by male discourses, adding that irony is the 
means of overcoming these discourses by provocatively parodying and thus destabilizing 
them. However, Jewish heritage is present in the novel, too, and it also becomes an 
essential source of self-irony both as patriarchal tradition and as a minority culture in itself. 
Isadora’s mother is preoccupied with her children’s marriages like the stereotypical Jewish 
mother depicted in Melvin J. Friedman’s essay, “Jewish Mothers and Sons: The Expense 
of Chutzpah”, in which he claims that “[t]here is no such thing as a ‘famous’ or 
‘successful’ Jewish mother (she is usually too busy making her son ‘famous’ and 
‘successful’ to have any time left for herself” (161). Isadora’s mother gives an advice to 
her daughter in the same spirit. “‘Women cannot possibly do both,’ she said ‘you’ve got to 
choose. Either be an artist or have children’” (Jong, Fear of Flying 56). Isadora speaks 
about her sister’s Chloe’s marriage in the same mocking tone characteristic of the whole 
novel: “Chloe, of course, married a Jew. Not a domestic Jew, but an import. (Nobody in 
the family would stoop to marrying the boy next door.)” (60), adding the self-ironically 
verbatim quoted criticism on her position without a family of her own in Yiddish “[so] I 
was the only sister ohne kinder” (61). Chloe’s views ironically recur in the attitude of 
Isadora’s Chinese husband, Bennett. “‘Better find a nice Chinese girl,’ I said. It wasn’t 
racism, just my skittishness about marriage. [...] ‘I don’t want a nice Chinese girl,” Bennett 
said. ‘I want you.’  (It turned out Bennett had never taken out a Chinese girl in his whole 
life—much less screwed one. He was all hung up on Jewish girls” (47-48). So marriage is 
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represented both as an escape for Isadora from a patriarchal Jewish subculture and as a 
similar opportunity for Bennett trying to flee his own minority culture. The ironic tone of 
the novel thus expresses the individual’s need to revise norms encoded not only in 
patriarchal society but in ethnic cultural traditions, too. 
 The individual is brought into the foreground as soon as the opening sentence of the 
novel, since the setting for Isadora’s quest for herself starts with a journey to Europe, to a 
conference on psychoanalysis organized in Vienna. “There were 117 psychoanalysts on the 
Pan Am flight to Vienna and I'd been treated by at least six of them. And married a 
seventh” (5). On the one hand, Freudian doctrines, especially the sexual liberation of the 
self from oppressive conventions have a great impact on Isadora’s rhetoric. On the other 
hand, a treatment that has already proved to be inefficient six times does not sound very 
assuring to start with, and the self-reflexivity encouraged by Freud seems to lead to 
destabilizing self-irony instead of answers in Isadora’s initial description of 
psychoanalysis.   
 “The Jewish science,” as anti-Semites call it. Turn every question upside 
down and shove it up the asker's ass. Analysts all seem to be Talmudists who 
flunked out of seminary in the first year. I was reminded of one of my 
grandfather's favorite gags: Q: “Why does a Jew always answer a question with 
a question?” A: “And why should a Jew not answer a question with a 
question?” (10)  
Isadora tries to break free from family constraints according to the Freudian recipe: by 
courageously facing her sexual fantasies on the “zipless fuck”—a sexual adventure without 
commitment—and by actually getting involved in a love affair. However, psychoanalysis, 
established by a man, self-ironically reminds her of the Jewish heritage communicated to 
her by another man, her grandfather. At the same time, the relationship between Talmudic 
and Freudian self-reflection is an observation ironically quoted from “anti-Semites”, so 
even her restraints cannot be read without restraints.  
The penultimate scene of the novel is the dramatically self-ironic realization of 
Isadora’s fantasies. She is travelling on a train, and the conductor tries to seduce or rape 
her. Isadora is shocked and manages to run away, yet a few minutes later she realizes that 
her idea of a true, instinctive inner self has been just one among the numerous other 
untrustworthy beliefs.    
[I]t downed on me how funny that episode had been. My zipless fuck! My 
stranger on a train! Here I'd been offered my very own fantasy. The fantasy 
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that had riveted me to the vibrating seat of the train for three years in 
Heidelberg and instead of turning me on, it had revolted me! (417)
 The same gesture of overwhelming, ultimate self-irony seems to predominate in 
Cynthia Ozick’s novel, too. Ambiguity already appears at the level of the title. The 
working title of the book was Lights and Watchtowers, borrowed from the medieval Jewish 
scholar, Al-Kirkisani, who wrote a book under the same title (Ozick, “Interview”), and 
whose teachings provide an essential basis for the novel both thematically and 
theoretically. Sounding too didactic, however, this title was eventually discarded by Ozick. 
The American edition of her book in 2004 was published as Heir to the Glimmering World, 
and a year later the British version came out as The Bear Boy. This latter phrase is a 
metaphoric nickname of a character modeled after Christopher Robin Milne, whose 
obituary first triggered Ozick’s novel. She read about his troubled relationship with his 
father and started thinking about the complications deriving from a situation of a flesh-and-
blood person getting too much entangled with his fictive doppelgänger. As she says in an 
interview made by Robert Birnbaum, “I began to think, ‘What happens to a human being if 
he isn’t allowed to become a man? What happens to a little boy who is so embellished and 
over-interpreted and made into a fable and legend and who the whole world worships as 
that the idea of a little boy?’ So that was the origin of it”. As a tribute, the first page of the 
novel represents the most widely known photo of Alan Alexander Milne and his son 
holding the teddy bear who inspired Winnie-the-Pooh.   
The problem of interpretations is at the center of the whole book. It is brought in 
the focus as early as in one of the two mottos taken from Frank Kermode’s essay “The 
Man in the Macintosh”: “Yet the world is full of interpreters ... So the question arises, why 
would we rather interpret than not?” (Ozick, Heir 3). Interpretation is also the theme of Al-
Kirkisani’s above mentioned religious treatise, the Book of Lights and Watchtowers, a 
philosophical and theological code based on the Talmud. Its author was a leader of 
Karaism, an obscure Jewish movement flourishing at the end of the first millennium. 
Karaism is important in Ozick’s novel not only as one of her major character’s research 
field playing pivotal role in the plot—a shared interest in Karaism brings together some of 
the characters—but also as the source of many substantial philosophical questions. The 
Karaites opposed the Rabbanites because the Karaite movement accepted only the Tanach 
(the Old Testament in Christian terms) as the words of God but rejected the Halacha (the 
collection of rabbinical laws based on the interpretations of Tanach) as fake, human 
fabrications. Al-Kirkisani’s title, however, emphasizes not only pure ideas, “Lights” but 
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human viewpoints, “Watchtowers”, too. Ozick’s gesture of replacing the concept of clear 
guiding lights and stabile viewpoints by the metaphor of uncertain “glimmering”, 
expresses doubts concerning both paradigms and subjects. 
 The central subject in Ozick’s novel is a young girl, called Rose Meadows. She is 
the first person singular narrator of most of the text. Her narrative follows a neat 
chronological order and is mostly restricted to her simultaneous knowledge, only rarely 
supplemented by an impersonal voice providing retrospective information on preliminary 
circumstances or on events happening in her absence and other details rounding off or 
explaining the life stories and personalities of certain characters. This unnamed third 
person singular narrator can very well be Rose at an older age, for the story is recorded 
decades later than the plot took place, and she might have learnt a lot more about the 
actions, the characters and their opinions in the meantime. The long period between action 
and writing is clearly indicated by sentences like the following. “Only many decades later 
would I come to agree with Ninel about the useless delusions of literature” (Ozick, Heir
58). The primary plot starts in 1935 and covers roughly two years. The novel is spatially 
condensed as well: most of the actions take place in a house in the Bronx which serves as a 
meeting point for diverse people and their fates. In this extremely limited time and space, 
Ozick gives a comprehensive tableau of the era, which she achieves by characters with 
detailed preliminary biographies turning them into representatives of certain social and 
cultural segments of their age.  
The novel consists of three intertwined family stories. The families not only come 
from different social backgrounds but they are also associated with different cultural 
paradigms and literary traditions. Moreover, each group is also divided both practically and 
spiritually. Rose Meadows is an eighteen-year-old orphan, who lives for a while with a 
distant relative called Bertram. They are everyday American citizens living in small towns 
and belonging to the lower middle class, thinking about the world and themselves in terms 
of Marxism and feminism, the two great theoretical systems of the age demanding essential 
changes of social paradigms. The most devout believer of these ideas is Bertram’s ardent 
communist girlfriend, Ninel. “It was not her real name, it was a Party name, in honor of 
Lenin. ‘Just try spelling it backward,’ Bertram told me” (Ozick, Heir 23), writes Rosie. 
With her reverse name and her female body but aggressively masculine behavior, her 
character can be read as a parody on the communist leader. Ninel also has a disastrous 
effect on Bertram’s family life: she chases away Rosie, who takes a job as an au pair. In 
line with the emphasis on social issues, Rosie, the primary narrator mostly follows the 
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realist tradition of storytelling. There are only a few books mentioned in the novel, but it 
just makes them more significant. For example, Rosie's reading list includes Hard Times
and A Tale of Two Cities by Charles Dickens or Middlemarch by George Eliot. In addition 
to realism, the female aspect is also brought in the foreground by frequent allusions to 
Rosie’s favorite book, Sense and Sensibility by Jane Austen. 
 Rosie’s employers, the Mitwissers are The Family, the central group of people in 
the novel. They are bourgeois immigrants from Germany: Rudolf Mitwisser, a historian of 
Karaism, his wife, Elsa, and their five children. According to Ozick's fiction, Elsa used to 
be a collaborator and secret lover of Schrödinger, one of the greatest scientists renewing 
physics at the beginning of the 20th century, while Rudolf is an acknowledged scholar in 
the field of humanities, thus they stand for hard and soft sciences and metonymically for 
European high culture. Their story fits well into the mainstream of Jewish American 
literature, a major theme of which is the assimilation process of Jewish refugees fleeing 
from the Nazis. Ozick herself addressed these issues in a former novella of hers, Rosa. In 
Heir to the Glimmering World, however, the traditional story about the newcomer’s 
difficulties with integrating into American society is self-ironically turned inside out. Here 
it is the American girl, who feels a sense of displacement and tries to integrate in the 
Mitwisser family. The reader can follow this process step by step, as depicted by Rose. 
“Some weeks later, when I dared to say this to Anneliese—‘I sometimes feel like a refugee 
myself’—she shot me a look of purest contempt” (4). “It disturbed me that the Mitwisser 
children spoke of home. They were as homeless as I was” (42). “We had been eight; or, 
rather, they had been seven, and I a hireling, never an intimate” (90). Finally, the 
“Mitwissers were an organism, and I was part of its flesh” (306). Rose’s inverse Holocaust 
story can be read as a personal narrative on the revaluation of Jewish American identity 
under the influence of European Jewish refugees arriving to the United States during and 
after the World War II, and thus it is in parallel with Roth’s “Eli, the Fanatic”. 
The third family is represented in the primary plotline by the Bear Boy, James 
A’Bair, the fictive counterpart of Christopher Robin. As a young child, he became the 
protagonist of a series of children’s books called “The Bair Boy, popularly transmuted into 
the Bear Boy” (Ozick, Heir 47) written and illustrated by Jim’s father. Therefore, the first 
literary genre associated with him is children’s tales. The enormous fortune deriving from 
the copyrights, which he inherited after the early death of his father—and which allows 
him to take a whimsical worldwide journey full of adventures associating the genre of 
picaresque or, with regard to the American context, road movie—might also remind the 
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reader of fairy tales. However, there is an essential conflict between father and son, and 
later on within the personality of Jim, due to the blurred dividing line between fiction and 
reality. The title of the first book in the series: “The Boy Who Lived in a Hat” (Ozick, Heir
49) metonymically refers to the problem: the father places the fictive kid into a hat 
prepared by the mother, but the playful gesture reduces the real child’s existence to the 
imagination of his parents. “His father had created a parallel boy; his father had interpreted 
him for the world. The Bear Boy was never himself. He was his father's commentary on 
his body and brain” (Ozick, Heir 121). Jim could not naturally develop, he had to sit model 
for his father’s drawings instead of playing with his friends, his schoolmates stared at him 
as a rarity, everybody was interested in him only as the embodiment of the Jim known 
from the books, and no one cared for him as a flesh and blood child, as a real, whole, 
independent personality. As an adult the “hour came when the first boy, the boy born Jim, 
despised the second boy, the make-believe boy. He despised him, he renounced him, he 
threw him away. The fiery coldness (it was bitterness, it was rage) released him; he was 
free” (Ozick, Heir 211). However, James had no adult self that could handle the freedom 
gained by the rejection of the despised, fictive self and by his money. So it is precisely his 
absolute freedom which after a while turns into an aimless, bored nonsense. His family 
story is an inverse narrative, self-ironically turning upside down the fairy tale of the 
American Dream instantly fulfilled and becoming utterly empty within only two 
generations.  
Jim suffers from a lack of identity because of his rejection of a false identity. That 
is why he makes friends with Rudolf Mitwisser financially supports his research on 
Karaism, and thus all his family—who also suffer from the loss of their identities resulting 
from their displacement. Jim asks “[h]ow was he [...] different form the Karaites, who 
rejected graftings on the pristinely God-given? He too rejected graftings. He was born 
unencumbered, nakedly himself, without a lace collar. The author of the Bear Boy had 
grafted on the lace collar” (Ozick, Heir 212). However, there is no fact without 
interpretation, as we are reminded by Elsa and modern physics, or by the mistakes of the 
Karaites recognized by professor Mitwisser. “The Rational Mind, argue the Karaites (but 
they do not notice that they are arguing Talmudically, since Talmudic argument is what 
they disdain)” (Ozick, Heir 74). The observation that the wish for an ultimate, 
unadulterated truth is ab ovo failed to doom is expressed in the plot by Jim’s suicide. At 
the same time, the opposite of Jim’s nihilism, undiscerning faith ironically leads to a 
similar outcome as well according to the logic of the novel; Ninel, the enthusiastic 
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communist portrayed in a caricaturistic way dies young in Spain as a volunteer in the Civil 
War during her quest for an identity derived from her devout belief in the existence of an 
absolute truth. 
Therefore two major issues of Jewish American fiction: identity and faith appear 
together in the novel. However, their combination self-ironically overwrites traditional 
narratives. There are serious theological oppositions in Ozick’s book but these do not take 
place between the orthodox Israelite and the Gentile. All the major characters—except for 
James A’Bair—are of Jewish origin but neither of them practices their religion and 
apparently no one attributes a great significance to religion in the US. This is emphasized 
by the ironic turn in the plot that Professor Mitwisser is originally invited and supported by 
a Christian college, who misread Karaism for Charismites—a minor branch of 
Christianity—but once the Professor arrives they are symphatic enough not to send him 
back. Each character is an atheist on somewhat different grounds: James because of his 
nihilism, and Rosie’s deceased father for a similar lack of concern. “‘I don’t hold with it,’ 
he said. ‘I've got bigger troubles than worrying about who runs the universe’” (Ozick, Heir
15). Bertram and Ninel reject religion because of their communist convictions, whereas 
Elsa Mitwisser does the same on scientific bases. Even the professor, a scholar of Jewish 
studies “had raised a wall between belief and the examination of belief” (Ozick, Heir 67), 
in other words he was engaged in Karaism not as a believer but as an objective historian. 
So in Ozick’s world the question of identity seems to be sought independently from 
religion, moreover, both extremities concerning faith—the lack of it, as in case of Jim as 
well as the unquestioned zeal, as in case of Ninel—seem to have fatal effects. However, 
the conventional feminine answer familiar from 19th century family sagas: identity 
determined not by great theoretical frameworks but by domestic life does not seem 
satisfying either. By the end of the novel, practically each character’s fate is neatly rounded 
off by marital happiness, money or death. But even the happy endings are based on 
failures, lies and bitter compromises. Rudolf’s and Elsa’s carriers are broken although they 
are financially safe due to the money inherited from Jim. Their eldest daughter, pregnant 
with Jim’s baby, gets married to Bertram. Private resolutions without any intellectual or 
social aspiration do not appeal as very attractive any longer. 
Rosie Meadows chooses none of the ways above. She gets confidential with one 
character after the other along the story, she identifies or at least sympathizes with almost 
each point of view for a while—mostly as part of the plot, but at least as a narrator—but in 
the end she is detached from all of them. She leaves the story alone, possessing precisely 
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and symbolically the same 500 dollars with which she arrived to the Mitwisser family. So 
she has or is not more than previously—she is only different. The remark made about Al-
Kirkisani seems to be valid for her as well. “He accepts, he receives, in order to refuse” 
(Ozick, Heir 261). Moreover, it also describes Ozick’s approach, who carefully maps the 
traditions and paradigms defining the thinking of an everyday urban Jewish American girl 
living on the East Coast in the second half of the 20th century. She recollects and self-
ironically paraphrases many of the major themes and narratives of 20th century Jewish 
American fiction: questions regarding family, faith, immigration, the relation to Europe 
and to the Holocaust, and powerful ideologies like communist and feminist movements. 
Placing her narrator, Rosie Meadows, in the context of various characters representing 
diverse but interdependent traditions, Ozick voices the imperative to acknowledge the 
complexity of our cultural heritage as well as the unwillingness to subject ourselves to any 
of its precarious categories without reservations. 
The female point of view prevails in all the texts studied above. However, none of 
the authors address merely feminist concerns but they rather juxtapose primarily female 
concerns and other issues of identity. Tillie Olsen expresses the wish for a self-conscious 
identity for those who lack that because of their difficult status in society because of either 
financial reasons or conventional gender roles. Similarly, Grace Paley connects the ideas of 
social responsibility and a dominantly female point of view. In Erica Jong’s approach, 
Judaism appears both as a patriarchal tradition oppressing women and as a minority culture 
oppressed by majority society. Rich and Ozick reveal the contradictions implied in various 
ideologies defining the second half of the 20th century in the United States. Each author 
criticizes traditions and current paradigms by ironically paraphrasing them and thus self-




The first chapter in Paul McDonald’s book, Laughing at the Darkness: 
Postmodernism and Optimism in American Culture, bears the title “Postmodernism, 
Humour and the Jewish American Ethnic Identity” (25). The author focuses on “the best 
known Jewish American humorists to have emerged in the late 1950s and 60s: Joseph 
Heller, Lenny Bruce, Mel Brooks, Woody Allen and Philip Roth” (25), and he makes the 
following important distinction. 
[T]heorists like Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer [...] famously 
criticised popular comedy: they suggest that the laughter evoked by 
mainstream comedy becomes a ‘placebo which it feeds to the population... 
through television and film in order to divert them from reflecting on their 
inauthentic existence’. The new Jewish humour by contrast is less of a 
diversion and more of a challenge: it allowed more critical engagement partly 
because it was open and discursive, rather than formulaic and reductive. (26) 
McDonald’s views are worth mentioning not only because he discerns a change in 
the American sense of humor in the decades immediately after the World War II and 
he associates the shift with Jewish American identity. The opposition he sets up 
between the postmodern style introduced by the authors he calls the “new wave of 
Jewish humorists” (26) and the comedies produced by their predecessors is also 
relevant to this paper as it seems to be in line with my initial proposition for the need 
to distinguish between self-irony and irony. McDonalds claims that the popular 
comedy before the shift diverts the audience’s attention from themselves and their 
laugh is the result of their recognizing an indirectly expressed, fixed second meaning 
whereas the humor after the turn is “open and discursive”, in other words it invites 
for self-reflexive engagement and multiple interpretations. 
 In various literary theories, several attempts have been made at such 
distinctions. As described in detail in the “Introduction” of this paper, Kierkegaard 
distinguishes between teleological and non-teleological irony; Ernst Behler 
differentiates classical, rhetorical irony from irony after Romanticism; Wayne Booth 
writes about “stable” as opposed to “unstable” irony; and Candace Lang preserves 
the term “irony” for the first type while she calls the latter “humor”. I follow Lang’s 
logic but I prefer the term “self-irony” for the second type in these oppositions for 
two reasons. Firstly and most importantly the word “self-irony” brings in the 
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foreground the substantial relationship between the self-reflexive instability of the 
subject and the plurality of meanings. Secondly, self-irony is already in use in such a 
sense to some extend in English and even more frequently in several Eastern 
European languages like Hungarian. By no means do I want to suggest that self-irony 
would be unique to Jewish American literature, however, Eastern European 
terminology might be worth more consideration in case of authors and texts that are 
just as much rooted in Eastern European as in American culture. Besides, Jewish 
American people had to face several challenges of identity during their history in the 
twentieth century and self-irony is by definition an apt device to articulate the 
subject’s doubts and uncertainties arising from the multiplicity of referential systems. 
Therefore I have focused on those texts in Jewish American fiction which address 
various themes of identity crisis and I have analyzed the ways self-irony is present in 
them. I have also investigated the irony and humor in these works as these concepts 
are often closely intertwined.  
I have used humor as a general concept understood as the result of Arthur 
Koestler’s bisocation, including irony and self-irony as well as other phenomena 
with a funny effect. I have also tried to sort out the features distinguishing self-irony 
from irony. In my reading, irony is a finite rhetorical device which offers an 
ostensible, literal meaning in apparent contradiction with the context and an implied, 
second meaning, inviting the audience to get the irony by recognizing the latter. Thus 
the author and the audience are accomplices, who, due to their shared laugh, gain 
superiority over the butt of the irony, which might be a person as well as a set of 
beliefs. In contrast, self-irony evokes multiple contexts involving controversial 
interpretations for the same phenomenon without deciding in favor of either. Self-
irony thus operates “like the duck/rabbit image” (57), an ambiguous picture first 
published in a German humor magazine in 1892, made famous by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein  and also used by Linda Hutcheon in her book Irony’s Edge: The 
Theory and Politics of Irony to illustrate the “oscillating yet simultaneous perception 
of plural and different meanings” (64). 
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While in case of irony, the second, implied meaning clearly dominates over the literal one, 
self-irony leaves the dilemma suspended as neither interpretation is predominant. This 
approach allows the author to point out doubts and questionable elements regarding 
complex situations with due references to parallels and without erasing the uniqueness of 
the individual case by providing the reader with an immediate, again falsely generalizing 
answer. 
Self-irony can be present at any level of a narrative. It may be manifest in the 
authors’ playing with their own identities, as we have seen it with Isaac Bashevis Singer’s 
various pseudonyms or Paul Auster’s metafictional gestures. Most frequently, the source of 
self-irony is the narrator, like in Art Spiegelman’s Maus or Jonathan Safran Foer’s 
Everything Is Illuminated. But these novels as well as Bernard Malamud’s paraphrases of 
biblical parables question the media of expression, too: the genres, symbols, traditional 
interpretations and other literary conventions involved in communication; or they can 
express doubts regarding language in general as in Cynthia Ozick’s “Yiddish, or Envy in 
America”. Self-irony can rely on intertextual references, as in Adrienne Rich’s “Yom 
Kippur, 1984” as well as on an exaggerated rhetoric revealing the hypocrisy of various 
discourses familiar from everyday life and from politics through their parody, as in Joseph 
Heller’s Good As Gold; or it can unfold from a dramatic situation like in case of the 
“zipless fuck” dream realized and immediately rejected in Erica Jong’s The Fear of Flying. 
Many of the protagonists have also proved to be self-ironic from Philip Roth’s “Eli, the 
Fanatic” to Cynthia Ozick’s Rose Meadows. Besides, self-irony might prevail in a text as a 
whole, as in The Yiddish Policemen’s Union by Michael Chabon or it might appear just in 
some of its microstructures, like in Abraham Cahan’s “A Ghetto Wedding” or Chaim 
Potok’s My Name is Asher Lev. In addition, remarkable parallels have been observed 
between self-ironic texts and the ideas of Freudian psychoanalysis destabilizing the subject 
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by self-reflection as well as certain essential doubts in Holocaust fiction and metafiction 
regarding the questionable authenticity of the subject, the distrust in language and in 
conventional categories concerning identity.  
For practical purposes, I have narrowed down the scope of my study to the field of 
twentieth century Jewish American fiction, a corpus outlined by “a self-conscious re-
visioning of a Jewish narrative tradition” (42) in Tresa Grauer’s words. I have examined 
the literary representations of several issues requiring the revision of identity from various 
stages of immigration and assimilation through the Holocaust to the Jewish relationship 
with other minorities. However, the focus of my investigation was not so much the 
thematic aspect of these texts but rather the wide variety of ways in which self-irony, irony 
and humor operates in them. The humor of most narratives analyzed in this paper derives 
from the permanent juxtaposition of disparate contexts as in Cynthia Ozick’s “The Pagan 
Rabbi” or Bernard Malamud’s “The Silver Crown”. Many of the stories are organized 
along dichotomies which are self-ironically questioned and which, as a result, tend to break 
down, like in Philip Roth’s “The Conversion of the Jews” or Bernard Malamud’s “Angel 
Levine”. Another tendency is various ironies played out against each other ultimately 
turning into self-irony as in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s “The Joke” or Cynthia Ozick’s Heir to 
a Glimmering World. In narratives like “The German Refugee” by Bernard Malamud or 
The New York Trilogy by Paul Auster, empathy has proved to be an essential feature of 
self-irony destabilizing the central position of the subject. Finally, the redemptive power of 
self-irony and of humor can be observed in books like Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything 
Is Illuminated or Paul Auster’s The Book of Illusions.   
Numerous works of great relevance have fallen beyond the scope of this study. It 
might be worth mentioning just a few examples for these necessarily omitted but exciting 
themes. The aspect of humor in the biblical story of Isaac has been often discussed as his 
name “Isaac, or Yitzhak [...] in Hebrew means “he will laugh” (Randall 86), in memory of 
the scene when the news of his birth was received by his parents, Abraham and Sarah with 
laughter. However, an additional analysis on the self-irony of the narrative could be even 
more exciting with special regards to the positions of the author, the ironist, the butt of 
irony and the interpreter in case of a biblical narrative and a protagonist who is both the 
venerable forefather of the Jewish people defined by their covenant with God and the 
embodiment of laughter, a gesture frequently considered to undermine any solemn and 
solid, monolithic conceptual system. Another book worth attention could be Lucinde by 
Friedrich Shlegel, one of the most influential theorists of irony. Both the irony and the 
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autobiographic references in this romance have been thoroughly investigated, however, it 
might also be interesting to reconsider the self-irony of this work in the light of the fact 
that the tile heroine is modeled after Schlegel’s future wife, Dorothea, who was born as 
Brendel Mendelssohn, daughter to Moses Mendelssohn, the Jewish philosopher who 
initiated the movement of Haskalah, the Jewish Enlightenment in Germany at the end of 
the eighteenth century. A third line of special interest for me as a Hungarian student of 
self-irony in Jewish American literature would be the exploration of the self-ironic aspects 
of twentieth century Jewish Hungarian writers’ work. A preliminary list of relevant texts 
might include Frigyes Karinthy’s legendary humor manifest in various genres from his 
poem “Struggle for Life” or his travesties of the greatest contemporary authors belonging 
to the literary generation “Nyugat”, which he strongly identified with, to the immense 
corpus of his humorous sketches; Jen  Rejt ’s pulp fiction parodies; some of Antal Szerb’s 
novels, like Utas és Holdvilág (Journey by Moonlight) representing the protagonist’s quest 
for himself as the process of complete destabilization, or his mock gothic novel, A 
Pendragon-legenda (The Pendragon Legend) with its parody of the literary scholar, or 
even certain passages in his grand historical summaries of Hungarian and world literature; 
Emberszag (The Smell of Humans) by Ern  Szép or Sorstalanság (Fateless) by Imre 
Kertész, which are unique among other first-generation survivor testimonies on the 
Holocaust because both books address their tragic theme in a self-ironic way although their 
self-ironies are immensely different as the tone of Szép’s book verges on explicit humor 
whereas Kertész destabilizes its rhetoric by ironically overstraining it; the genre of “one 
minute stories” established by István Örkény as well as his play Pisti a vérzivatarban
(Stevie in Bloodbath), which offers a tragicomical overview of mid-twentieth century 
history in Hungary from the point of view of an Everyman protagonist; and the list would 
undoubtedly be worth extending.        
 Twentieth century Jewish American fiction seemed to be a promising field for a 
first investigation of self-irony due the strong sense of textual tradition and the series of 
identity challenges predominant in the work of Jewish American writers. Yet the concept 
of self-irony, as illustrated by the examples above, might prove to be fruitful in the study of 
other texts as well, especially in our multicultural context at the beginning of the twenty-
first century, when the coexistence of individuals and communities with diverse identities 
is one of the most crucial current issues. Self-irony allows both the author and the reader to 
explore the challenges and ambiguities involved in the simultaneous presence of multiple 
referential systems, preserving the genuine features of each while calling for revisions that 
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can point toward possible resolutions. At the same time, it foregrounds the awareness of 
the temporal validity—or in Richard Rorty’s term, the contingency— of any such 
reconciliation. Thus self-irony both as a rhetorical device and as a “mode of existence” 
(Lang 1) might enhance tolerance without erasing essential differences but helping 
individuals as well as communities to deal with them relying on the redemptive power of 




Aarons, Victoria. “American Jewish Identity in Roth’s Fiction”. The Cambridge 
Companion to Philip Roth. Ed. Timothy Parrish. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007. 9-21. Print. 
---. “American Jewish Fiction”. The Cambridge Companion to American Fiction after 
1945. Ed. John N. Duvall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 129-141. Print. 
Alexander, Jeffrey C. “The Social Construction of Moral Universals”. Remembering the 
Holocaust: A Debate. Ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2009. 3-104. Print. 
Amian, Katrin.Rethinking Postmodernism(s): Charles S. Pierce and the Pragmatist 
Negotiations of Thomas Pynchon, Toni Morrison, and Jonathan Safran Foer. Amsterdam 
& New York: Rodopi B. V., 2008. Print. 
Antal Éva. Túl az irónián. Budapest: Kijárat Kiadó, 2007. Print. 
Aristotle. Poetics. Trans. S. H. Butcher. Pennsylvania State University, 2000. Web. 
http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/aristotl/poetics.pdf. 16 Apr 2014. 
Arnold, Matthew. Culture and Anarchy: An Essay in Political and Social Criticism. 
London, Smith, Elder & Co., 1869. Print.   
Ascari, Maurizio. Literature of the Global Age: A Critical Study of Transcultural 
Narratives.  Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2011. Print. 
Auster, Paul. The New York Trilogy. New York: Faber & Faber, 1987. Print. 
---. “Why Write?”. The Art of Hunger. New York: Penguin, 1997. 381-395. Print. 
---. The Book of Illusions. New York: Henry Holt, 2002. Print. 
---. “Book of the Dead”. Collected Prose. London: Faber & Faber, 2003. 571-579. Print. 
Avery, Evelyn. “Introduction”. “The Magic Worlds of Bernard Malamud”. Ed. Evelyn 
Avery. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001. Print.  
146 
Barack-Fishman, Sylvia. “Homelands of the Heart: Israel and Jewish Identity in American 
Jewish Fiction”. Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1996. 271-292. 
Print. 
Barbe, Katharina. Irony in Context. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company, 1995. Print. 
Barone, Dennis. “Introduction: Paul Auster and the Postmodern American Novel”. Beyond 
the Red Notebook: Essays on Paul Auster. Ed. Dennis Barone. Pennsylvania: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1995. 1-26. Print.  
Baudelaire, Charles. “De l’essence du rire et généralement du comique dans les artes 
plastiques”. Le Portefeuille Jul 1855.. Print. Collections Litteratura. Web. 16 Apr 2014. 
Beauvoir, Simone de. “Introduction”. Trans. H. M Parshley. Feminist Theory Reader: 
Local and Global Perspectives. Ed. Carol R. McCann and Seung-kyung Kim. New York: 
Routledge, 2013. 44-48. Print. Trans. of “Introduction”. Le Deuxième Sexe. Paris: 
Gallimard, 1949.  
Behler, Ernst. Irony and the Discourse of Modernism. Seattle & London: Washington 
University Press, 1984. Print. 
Bellow, Saul. “The Old System”. Mosby’s Memoirs and Other Stories. New York: Fawcett 
Crest, 1969. Print. 
Bergson, Henri. Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of Comic. Trans. C. Brereton & F. 
Rothwell. Rockville, MD: Wildside Press, 2008. Print. Trans. of Le Rire: essai sur la 
signification du comique. 1900. 
Berke, Nancy. Women Poets on the Left: Lola Ridge, Genevieve Taggard, Margaret 
Walker. Northwest, NL: University Press of Florida, 2001. Print.  
Booth, Wayne. A Rhetoric of Irony. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974. 
Print. 
Budick, Emily Miller. “The Holocaust in the Jewish American Literary Imagination”. The 
Cambridge Companion to Jewish American Literature. Eds. Kramer, Michael P. & Wirth-
Nesher Hana. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 212-230. Print. 
147 
Cahan, Abraham. The Rise of David Levinsky. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1917. Print.  
Carver, Raymond. “A Small, Good Thing”. Where I’m Calling From. New York: Random 
House, 1989. 376-405. Print. 
Chabon, Michael. The Yiddish Policemen’s Union. New York: HarperCollins, 2007. Print. 
Cioran, Emil Mihail. “Irony and Self-irony”. The Heights of Despair. Trans. Ilinca 
Zarifopol-Johnston. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992. 91-92. Print. Trans. of Pe 
culmile disper rii. 1934.  
Colebrook, Claire. Irony. London & New York: Routledge, 2004. Print. 
Comte-Sponville, André. A Small Treatise on the Great Virtues. Trans. Catharine 
Temerson. New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company LLC, 2001. Print. 
Trans of Petits traité des grandes vertus. 1995. 
Corwin, Lily Neilan. I & I: The Breakdown of Buber in Post-Holocaust Jewish American 
Literature. Charleston, SC: BiblioBazaar, 2011. Print. 
de Man, Paul. “The Rhetoric of Temporality.” Blindness and Insight. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1969. 187-228. Print. 
---. “Autobiography as De-facement”. Modern Language Notes, Comparative Literature
94.5 (1979): 919-930. Print. 
---. Allegories of Understanding. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1979. 
Print. 
---. “The Concept of Irony.” Aesthetic Ideology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996. 163-184. Print. 
Deutscher, Isaac. “Who is a Jew?”. The Non-Jewish Jew and Other Essays. London: 
Merlin Press, 1981. 42-60. Print. 
---. “Marc Chagall and the Jewish Imagination”. The Non-Jewish Jew and Other Essays. 
London: Merlin Press, 1981. 153-162. Print. 
148 
Dubnow, Simon. “The Sociological Veiws of Jewish History”. Modern Jewish Thought: A 
Source Reader. Ed. Nahum N. Glatzer.  New York: Shocken Books, 1977. 90-100. Print. 
Durrant, Sam. Postcolonial Narrative and the Work of Mourning. Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2004. 
Elias, Amy J. “Postmodern Metafiction”. The Cambridge Companion to American Fiction 
after 1945. Ed. John N. Duvall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 15-29. 
Print. 
Evans, C. Stephen. Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self: Collected Essays. Waco, TX: 
Baylor University Press, 2006. Print. 
Fiedler, Leslie. “Isaac Bashevis Singer; or The American-ness of the American-Jewish 
Writer”. Fiedler on the Roof: Essays on Literature and Jewish Identity. Boston: David R. 
Godin, 1991. Print. 
Foer, Jonathan Safran. Everything Is Illuminated. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
2002. Print. 
---. “Questions for Jonathan Safran Foer”. Interview by Marion Ettlinger. The New York 
Times. 2004. http://www.nytimes.com/ref/books/foer-answers.html?8bu. Web. 16 Apr 
2014. 
Forster, Edward Morgan. “The Story of a Great Panic”. The Celestial Omnibus. London: 
Sidgwick and Jackson Ltd., 1912. Print 
Friedman, Lawrence S. Understanding Cynthia Ozick. Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina, 1991. Print. 
Freud, Sigmund. Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. Trans. James Strachey. 
New York & London: Norton, 1960. Print. Trans. of Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum 
Unbewussten. 1905. 
Friedman, Melvin J. “Jewish Mothers and Sons: The Expense of Chutzpah”. 
Contemporary American-Jewish Literature: Critical Essays. Ed. Irving Malin. 
Bloomington – London: Indiana University Press, 1973. 156-174. Print.
149 
Gelfant, Blanche H. The Columbia Companion to the Twentieth-Century American Short 
Story. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Print.
Grauer, Tresa L. “’The Changing Same’: Narratives of Contemporary Jewish American 
Identity”. Mapping Jewish Identities. Ed. Laurence. J. Silberstein. New York & London: 
New York University Press. 2000. 37-64. Print.  
Grebstein, Sheldon Norman. “Bernard Malamud and the Jewish Movement”. 
Contemporary American-Jewish Literature: Critical Essays. Ed. Irving Malin. 
Bloomington – London: Indiana University Press, 1973. 175-212. Print.
Guttmann, Allen. The Jewish Writer in America: Assimilation and the Crisis of Identity. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. Print. 
Heller, Joseph. Good As Gold. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976. Print. 
---. God Knows. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984. Print. 
Herman, Simon N. Jewish Identity. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989. Print. 
Hertzberg, Arthur. “A Generation Later”. Being Jewish in America: The Modern 
Experience. New York: Herzl Press, 1979. 59-68. Print. 
Hever, Hannah. “Mapping Literary Spaces: Territory and Violence in Israeli Literature”. 
Mapping Jewish Identities. Ed. Laurence. J. Silberstein. New York & London: New York 
University Press. 2000. 201-219. Print. 
Hungerford, Amy. The Holocaust of Texts: Genocide, Literature and Personification. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. Print. 
Hutcheon, Linda. A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction. New York: 
Routledge, 1988. Print. 
---. Irony’s Edge: The Theory of Politics and Irony. New York: Routledge, 1994. Print. 
---. A Politics of Postmodernism. New York: Routledge, 2002. Print. 
Huyssen, Andreas. “Of Mice and Mimesis”. Ed. Barbie Zelizer. Visual Culture and the 
Holocaust. 28-42. Print. 
150 
Jong, Erica. Fear of Flying. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1973. Print. 
---. Fear of Fifty: A Midlife Memoir. New York: Penguin, 2006. Print. 
Kertész Imre. Fateless. Trans. Christopher C. Wilson & Katharina M. Wilson. Evanston, 
IL: Hydra Books, Northwestern University Press, 1992. Print. Trans. of Sorstalanság. 
Budapest: Szépirodalmi Kiadó, 1975.  
---. A szám zött nyelv. Budapest: Magvet , 2001. Print. 
Kierkegaard, Søren. On the Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates. Trans. 
H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Print. Trans. of 
Om Begrebet Ironi med stadigt Hensyn til Socrates. 1841. 
King James’s Bible. http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/. Web. 16 Apr 2014. 
Knox, Norman. The Word Irony and Its Context, 1500 – 1755. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1961. Print. 
Koestler, Arthur. The Act of Creation. London: Hutchinson, 1964. Print.king 
Kolá , Stanislav, et al. Reflections of Trauma in Selected Works of Postwar American and 
British Literature. Košice: Pavol Jozef Šafarik University, 2010. Print. 
Lang, Candace D. Irony / Humor. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1988. 
Print. 
Levinas, Emmanuel. “Jewish Thought Today”. Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism. 
Trans. Seán Hand. London: The Athlone Press, 1990. 159-166. Print. Trans. of Difficile 
Liberté: Essais sur le judaïsme. Paris, 1963 & 1976. 
Little, G. William. The Waste Fix: Seizures of the Sacred from Upton Sinclair to the 
Sopranos (Literary Criticism and Cultural Theory). New York: Routledge, 2012. Print. 
Malamud, Bernard. The Complete Stories. New York: The Noonday Press, 1997. Print. 
Malkin, Elliot. How to Lose Your Religion in 5 Easy Steps. http://dziga.com/how-to-lose-
your-religion-in-5-easy-steps/. Sep 2013. Web. 16 Apr 2014.  
151 
Mandel, Dena. “Keeping Up With Faith: Grace Paley’s Sturdy American Jewess”. Studies 
in American Jewish Literature: Jewish Women Writers and Women in Jewish Literature. 
Ed. Daniel Walden. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1983. 85-98. Print. 
McDonald. Paul. Laughing at the Darkness: Postmodernism and Optimism in American 
Humour. Penrith, CA: Humanities-Ebooks, 2010. E-book. 
Muecke, Douglas Colin. The Compass of Irony. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1969. Print. 
---. Irony and the Ironic. London & New York: Methuen, 1970. Print. 
Muller, H. Gilbert. New Strangers in Paradise: The Immigrant Experience and 
Contemporary American Fiction. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999. 
Print. 
Murphy, Julien S. “The Look in Sartre and Rich”. The Thinking Muse: Feminism and 
Modern French Philosophy. Ed. Jeffner Allen & Iris Marion Young. Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1989. 101-112. Print. 
Olsen, Tillie. Silences. New York: Feminist Press, 1978. Print. 
---. “Tell Me a Riddle”. Trans. Rosette C. Lamont. Flanzbaum, Hilene, et. al., eds. Jewish 
American Literature: A Norton Anthology. New York: Norton & Company, 2001. 689-
715. Print. 
Orbán, Katalin. Ethical Diversions: The Post-Holocaust Narratives of Pynchon, Abish, 
DeLillo, and Spiegelman. New York: Routledge, 2005. Print. 
Ozick, Cynthia. “Usurpation (Other People’s Stories)”. Bloodshed and 3 Novellas. New 
York: Signet, 1977. 129-178. Print. 
---. The Pagan Rabbi. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1983. Print.   
---. “Toward a New Yiddish”. Art & Ardor: Essays. New York: E. P. Dutton Inc., 1984. 
151-177. Print. 
---. “The Art of Fiction, No. 95”. The Paris Review.  Interview by Tom Teicholz. 
http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/2693/the-art-of-fiction-no-95-cynthia-ozick. 
Spring 1987 No. 102. Web. 16 Apr 2014. 
152 
---. Heir to the Glimmering World. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2004. Print. 
---. Interview by Robert Birnbaum. The Morning News. 14 Dec. 2004. 
http://www.themorningnews.org/article/birnbaum-v.-cynthia-ozick. Web. 16 Apr 2014. 
Paley, Grace. The Collected Stories. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994. Print. 
Papp Richárd. Miért kell Kohn bácsinak négy h t szekrény?: Él  humor egy budapesti 
zsidó közösségben. Budapest: Nyitott Könyvm hely, 2009. Print. 
Plath, Sylvia. “Lady Lazarus”. Ariel. London: Faber & Faber, 1965. 16-19. Print. 
Potok, Chaim. My Name is Asher Lev. New York: Knopf, 1972. Print. 
Price, Kenneth M. To Walt Whitman, America. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2006. Print. 
Prot, Katarzyna. “Research on the Consequences of the Holocaust”. Archives of Psychiatry 
and Psychotherapy. Kraków, Poland: 2010/2. 61-69. Print. 
Randall, Margaret. “First Laugh”. First Laugh: Essays 2000-2009. Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska, 2011. 79-90. Print. 
Redressing the Balance: American Women’s Literary Humor from Colonial Times to the 
1980s. Ed. Nancy Walker & Zita Dresner. Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 
1988. Print. 
Reizbaum, Marylin. “Surviving on Cat and Maus: Art Spiegelman’s Holocaust Tale”. 
Mapping Jewish Identities. Ed. Laurence. J. Silberstein. New York & London: New York 
University Press. 2000. 122-144. Print. 
Rich, Adrienne. Adrienne Rich’s Poetry and Prose: A Norton Critical Edition. Ed. Barbara 
Charlesworth Gelpi & Albert Gelpi. New York: Norton, 1993. Print. 
Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
Print. 
Rose, Jacqueline. “Daddy”. Bloom’s Modern Critical Views: Sylvia Plath. Ed. Harold 
Bloom. New York: Infobase Publishing, 2007. 21-58. 
153 
Roth, Henry. Call It Sleep. New York: Robert O. Ballou, 1934. Print. 
Roth, Philip. Goodbye, Columbus. 1st ed. 1959. Boston: Houghton & Mifflin, 1989. Print.
---. Operation Shylock. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993. Print. 
---. “Introduction: Rereading Saul Bellow”. Herzog. By Saul Bellow. 1959. New York: 
Penguin, 2003. ix-xxvi. Print. 
---. “It No Longer Feels a Great Injustice That I have to Die”. The Guardian.  
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2005/dec/14/fiction.philiproth. 14 Dec. 2005. Web. 16 
Apr 2014. 
Sartre, Jean Paul. “Why Write?”. “What Is Literature” and Other Essays. Trans. Bernard 
Frechtman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988. 48-69. Print. Trans.of 
“Pourquoi écrire?”. Qu’est-ce que la littérature?. Paris: Gallimard, 1948. 
Schiff, Ellen. From Stereotype to Metaphor: The Jew in Contemporary Drama. Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1982. Print. 
Seed, David ed. A Companion to Twentieth-century United States Fiction. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2010. Print. 
Shapiro, Karl. Poems of a Jew. New York: Random House, 1958. Print. 
Shapiro, Susan S. “On Thinking Identity Otherwise”. Mapping Jewish Identities. Ed. 
Laurence J. Silberstein. New York & London: New York University Press, 2000. 299-323. 
Print.   
Sicher, Efraim. The Holocaust Novel. New York: Routledge, 2005. Print.  
Sielke, Sabine. Reading Rape: The Rhetoric of Sexual Violence in American Literature and 
Culture, 1790-1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002. Print. 
Singer, Isaac Bashevis. The Collected Stories. New York: The Noonday Press, 1996. Print. 
---. Nobel lecture 8 December 1978. 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1978/singer-lecture.html. Web. 
16 Apr 2014. 
154 
Sorapure, Madeleine. “The Detective and the Author: City of Glass”. Beyond the Red 
Notebook: Essays on Paul Auster. Ed. Dennis Barone. Pennsylvania: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1995. 71-87. Print. 
Spiegelman, Art. Maus I-II. New York: Random House, 1991. Print. 
---. MetaMaus: A Look Inside a Modern Classic: Maus. New York: Random House, 2011. 
Print + DVD. 
---. “Meet the Author: Art Spiegelman”. Interview by Nick Higham. bbc.co.uk. 8 Dec. 
2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-16102795. Web. 16 Apr 2014. 
Stein, Gertrude. “Melanchta”. Three Lives. New York: The Grafton Press, 1909. Print 
---. The Making of Americans. 1st ed. 1925. Normal, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1995. Print. 
Stone, Dan. The Holocaust, Fascism and Memory: Essays in the History of Ideas. New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013. Print. 
Szegedy-Maszák Mihály. “A kívülálló és az érintett: a megértés iróniája”. Az elbeszélés 
módozatai. Ed. Józan Ildikó et al. Budapest: Osiris, 2003. 396-405. Print. 
Unterman, Alan. Jews: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices. Boston, London & Hendley: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. Print. 
Venuti, Lawrence. “Translation, Community, Utopia”. The Tranlation Studies Reader. Ed. 
Lawrence Venuti. London & New York: Routledge, 2004. 568-488. Print. 
Wade, Stephen. Jewish American Literature Since 1945: An Introduction. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1999. Print. 
Wallant, Edward Lewis. The Pawnbroker. San Diego: Harcourt, 1961. Print.  
Waugh, Patricia. Metafiction. London: Routledge, 1984. Print. 
Whitfield, Stephen J. American Jewish Culture. Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, 
1999. Print. 
155 
Wiesel, Eli. “Why I Write”. Trans. Rosette C. Lamont. Flanzbaum, Hilene, et. al., eds. 
Jewish American Literature: A Norton Anthology. New York: Norton & Company, 2001. 
907-911. Print. 
---. “The Heirs”. A Jew Today. Trans. Marion Wiesel. New York: Random House, 1978. 
40-42. Print. 
---. “Nobel Acceptance Speech”. Oslo, 10 Dec 1986. http://www.pbs.org/eliewiesel/nobel/. 
Web. 16 Apr 2014. 
Wieseltier, Leon. “Language, Identity and the Scandal of the American Jewry.” 
Conference organized by the Samuel Bronfman Foundation, Park City, UT, 30 Jun. 2008. 
Lecture. 
http://www.myjewishlearning.com/culture/2/Languages/Hebrew/History_and_Centrality/h
ebrewscandal.shtml. Web. 16 Apr 2014. 
Wirth-Nesher, Hana. “Traces of the past: multilingual Jewish American writing”. The 
Cambridge Companion to Jewish American Literature. Eds. Kramer, Michael P. & Wirth-
Nesher Hana. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 110-128. Print. 
Wisse, Ruth. The Modern Jewish Canon. New York: The Free Press, 2000. Print. 
Yang, Philip Q. Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches. New York: State University of 






Alulírott Szlukovényi Katalin ezennel kijelentem és aláírásommal meger sítem, hogy 
az ELTE Bölcsészettudományi Kar Irodalomtudományi Doktori Iskola Modern Angol és 
Amerikai Irodalom doktori oktatási programján írt jelen disszertációm saját szellemi 
termékem, amely hivatalos szövegkiadásban még nem jelent meg sem nyomtatott, sem 
elektronikus formában.  
A mások munkájaként megjelent kiadványból vagy betekintésre átadott kéziratból, 
internetes forrásból, személyes adatközlésb l stb. származó szövegrészeket idéz jel és pontos 
hivatkozások nélkül nem építettem be a disszertációmba.  
Budapest, 2014. április 16.  
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